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Abstract 
 
Many studies have explored the phenomena of Islamic parties in Indonesia, the largest 
predominantly Muslim country in the world. However, little effort has been made to 
explore the organizational structures of Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. The 
existing studies have also paid little attention to the role of Islamic parties at the regional 
level in the implementation of the decentralized system in terms of the relationship 
between the central and regional governments.  
This study is an attempt to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the way the 
Islamic parties at the regional level in post-Suharto Indonesia organize. In doing so, the 
organization of the Islamic parties is examined in three different dimensions, i.e., the party 
organization on the ground (political linkage between the Islamic parties and their 
members or supporters), the party organization in central office (leadership of the Islamic 
parties), and the party organization in public office (the role of the Islamic parties in 
policy-making).  
As the units of analysis, this study selects six major Islamic parties, i.e., the 
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), National Awakening Party 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or 
PBR), United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), Justice and 
Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) and Star and Crescent Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang or PBB). Despite the fact that these parties experienced a significant 
decrease at the national level, most of them succeeded in maintaining or increasing their 
level of political support at the regional level.  
Meanwhile, this study focuses on the Tasikmalaya district as the locus of study 
because it has become one of the regional bases for these parties to maintain or increase 
their political achievement. The district also has a long historical root in the Islamic state 
movement in Indonesia. As a result, Muslims in the district have a strong Islamic 
sentiment. 
This study proposes two major findings. Firstly, the way the Islamic political actors 
organize the Islamic parties in Tasikmalaya district suggests that these parties contain some 
elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party, and cartel party 
models. In other words, the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia have hybrid features. 
Therefore, the organizational features of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia are 
not completely exceptional or unique compared to the organizational features of party 
politics in other developing countries. Moreover, the organizational development of the 
contemporary Islamic parties in Indonesia takes different trajectories. In the case of the 
PAN and PPP, these parties are in a transitional stage from the mass-based party model to 
the electoralist party model. The organizational development of the PKS suggests that this 
party is experiencing a maturation process of the mass-based party model, while the 
organizational development of the PKB, PBR and PBB shows that these parties are 
experiencing a stagnation process in the stage of the elite-based party. 
Secondly, the case of the Tasikmalaya district also indicates that the Islamic 
political actors in Indonesia rely on rational calculations rather than ideological 
considerations when they manage their Islamic parties. In this sense, the PBB, PKS, PPP 
and PBR as the Indonesian Islamist parties have experienced a moderation process. The 
way these parties organize has not led to the Islamisation of the state, but it has led to the 
long term Islamisation of society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Democratization in Indonesia 
Efforts to establish a democratic system in Indonesia can be traced back to the period of 
parliamentary democracy in 1949-1957. Feith argues that the period of parliamentary 
democracy contained several democratic elements. The most important element is the 
fact that civilian politicians enjoyed civil liberties in order to participate in the political 
process. Through party politics, they also played a pivotal role in making policies. In 
this period, all political actors, including the opposition parties, respected the existing 
democratic constitution. They also maintained their commitments to democratic 
principles. As a consequence, civil liberties were rarely infringed and political coercion 
was scarcely used.
1
  
 The most significant achievement in the period of parliamentary democracy was 
the implementation of two democratic elections in 1955.
2
 The first election was 
implemented on September 29, 1955 in order to recruit members of the People‟s 
Representative Council (DPR or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). The second election was 
carried out on December 15, 1955 to select members of the Constitutional Assembly 
(Konstituante) whose special assignment was to draft a new constitution. As a result of 
the September 29 election, four political parties gained a significant number of votes 
and seats, namely the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia or 
PNI), the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Party (Partai Majelis Syuro 
Muslimin Indonesia or Partai Masyumi), the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia or PKI) and the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars Party (Partai 
Nahdlatul Ulama or Partai NU). 
In addition, these parties represented social cleavages in Indonesia in the 1950s, 
namely santri, abangan and priyayi.
3
 According to Geertz, the santri denotes a group in 
society who implemented Islamic tenets. Meanwhile, the abangan refers to those in 
society who practiced the animistic aspects of the over-all Javanese syncretism. On the 
other hand, the priyayi is the traditional bureaucratic elites who emphasized the 
                                                          
1
 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1962), p. XI.  
2
 For a more detailed discussion on the 1955 election, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 
(Cornell University: Southeast Asia Program, 1971). 
3
 Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (Yale University: Southeast Asian Studies, 
1963), p. 30. 
2 
 
Hinduism aspects.
4
 Further, the abangan and priyayi were mostly affiliated with the 
secular-nationalist parties, especially the PNI and PKI, while the santri strongly 
supported Islamic parties, more specifically the Masyumi Party and NU Party. 
After less than a decade, the period of parliamentary democracy came to an end 
in 1959 when Sukarno introduced the so-called “guided democracy”. In this period, the 
national political stage was dominated by a triangular relationship involving Sukarno, 
the Army and PKI. In this mutual relationship, Sukarno acted as a counterweight in the 
strong rivalry between the Army and PKI. More specifically, he relied on the PKI to 
gain his political supports among the civilians as the party had become one of the major 
parties. At the same time, Sukarno also depended on the Army to balance the political 
force of the PKI. For the PKI and the Army, the role of Sukarno was very important in 
guarantying their role in political process.
5
 
Following an economic crisis, the emergence of regional rebellions
6
 and the 
September 1965 coup
7
, Sukarno‟s Guided Democracy was replaced by Suharto‟s New 
Order in 1966. In the beginning of its power, the New Order government introduced 
liberalization policies, such as freeing most political detainees and guaranteeing the 
freedom of the press. However, after 1970 the New Order government enforced various 
policies which reflected that it intended to adopt an authoritarian political regime.
8
 For 
instance, the New Order government restructured the party system in 1973 by grouping 
                                                          
4
 See, Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes. Social Development and Economic Change in Two 
Indonesian Towns (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 14.  
5
 Furthermore, see Herbert Feith, “President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle 
Changes Shape.” Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 8, 1964, pp. 969-980. 
6
 Furthermore on regional rebellions in Indonesia in the 1950s, see Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Half A 
Rebellion (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1977); Ichlasul Amal, Regional and 
Central Government in Indonesian Politics: West Sumatera and South Sulawesi 1949-1979 (Yogyakarta: 
Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992); Kees van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul 
Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican 
Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985); 
Audrey Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and Indonesian Polity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
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ten parties together in the 1971 election into three parties, namely the United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) for Islamic parties, the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) for secular-
nationalist parties and the Functional Group (Golongan Karya or Golkar) which served 
as a political machine for the New Order government. Another example is that the Ne 
Order government introduced the sole ideology through which these parties had to 
adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation.
9
 With regard to the relationship between 
the central and regional governments, the New Order government implemented a 
centralized system so that the role of the central government was very dominant in local 
politics. 
Relying on economic development and applying a security approach in which 
the role of the Army was very dominant, the New Order government was able to 
maintain its power in this way for more than three decades. However, the New Order 
government began to lose its political legitimacy when the Asian financial crisis hit 
Indonesia in 1997. This situation was exacerbated by various political crises, such as the 
threat of national disintegration and student demonstrations demanding the elimination 
of corruption, collusion and nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme or KKN) and the 
ethnic riots in major cities, including in Jakarta. Under all of these conditions, Suharto 
finally announced his resignation on May 21, 1998 and appointed the Vice President 
B.J. Habibie as his successor.
10
 
Under strong pressures for change, B.J. Habibie proposed various liberalization 
policies, such as freeing political detainees and guaranteeing the freedom of the press. 
He also removed the sole ideology policy and encouraged the establishment of new 
parties before the implementation of the 1999 election. Concerning the relationship 
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between the central and regional government, he also proposed the implementation of a 
decentralized system. These policies, therefore, marked an era of the transition to 
democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia.  
In addition, Hadiz argues that the political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia 
has several features which distinguish it from the political features in the New Order 
period, i.e., the decentralization of power from the presidency to political parties and to 
parliament, the rise of political parties with predatory interests, the decentralization of 
power from Jakarta to the regions, the emergence of patronage networks at the national 
as well at the regional levels, the rise of political fixers, entrepreneurs, enforces and the 
emergence of hooligans and thugs who were organized in party militia and paramilitary 
forces.
11
  
More than a decade after the Suharto‟s resignation, some scholars have defined 
the democratization process in Indonesia as a “liberal democracy”.12 However, other 
studies have also come to the conclusion that the democratization process in post-
Suharto Indonesia was still far from ideal. For instance, Diamond argues that the 
characteristic of the regime in post-Suharto Indonesia is still ambiguous as there is a 
blurring of boundaries between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism.
13
 
Similarly, Case points out that the democratization process in post-Suharto Indonesia 
reflects a process of “transition to fuller democracy” as there is a slow process of 
replacement of the old regime.
14
 Meanwhile, Croissant argues that a “defective 
democracy” takes place in post-Suharto Indonesia because of the Army‟s hegemony in 
the political process and the existence of radical Islamic groups as well as the 
consolidation of corruptions.
15
 Moreover, Törnquist describes Indonesia‟s new 
democracy as a “bad guys‟ democracy” since there is a growing number of local bosses, 
thugs and corruptors who have challenged the democratization process.
16
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More recently, Hadiwinata and Schuck argue that the democratization process in 
post-Suharto Indonesia can be categorized as an “illiberal democracy” as the legal 
system is weak, there is systematic corruption in politics and the public administration 
and the state is not yet able to protect the population from violence. It also can be called 
a “gridlocked democracy” referring to the weakness of the president although he has 
been elected directly by the people. Further, it can be categorized as a “domain-
democracy” because the Army, entrepreneurs or multinational corporations take certain 
political domains out of the hands of democratically elected representatives.
17
 
From the brief explanation above, we can see that the political system in 
Indonesia has been dominated by a long period of authoritarian regimes. The first effort 
to establish a democratic political system during the period of parliamentary democracy 
in 1949-1957 was terminated by Sukarno‟s Guided Democracy in 1959-1966. In turn, 
the transition period after the fall of Sukarno had produced the New Order‟s 
authoritarian regime in 1966-1998. The fall of Suharto in 1998, therefore, marked a new 
era of the democratization process in Indonesia.  
 
2. Decentralization and Local Politics 
As mentioned earlier, the new political system in post-Suharto Indonesia has some 
salient features. For the purpose of this study, two important dimensions deserve 
particular attention. The first interesting phenomenon in democratizing Indonesia is the 
implementation of the decentralized system in terms of the relationship between the 
central and regional government.  
During the New Order period, the central government played a dominant role in 
local politics. The domination of the central government was institutionalized into Law 
No. 5/1974 on Principles of Regional Government Administration. Based on this 
provision, the central government divided the regional administration system into three 
levels, i.e., province, district or municipality and sub-district or sub-municipality. The 
central government also established two parallel structures, namely administrative area 
and autonomous region. The former refers to the top-down implementation of central 
government‟s policies in regional government, while the latter denotes to the bottom-up 
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political representation of regional interest. In this sense, province, district or 
municipality and sub-district or sub-municipality served as the administrative area and 
autonomous region at the same time.
 18
  
In practice, the central government emphasized more on the implementation of 
the administrative area than the implementation of the autonomous region. For example, 
the central government strongly controlled the executive branch of regional 
government, i.e., governor, district head (bupati) and mayor. It should also be 
acknowledged that many governors, district heads and mayors came from active as well 
as retired military personnel. Another example is that, the executive branch of regional 
government played a dominant role in making policies at the local level. As a result, the 
legislative branch of regional government was not able to implement oversight, 
budgeting and policy-making functions. In this sense, it served just as a rubber stamp 
for all of the decisions made by the central government through the executive branch of 
regional government.
19
  
After the Suharto‟s resignation, these conditions have drastically shifted. 
Initially, the Habibie administration introduced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional 
Governance and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional 
Governments in 1999. However, it was not until 2001 under the Abdurrahman Wahid 
administration that the government began to implement a decentralized system. 
Afterwards, these provisions were revised by Law No. 32/2004 on Regional 
Governance and Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional 
Governments in 2004 during the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration.
20
  
Based on the new provisions, as shown in Figure 1.1, the regional government 
has recently been divided into three levels, namely province, district and municipality. 
More specifically, the provincial government is divided into either districts (kabupaten) 
in a rural area or municipalities (kota) in an urban area. In turn, districts and 
municipalities are divided into sub-districts and sub-municipalities (kecamatan). 
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Finally, each of sub-districts and sub-municipalities are divided into villages which can 
be either desa in the district area or kelurahan in the municipal area.
21
 
Figure 1.1 
The Relationship between the Central and Regional Governments  
In Post-Suharto Indonesia
22
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The new provisions also mention that the provincial government has a dual 
status as an administrative area and as autonomous region. As the administrative area, it 
serves as a representative of the central government in a given region. In this sense, the 
provincial government implements some authorities of the central government. On the 
other hand, as the autonomous region, the provincial government has some authorities 
in managing its own regional affairs, such as mediating disputes amid districts or 
municipalities, disputes between districts and municipalities, facilitating cross-district 
and cross-municipal developments as well as carrying authorities that are not or not yet 
implemented by districts and municipalities.  
Different to the provincial government, the district and municipal governments 
serve as the autonomous region.
23
 Therefore, they have authorities in managing their 
own regional affairs covering various sectors, i.e., public works, health, education and 
                                                          
21
 In addition, up to January 2009, there were thirty-three provinces, three hundred and ninety-nine 
districts and ninety-eight municipalities. The number continues increasing since there are many demands 
to establish new regional governments, either the provincial, district, or municipal governments. 
22
 Derived from Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government. 
23
 There are at least two arguments of the district-focused decentralization. Firstly, it would promote 
democratization through which local communities can participate in public policy-making. Secondly, it is 
the best way to ensure that the decentralized system does not encourage separatism and national 
disintegration. Furthermore, see Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, “Introduction: Decentralization, 
Democratization and the Rise of the Local,” in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), Local Power and 
Politics in Indonesia. Decentralization and Democratization, pp. 1-11. 
Central Government 
Province  
District
s 
Municipality  
Sub-District Sub-Municipalitiy 
Village
   District  
Village
   District  
    Instruction 
    Coordination 
8 
 
culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land 
affairs, cooperatives and manpower sectors. In addition, the relationship between the 
provincial government and the district or municipal governments is based on the 
coordinative relationship.  
In practice, since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, the 
district and municipal governments have been able to make their own policies, 
including local budget policy. Not surprisingly, regional legislature has also played a 
significant role in making policies. Following the direct presidential election in 2004, 
the regional government has also implemented the direct governor, district head and 
mayor election (known as pemilihan kepala daerah langsung or pilkadasung). Along 
with the implementation of the democratization process, there is also a growing 
participation among local population in policy-making. In this sense, the 
implementation of the decentralized system since 2001 has facilitated the emergence of 
local politics as a new arena for political contestations. 
The most prominent example of the emergence of local politics is the 
implementation of sharia (Islamic law) in some regions outside of Aceh.
24
 For instance, 
the Tasikmalaya district proposed some elements of sharia in its policy of development 
planning. Another example is the Bulukumba district which enforced some elements of 
sharia in public policies, including restrictions (hudud) and harsh Islamic criminal law 
(qishash), such as whip punishments for sexual acts outside of marriage, alcoholic 
drinking and cruel treatments.  
In addition, sharia-based policies at the regional level have been proposed by 
the executive branch of regional government in various policies, such as governor‟s 
decree (surat keputusan gubernur), district head‟s decree (surat keputusan bupati), 
district head‟s circulation (surat edaran bupati), or mayor‟s instruction (instruksi 
walikota). They have also been proposed by the legislative branch of regional 
government in the form of regional policy (peraturan daerah or perda). Moreover, 
Salim explains that sharia-based policies at the regional level can be categorized into 
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three types, i.e., regulations on public order and social problems, such as prostitution, 
gambling and alcohol consumption, regulations on religious skills and obligations, 
including reading the Quran and paying tithe (zakat) and regulations on religious 
symbolisms, such as the obligation to wear Muslim clothes.
25
 
It is also important to mention that the implementation of the decentralized 
system has significantly failed to increase social welfare of local population. Various 
factors have contributed to this situation, such as the implementation of the 
decentralized system which has not been followed by a fundamental change inside the 
local bureaucratic structure. As pointed out by Antlöv, „the bureaucracy remains 
dominated by people trained under the Suharto‟s authoritarian regime and many people 
who lived comfortably under the New Order are still in power”.26 Another factor is the 
emergence of a new feudalism as well as a patronage system in local politics
27
 and 
money politics in the direct governor, district head and mayor elections.
28
 There are also 
a growing number of corruptions at the regional level.
29
 In this sense, local elites have 
hijacked the implementation of the decentralized system in order to propose their own 
personal interests.
30
 
 
3. The Rise of Islamic Parties 
Another prominent feature of the new political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia is 
the rise of the Islamic parties.
31
 As mentioned earlier, the New Order government had 
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domesticated the Islamic parties by introducing the fusion policy in 1973 through which 
these parties were merged into a single party, namely the PPP. As a consequence of the 
fusion policy, the PPP experienced various internal conflicts as the party consisted of 
different Islamic parties with alternate interpretations of Islam as well as with differing 
platforms. The New Order government also enforced the PPP to adopt Pancasila as its 
ideological foundation. Moreover, the mass depoliticizing policy had an impact on 
political disengagement between the PPP and its members or supporters. It is not 
surprising if during the New Order period, the PPP in particular and political Islam in 
general, had been “constitutionally, physically, electorally, bureaucratically and 
symbolically defeated by the state”.32 
 Thanks to liberalization policies introduced by the Habibie administration, this 
situation has massively shifted. Nowadays, some Islamic parties adopt Islam as their 
ideological foundation. Some of Islamic parties also propose the establishment of an 
Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in Indonesia. Other Islamic parties, 
however, select Pancasila as their ideological base and introduce more secular 
platforms. The major Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia are the National 
Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or PBR), 
PPP, Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) and Star and 
Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB).  
The PAN was founded on August 23, 1998 by former political activists 
opposing the New Order government.
33
 Introducing pluralism and inclusive principles, 
this party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. In the beginning of its creation, this 
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party tended more towards being a secular-nationalist party. After the implementation 
of the 1999 election, however, some Islamic elements have been more dominant inside 
this party.
34
 In addition, the most prominent figure in this party is Amien Rais, once the 
chairperson of the Muhammadiyah and the head of the People‟s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR). This party relies on Muhammadiyah‟s 
members in Yogyakarta, Central Java and West Sumatera as its loyal supporters.
35
 In 
addition, this party experienced a continuous decline in the number of votes and seats in 
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections.  
Meanwhile, the PKB was established on July 23, 1998 by five leaders of the 
NU, namely Munasir Ali, Ilyas Ruchyat, A. Mustofa Bisri, A. Muhith Muzadi and 
Abdurrahman Wahid.
36
 Officially, this party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. As 
its loyal supporters, this party relies heavily on NU‟s members coming from poor and 
lower-class people in rural areas of Central and East Java.
37
 In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 
elections, this party also experienced a continuous decrease in the number of votes and 
seats. It is also important to mention that since its establishment, this party has 
experienced internal conflicts, i.e., the conflicts between the Abdurahman Wahid group 
and the Matori Abdul Jalil group in 2001-2002, between the Abdurahman Wahid group 
and the Alwi Shihab group in 2005 and again between the Abdurahman Wahid group 
and the Muhaimin Iskandar group in 2007. 
Created by a charismatic leader, Zainuddin M.Z., the PBR was founded on 
January 20, 2002. This party officially adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. It 
should be acknowledged that the creation of this party had to do with internal conflicts 
within the PPP when some prominent elites of the PPP, including Zainuddin M.Z. 
believed that the PPP had a strong relationship with the New Order government. They 
also believed that they had been marginalized from the PPP. Afterwards, they declared 
their resignation from the PPP and created the United Development Party-Reformation 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-Reformasi or PPP-Reformation). Shortly before the 
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implementation of the 2004 election, the PPP-Reformation changed its name to the 
PBR. In addition, although it succeeded in gaining votes and seats in the 2004 election, 
the PBR was not able to maintain its political performance in the 2009 election when it 
failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold. 
Another Islamic party as previously mentioned is the PPP which was founded on 
January 5, 1973 through the party fusion policy introduced by the New Order 
government.
38
 After the NU announced its resignation as a political party in 1984 
(known as kembali ke khittah 1926 or Return to the Guidelines of 1929), the recent PPP 
consists of three parties, namely, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia or Parmusi), the Indonesian Islamic United Party (Partai Syarikat Islam 
Indonesia or PSII) and the Islamic Education Movement Party (Partai Pergerakan 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah or Perti). During the New Order period, this party was forced to 
adopt Pancasila as its ideology and was also banned for using the ka’bah as the party 
symbol. Since 1998, however, this party has adopted Islam as its ideological foundation 
and has utilized the ka’bah as the party symbol. This party gains its votes mainly from 
poor and lower class people coming from NU‟s members outside Java as well as former 
members of the Parmusi, PSII and Perti.
39
 In addition, the PPP also experienced a 
continuous decrease in the number of votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 
elections. 
Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the PKS succeeded in increasing 
its level of political support gradually in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Established 
on April 20, 2002, this party in fact was reinvented from the Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan or PK) as the PK failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold in 
the 1999 election. Initially, this party was developed from the Islamic students‟ 
networks in some major universities in Indonesia.
40
 Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood organization, this party declared Islam as its ideological foundation. Some 
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Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. 
The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party,” PhD dissertation, Australian National 
University, 2006, pp. 107-31; Ahmad-Norma Permata, “Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006,” PhD dissertation, Münster University, 2008, pp. 
103-20; Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto, pp. 83-90. 
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of the prominent figures in this party are Suripto, Hidayat Nur Wahid and Tifatul 
Sembiring.  
The PBB was founded on July 17, 1998.
41
 Imposing the establishment of an 
Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in Indonesia, this party adopts Islam as 
its ideological base. It should be acknowledged that this party claims itself to be the 
only successor of the Masyumi Party.
42
 For its supporters, this party relies on former 
members of the Masyumi Party and members of PERSIS (Persatuan Islam or Islamic 
Union) in rural areas of West Java, Sumatera and Kalimantan.
43
 The central figure in 
this party is Yusril Ihza Mahendra, once serving as the Minister of Justice in the 
Megawati Sukarnoputri administration. Despite the fact that it was able to increase the 
number of its votes in the 2004 election, this party experienced a significant decrease in 
the 2009 election when it was not able to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral 
threshold.  
Table 1.1  
Performance of the Islamic Parties  
In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections at the National Level 
Islamic 
Parties 
Votes 1999 
(%) 
Seats 1999  
 (%) 
Votes 2004  
(%) 
Seats 2004  
 (%) 
Votes 2009  
 (%) 
Seats 2009  
 (%) 
PAN 7.1 6.8 6.4 9.5 6.01 7.68 
PKB 12.6 10.2 10.6 9.5 4.94 4.82 
PBR - - 2.8 2.4 1.21 0 
PPP 19.7 11.6 8.2 10.5 5.32 6.6 
PK/PKS 1.3 1.4 7.3 8.2 7.88 10.18 
PBB 1.8 2.6 2.6 2 1.79 0 
Total 37.7 32.6 38.7 42 27.15 29.28 
Source: The General Elections Commission (1999-2009). 
 
In general, the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia can be distinguished 
into two groups. The first group is the so called “Islam-inclusive,”44 “secular oriented 
Muslims,”45 “substantive sharia group,”46 “Muslim-nationalist parties,”47 and “pluralist 
                                                          
41
 Furthermore on the initial establishment of the PBB, see, for instance, Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam 
Politik Pasca-Suharto, pp. 61-67. 
42
 On the relationship between the Masyumi Party and the PBB, see Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in 
Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 
pp. 40-46.  
43
 Kevin Raymond Evans, The History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia; Dwight Y. 
King, Half-Hearted Reform. Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 105-
20. 
44
 Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory.” 
45
 Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice 
Party,” p. 192. 
46
 Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 93-96. 
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Islamic parties”.48 Parties in this group adopt Pancasila as their ideological base. 
Moreover, their interpretation of Islam is based on the context and substance of Islam. 
In this sense, they believe in pluralism and non-sectarianism principles. Despite the fact 
that they employ Islamic tenets and symbols to attract their supporters, they reject the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in Indonesia. The 
PAN and PKB can be categorized in this group. 
On the other side, there is the so called “formal sharia group,”49 “Islamist,”50 or 
“formalist Islamic parties”.51 Parties in this group adopt Islam, more specifically, the 
Quran and Sunna of the Prophet as their ideological foundation. Different to the first 
group, their interpretation of Islamic tenets is based on formalistic interpretations 
(textual). In this sense, they argue that the modern situation has to adjust to Islam. Not 
surprisingly, they view democracy just as a tool or tactic that may be useful to 
implement sharia and to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Included in this group 
are the PBR, PPP, PKS and PBB.  
Table 1.2  
Features of the Islamic Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia 
 
Features The Muslim-Nationalist Parties The Islamist Parties 
Ideology Pancasila Islam 
Interpretation of Islam Substantive approach Formalistic approach 
Characteristic Pluralism Sectarianism  
Political attitude From liberal to moderate From moderate to radical  
Party affiliation PAN and PKB PBR, PPP, PKS and PBB 
   Source: compilation by the Author. 
In addition, the polarization of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia 
reflects different Muslim‟s attitudes in understanding democracy in general. Nasr argues 
that attitudes of Muslims toward democracy can be distinguished into two categories, 
namely the Islamist and Muslim democrats.
52
 Moreover, the polarization of the Islamic 
parties in post-Suharto Indonesia also reflects a diverse political attitude of Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
47
 Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” in Frédéric Volpi and Francesco Cavatorta (eds.), Democratization in the Muslim World. 
Changing Patterns of Power and Authority (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 46-53. 
48
 Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” in Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. 
Brown (eds.), Religious Organizations and Democratization. Case Studies from Contemporary Asia 
(London: Armonk, 2006), pp. 221-41.  
49
 Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia, pp.93-96. 
50
 Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia”; Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous 
Justice Party,” p. 193. 
51
 Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia.” 
52
 Furthermore, see Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(2005), pp. 13-27. 
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parties in the Islamic world, ranging from the most moderate to the most militant 
Islamic parties in dealing with major issues, such as the nature of the state, the position 
of woman, human rights and the implementation of sharia.
53
 
Since 1999 the Islamic parties have played a significant role in the political 
process both at the national as well as regional levels. Some observers even argue that 
local politics has become a new political arena for the Islamists to establish an Islamic 
state and to implement sharia. For instance, Abuza argues that the proponents of sharia 
attempt to implement a strategy to create “Islands of Islam” in Indonesia by 
implementing sharia in regional governments.
54
 They attempt to do so after they failed 
to insert the elements of sharia in the national constitution.
55
 Similarly, Salim points out 
that the proponents of sharia are likely to employ a “bottom up strategy” by forcing the 
implementation of sharia in some regions after they failed to apply a “top down 
strategy” by inserting elements of sharia during a constitutional amendment in 2002.56 
 
4. Exploring Islamic Parties at the Local Level 
Many studies have explored the phenomena of the Islamic parties in Indonesia. Some of 
them have attempted to examine the role of these parties during the period of 
parliamentary democracy. Boland, for instance, focuses on the political rivalry between 
the Masyumi Party and NU Party, including its consequences on the political system.
57
 
Similarly, Noer explores the role of the Masyumi Party in political process in the period 
of parliamentary democracy, including the role of the party leaders, such as Mohammad 
Natsir.
58
 Meanwhile, Karim examines the role of various Islamic parties in the period of 
parliamentary democracy.
59
 On the other hand, Federspiel explains the relationship 
between the Masyumi and NU Party and the army in the period of Guided Democracy 
                                                          
53
 On the general features of Islamic parties in large parts of the Islamic world, see M.A. Mohamed Salih 
and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “Introduction,” pp. 23-25. 
54
 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 31-34. 
55
 Furthermore, see Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia; Bernhard 
Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy, pp. 178-205. 
56
 Arskal Salim, “Sharia in Indonesia‟s Current Transition: An Update,” in Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi 
Azra (eds.), Sharia and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2003), pp 213-32. Furthermore on the demand for the accommodation of sharia in the constitusional 
amendments in 2002, see Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia, pp. 201-14. 
57
 B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (Den Haag: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971). 
58
 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Analisis Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 
1945-1965 (Jakarta: Mizan, 2000).  
59
 M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut (Jakarta: 
Rajawali, 1993). 
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in 1957-1965.
60
 Likewise, Samson discusses the role of these parties in political process 
from the period of Sukarno‟s Guided Democracy to the early years of the New Order 
Government in the late 1960s.
61
  
Some studies have also explored the role of the Islamic party during the New 
Order period. For instance, Syamsuddin focuses on the internal dynamics of the PPP as 
well as some contributing factors to the internal conflicts of this party.
62
 Meanwhile, 
Turmudi examines the relationship between Islamic teachers, Muslims voters and the 
achievement of the PPP during the New Order‟s elections in the Jombang district, East 
Java province.
63
 
Some studies have also tried to explain the development and performance of the 
Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. For instance, Amir focuses on the internal 
dynamics of these parties in their initial stage of the establishment after the fall of 
Suharto, including their efforts in gaining political support in the 1999 election.
64
 
Meanwhile, Barton examines the performance of these parties in the 1999 and 2004 
elections.
65
 On the other hand, Baswedan compares the Islamic parties in the 1950s and 
in the 2000s and comes to the conclusion that the contemporary Islamic parties are more 
diverse and more pragmatic.
66
 Likewise, focusing on the performance of the PPP, PBB 
and PK/PKS in 1998-2003, Platzdasch argues that these parties “pursued different 
forms of political pragmatism”.67 It is also important to underline that the contemporary 
studies on parties in democratizing Indonesia focus mainly on the Islamist parties, 
especially the PKS.
68
 
This condition indicates that little effort has been made to explore organizational 
structures of major Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. Moreover, the existing 
studies have also paid little attention to the role of the Islamic parties at the local level in 
                                                          
60
 Howard M. Federspiel, “The Military and Islam in Sukarno‟s Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 
3, 1973, pp. 407-20. 
61
 Allan A. Samson, “Islam in Indonesian Politics,” Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12, 1968, pp. 1001-17.   
62
 Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991). 
63
 Endang Turmudi, “Religion and Politics: A Study on Political Attitudes of Devout Muslims and the 
Role of the Kiai in Contemporary Java,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1995, 
pp. 18-41. 
64
 Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Suharto.  
65
 Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia.”  
66
 Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia. Present and Future Trajectory.” 
67
 Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia. Politics in the Emerging Democracy, p. 327. 
68
 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia; Yon Machmudi, “Islamizing Indonesia. The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous 
Justice Party”; Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” pp. 221-41; Ahmad-Norma 
Permata, “Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 
1998-2006”; Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp 179-212. 
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the implementation of the decentralized system. In order to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Islamic parties in post-Suharto Indonesia, therefore, this 
study presents an in-depth and empirical analysis of the organizational features of the 
Islamic parties at the local level in post-Suharto Indonesia.  
The main question in this study is “How Islamic Parties Organize at the Local 
Level in Post-Suharto Indonesia?” To be more specific, this study attempts to answer 
these challenging questions: How do Islamic political parties organize at the district 
level in post-Suharto Indonesia? How do they create and maintain the political linkage 
with their members or supporters? How do elites of these parties organize their parties 
at the district level? What kinds of role do these parties play in making policies at the 
district level? Why do these parties organize the way they do at the district level? What 
are implications for democratization and decentralization in post-Suharto Indonesia? 
To answer these research questions, this study is divided in eight chapters. 
Chapter 1 explains the background and significance of the study. Chapter 2 discusses 
the analytical framework as well as the theoretical framework of this study. Since 
analyses of this study are based on empirical data, Chapter 3 explains method of the 
study. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 describes research area and units of analysis. Further, 
Chapter 5-7 are dedicated to examining the organizational features of the Islamic parties 
in three different organizational dimensions, i.e., the party organization on the ground, 
the party organization in central office and the party organization in public office. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the findings of this study, including their implications to 
party research as well as to the democratization and decentralization processes in post-
Suharto Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter aims to discuss the analytical framework employed in this study. In doing
so, this chapter is divided into four major parts. The first part discusses the analytical
perspective of this study, namely rational choice institutionalism. The second part
elaborates various theories on party organization as well as party models based on
organizational development of parties in established democracies. In order to minimize
“Eurocentric” perspectives, the following part deals with theoretical reviews of party
organization and party models in developing countries. Based on these theoretical
reviews, the last part explains the analytical framework applied in the study.
1. Rational Choice Institutionalism
In exploring organizational structures of Islamic parties at the regional level in post-
Suharto Indonesia, this study follows the rational choice institutionalism way of
thinking for three main reasons. Firstly, as Peters argues, “this approach tends to
provide a lucid analytic connection between individuals and their institutions through
the capacity of institutions to shape the preferences of individuals and to manipulate the
incentives available to members of the organizations”.1 Secondly, the rational choice
institutionalism attempts “to defuse the unconstructive stand-off between structuralists
and behaviouralists” so that it focuses not only on agency or interests, but it is also
concerned with structure and institutions.2 Thirdly, in a pragmatic vein, by following
key assumptions of the rational choice institutionalism approach, this study aims to
explore the rational dimensions of Islamic political actors who have typically been
assumed as ideological or irrational.3
1 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’ (London: Pinter,
1999), p. 67.
2 Furthermore, see Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and
Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan Press, 2002), pp. 90-108.
3 Similar to other theoretical approaches, however, rational choice institutionalism contains some
theoretical and analytic problems. Peters explains four limitations of rational choice institutionalism.
Firstly, “the difficulty in falsifying the predictions coming from this body of theory”. Secondly, “there is
little direct confrontation of theory and evidence”. Thirdly, “there is sometimes little relationship between
the institutions described in theory and the institutions with which the members of those structures are
familiar”. Fourthly, “the models are largely incapable of generating the type of predictions of policy
outcomes that would be required if these models are to be more than interesting representations of the
complex realities that they are meant to describe”. See, B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political
Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’ pp. 67-68. Meanwhile, Shepsle points out that the application of
rational choice institutionalism in social research tends to make “abstraction, simplification, analytical
rigor, and an insistence on clean lines of analysis from basic axioms to analytical propositions to
19
To understand the key assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, we need
to understand basic assumptions of rational choice theory. Based on neoclassical
economic theory, rational choice theory employs a set of assumptions. According to
Coleman, there are at least three major assumptions of rational choice theory. Rational
choice theory assumes that social interaction is basically guided by the actor’s rational
choice among alternative outcomes. It also argues that in order to decide a definite
choice, an individual applies a calculation of its costs and benefits. Moreover, it
assumes that actions of an individual are purposive and intentional.4 In short, as argued
by Hindmoor, “Rational choice theorists recognize that structures determine the range
of choices open to individuals, but, ultimately, they account for outcomes in terms of
the choices individuals make. They emphasize agency over structure”.5
Hindmoor also explains that rational choice theory applies the axiomatic
approach. In this sense, “A person is rational if they are instrumentally rational, they are
instrumentally rational if they have a preference-ordering which is reflective, complete,
transitive and continuous, and if they have such a preference-ordering their rationality
will manifest itself in utility maximization”.6 Similarly, Zey points out that in the
rational choice way of thinking, “an actor will choose an action rationally, based on a
hierarchy of preference (values, utilities), that promises to maximize benefits and
minimize costs”.7
In addition, the rational choice way of thinking has been used to define the
concept of a political party. For instance, in his An Economic Theory of Democracy,
Downs defined a political party as “a team of men seeking to control the government
apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election”.8 Another example is Epstein
who defined a political party as “any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect
governmental office-holders under a given label”.9 Similarly, Schlesinger argued that as
a matter of fact a political party is “a team that seeks to control by winning elective
empirical implications”. See, Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in R.A.W. Rhodes,
Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 32.
4 James S. Coleman, Foundation of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1990), pp. 13-19 and
27-44.
5 Andrew Hindmoor, Rational Choice (New York; Palgrave, 2006), p. 1.
6 Ibid, p. 184.
7 Mary Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique (Thousand Oaks: Sage,
1998), pp. 2.
8 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 25.
9 Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Books, 2000), p. 9.
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office”.10 When analyzing parties in the United States, Aldrich also defined parties in a
similar sense i.e., as coalitions of elites seeking to capture and utilize political office.11
In the rational choice perspective, therefore, a political party is viewed as a political
organization which pursues two main goals, namely to maximize votes (a vote-seeking
party) and to secure their position in government (an office-seeking party).12
Regarding institutionalism, scholars have distinguished two approaches of
institutionalism, namely traditional institutionalism and new institutionalism. Lowndes
argues that the traditional institutionalism approach focuses its analytical process on the
rules, procedures and formal organizations of government.13 Moreover, Peters explains
that traditional institutionalism has several characteristics, i.e., legalism, structuralism,
holism, historical and normative analysis.14 In contrast to rational choice theory,
therefore, the traditional institutionalism approach emphasizes structure over agency.
In contrast, the new institutionalism approach modifies its focus of analysis from
organizations to rules, from a formal to an informal concept of institutions, from a static
to a dynamic conception of institution, from submerged values to a value-critical stance,
from a holistic to a disaggregated concept of institution and from independence to
embeddedness.15 Peters explains that there are four major assumptions of the new
institutionalism approach. Firstly, institution refers to a structural feature of society that
can be either a formal structure (a legal framework) or an informal structure (a set of
shared norms). Secondly, institutions have some degree of stability over time. Thirdly,
institutions affect individual behavior. Fourthly, institutions contribute to a sense of
shared values and meaning among members of the institutions.16 Further, new
institutionalism has various versions, including rational choice institutionalism.
In the rational choice way of thinking, as March and Olsen pointed out,
“Institutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating
10 Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1991), p. 10.
11 John Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 19-20.
12 Further, Strøm and Müller explain that political parties have a small and well-defined set of objectives
which can be distinguished into the office-seeking, vote-seeking, and policy-seeking objectives. In the
modern political era, however, parties rarely have opportunities to realize all of their goals
simultaneously. Therefore, political parties are likely to make trade-offs and compromises among these
different objectives. Furthermore, see Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller, “Political Parties and Hard
Choices,” in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.), Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties
in Western Europe Make Hard Decision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-35.
13 Furthermore, see Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism.”
14 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’, pp. 6-11.
15 Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism.”
16 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,’ pp. 18-19.
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individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are (also) collections of
structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role
in political life”.17 Shepsle explains that the rational choice institutionalism approach
differentiates the relationship between individuals and institutions into three ways, i.e.,
institutions as “exogenous constraints, or as an exogenously given game form,”
institutions as the rules of the game or equilibrium which are provided by the players
themselves and institutions as “macrosociological practices” which are defined and
altered by historical contingency.18 Similarly, Peters points out that rational choice
institutionalism explains the relationship between individual and institutions into three
versions, i.e., institutions as rules to prescribe, proscribe and permit individual
behaviors, institutions as decision rules to achieve collective welfare and institutions as
an instrument to fulfill individual goals.19
According to Shepsle, the development of rational choice institutionalism was
heavily influenced by the first version, i.e., the institutions as constraints or the
institutions as rules.20 In this version, institutions are viewed as “aggregations of rules
that shape individual behavior, but individuals react rationally to those incentives and
constraints established by those rules”.21 Similarly, Immergut explains that institutions
structure individual actions so that they choose suboptimal equilibria.22 Different to
rational choice theory, therefore, rational choice institutionalism assumes that
institutions still play a pivotal role in determining actions of political actors. In this
sense, instead of acting as purely rational actors, political actors experience bounded
rationality23 or narrow rationality.24
Unlike traditional institutionalism, on the other hand, the rational choice
institutionalism approach argues that there is a room for political actors to act rationally
so that their actions are in fact not completely dictated by institutions. Landa argues that
the rationality of political actors is influenced by a combination of social justification of
17 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Elaborating “New Institutionalism”, in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A.
Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, p. 4.
18 Furthermore, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism.”
19 Furthermore, see B. Guy Peters, “Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,”
pp. 52-55.
20 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism.”
21 B. Guy Peters, “Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,” p. 50.
22 Furthermore, see Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics &
Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998), pp. 5-34.
23 Furthermore, see Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
24 Furthermore, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
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rational behavior and of individual-level application of norms to a particular situation of
choice.25 Likewise, Rose and Mackie point out that it is true that political actors must
react to external changes in the larger political environment. However, they must also
deal with their internal concerns.26 Within institutions, therefore, there is room for
political actors to make political maneuvers in order to pursue their own interests. As
argued by Perkins, “Political actors are not simply pawns, acting out strategies dictated
by larger structures, but are actors with their own goals and aspirations. Structures
remain important, but alone they can only provide probabilistic models which are of
little help when wishing to understand the mechanisms between structures and
outcomes”.27
In the rational choice institutionalism perspective, therefore, the role of structure
is as important as agency in determining the socio-political actions. In Peters’ words:
The fundamental argument of the rational choice (institutionalism) approach is that
utility maximization can and will remain the primary motivation of individuals, but
those individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved most effectively
through institutional action, and find that their behaviour is shaped by the
institutions.28
Further, Hall and Taylor explain that “the relevant actors have a fixed set of
preferences” and they “behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment
if these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive
calculation.29 In this sense, rational choice institutionalism argues that “political
institutions are systems of rules and inducements within which individuals attempt to
maximize their utilities”.30
Following the rational choice institutionalism way of thinking, this study
provides five major assumptions. Firstly, Islamic political actors have certain interests,
i.e., to win elections. Secondly, these actors organize Islamic parties in order to
maximize their chances of winning elections. Thirdly, in organizing their parties, they
have a set of strategies. Fourthly, among the existing strategies, these Islamic political
25 Dimitri Landa, “Rational Choices as Social Norms,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4
(2006), pp. 434-53.
26 Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie, “Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-Off Facing
Organization,” in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail. Emerging Alternative
Organizations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 533-58.
27 Doug Perkins, “Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party
Formation,” Party Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), p. 356.
28 B. Guy Peters, “Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism,” p. 48.
29 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,”
Political Studies, Vol. XLIV (1996), p. 944-45.
30 Vivien Lowndes, “Institutionalism,” p. 96.
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actors select the most preferred strategy. Fifthly, in selecting the most preferred
strategy, they take into account incentives and constraints provided by formal as well as
informal institutions or structures. In other words, this study rests on the assumption that
by calculating incentives as well as constraints provided by the existing socio-political
structures, Islamic political actors apply a certain strategy when they organize their
parties in order to maximize their chances of winning elections.
2. Party Organization and Party Models
Needless to say, the political party is the most interesting subject of analysis in modern
political science. Moreover, it is a study that has challenged many scholars for a long
time. As Montero and Gunther point out, “indeed, parties were among the first subjects
of analysis at the very birth of modern political science”.31 Research on parties reached
its golden age in the mid twentieth century in which many seminal works had been
produced.32 Using different approaches, studies on parties have focused on various
subjects.33 One of the most complicated topics is party organization. As Panebianco
points out, analysis of party organization is one of the oldest research dimensions of
parties and it is one of the most frustrating parts in the studies of parties as well.34 In
addition, the study of party organization had been started by Ostrogorski (1902) and the
efforts in turn had been continued by Michels (1911), Weber (1922), Duverger (1951)
and Kirchheimer (1966).
There has been widespread agreement that the role of parties is very important in
a democratic system. Mair argues that, “In modern democracies… politics is about
party politics”.35 As a consequence, as pointed out by Rossiter, “no democracy without
31 José Ramón Montero and Richard Gunther, “Introduction: Reviewing and Reassessing Parties,” in
Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New
Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 2.
32 According to Scarrow, the discourse on parties has a long history in Western European countries and
the United States. It can be traced back to the intellectual debates about parties among political scientists
and practitioners in Britain, the United States, and Germany in the eighteenth century. Susan E. Scarrow,
“Coming to Terms with Parties in the Nineteenth Century,” in Susan E. Scarrow (ed.) Perspective in
Political Parties. Classic Readings (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-26.
33 Puhle argues that the party literature focuses on six dimensions, namely the electoral dimension,
interest of the party constituency, party organization, party system, policy formulation, and policy
implementation. Furthermore, see Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “Still the Age of Catch-allism? Volksparteien and
Parteienstaat on Crisis and Re-equilibration,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz
(eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, pp. 61-62.
34 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), p. 3.
35 Peter Mair, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), p. 125.
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politics and no politics without parties”.36 Although many studies indicate that parties
have become less relevant to their members or supporters37 and the rise of the anti-party
movement38 so that various alternative political organizations have emerged and have
replaced the role of parties in the political process,39 parties still play a significant role
in the modern political age. This is due to the fact that they are able to continue their
special functions and to maintain the critical level of organization needed to fulfill those
functions. They also have a capability to adapt to changing rules, attitudes and
circumstances.40
Theoretically speaking, parties are assumed both by their members and by other
organizations as a political agency aiming to establish the political linkage between
voters or citizens and policy-makers or governments.41 More specifically, as explained
by Klingemann, parties select the demands of society which have been articulated
mostly by interest groups and the mass media. Afterwards, they turn these demands into
political issues by defining out policy alternatives. In turn, they attempt to transform
their policy alternatives into government policies.42 In this sense, parties serve as a
36 Clinton Rossiter as cited in John Kenneth White, “What Is A Political Party,” in Richards S. Katz and
William Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006), p. 7.
37 The phenomenon of declining party membership size takes place not only in established democracies,
but also in new democracies. Furthermore on parties declining in European countries, for example, see
Hermann Schmitt and Sören Holmberg, “Political Parties in Decline?” in Hans Dieter Klingemann and
Dieter Fuchs (eds.), Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-133; Russel J.
Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Partisan Change and the Democratic Process,” in Russel J. Dalton and
Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial
Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 261-85; Russel J. Dalton and Steven A.
Weldon, “Public Images of Political Parties. A Necessary Evil?” West European Politics, 28:5 (2005), pp.
931-51. Meawnhile, on parties declining in new democracies, see, for instance, Juan J. Linz, “Parties in
Contemporary Democracies: Problem and Paradox,” Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J.
Linz (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, pp. 291-317.
38 For the rise of the anti-party movement in European countries, for instance, see Mariano Torcal,
Richard Gunther and José Ramón Montero, “Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe,” in Richard
Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New
Challenges, pp. 257-90; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” in Richard S.
Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in
Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 1-22.
39 For various alternative political organizations outside parties, see Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl,
“Alternative Organizations: Environmental, Supplementary, Communitarian, and Antiauthoritarian,” in
Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail. Emerging Alternative Organizations, pp. 3-
12; Thomas Poguntke, “Political Parties and Other Organizations,” in Richards S. Katz and William
Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, pp. 396-405.
40 Nathan Yanai, “Why Do Political Parties Survive? An Analytical Discussion,” Party Politics, Vol. 5.
No. 1 (1999), pp. 5-17.
41 Kay Lawson, “Political Parties and Linkage,” in Kay Lawson (ed.), Political Parties and Linkage. A
Comparative Perspective (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 3.
42 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge, Parties, Policies, and Democracy
(Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 7-9.
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political representation through which they make voices, opinions and the interests of
society present in political process.43
In the context of new democracies, Diamond, Linz and Lipset underline that
parties play a pivotal role in connecting political leadership and voters, or political elite
and civil society, or the rulers and the ruled.44 Moreover, Randall and Svåsand argue
that the role of parties in the transition to democracy is paramount to recruit and to train
political leaders, to organize responsible opposition to government, to contribute to
conflict resolution and to institutionalize democratic behavior and attitudes among
people.45
The functions of parties have to do with party organization. Theoretically
speaking, a well-organized party will be able to implement these ideal functions, and
vice versa. In other words, by understanding party organization, one can analyze the
ability of parties to implement their ideal functions. Moreover, by exploring party
organization, one can understand the real condition inside parties when they deal with
various constraints and incentives surrounding them. In Taggart’s words:
Understanding how a party organizes itself allows us a glimpse into a party’s true
nature. It permits us to look beyond the persona deliberately cultivated and projected
to the voters at election time. It also enables us to look beyond the activists’ exalted
claims of ideological commitment and purity to see how deep those claims run when
faced the ideology-sullying problems of political survival. The organization of the
party is where the rhetoric meets the reality. It is nexus between beliefs and action.46
In the party organization literature, there are a number of classical works with
different focus of analyses. For instance, Ostrogorski focused on party structure,
processes, critical events and actors when he explored parties in Britain47 and in the
United States.48 Meanwhile, Michels emphasized intra-party democracy in the mass-
based party in Western European countries.49 On the other hand, Duverger explored the
relationship between parties and their members, the basic elements of parties and the
43 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of Press, 1967), pp. 8-
9.
44 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?” in
Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries:
Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 9.
45 Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and
Democratic Consolidation,” Democratization, Vol. 9. No. 3 (2002), pp. 1-10.
46 Paul Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a
Comparative Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 110.
47 M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. I (New York: Haskell
House Publishres, 1970).
48 M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II (New York: Haskell
House Publishres, 1970).
49 Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern
Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-56.
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ability of parties in articulating interests of their members.50 In addition, Sartori focused
on the phenomenon of fraction, faction and tendency inside parties in the United States,
Italy and Japan.51
These classical literatures have been continued by other scholars in order to
explain contemporary phenomena of party organization. Janda, for instance, proposes
two dimensions of comparative analysis, namely the party’s external relationship (the
relationship between party and society) and the party’s internal organization (intra-party
democracy).52 Meanwhile, Lawson employs four variables when he analyses the
element of party organization, namely motives, means, degree of closure and external
situation.53 Another example is Panebianco who explores comprehensively the
dynamics of the struggle for power within parties (organizational power).54 Focusing on
party organization in the United States, on the other hand, Schlesinger attempts to
categorize party models, namely the business firm, the interest group and the public
bureau.55 More recently, Randall and Svåsand introduce four aspects of party
institutionalization, i.e., systemness (the increasing scope of, density and regularity of
the interactions that constitute the party as a structure), value infusion (the identification
and commitment between party and its supporters), decisional autonomy (the degree of
freedom from interference in determining policies and strategies) and reification (the
party’s existence in the public imagination).56
A more comprehensive analytical framework, however, has been proposed by
Katz and Mair. According to these scholars, party organization can be analyzed by
distinguishing it into three different organizational faces, namely organization of the
party on the ground, organization of the party in central office and organization of the
party in public office. The organization of the party on the ground deals with the
relationship between parties and their members or supporters. The organization of the
party in central office has to do with party leadership. Meanwhile, the organization of
50 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States (London:
Lowe and Brydone Ltd, 1964), pp. 4-60.
51 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis (Colchester: ecpr Press, 2005),
pp. 63-102.
52 Kenneth Janda, “Cross-National Measures of Party Organizations and Organizational Theory,”
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 11 (1983), pp. 319-32.
53 Kay Lawson, “Toward a Theory of How Political Parties Work,” in Kay Lawson (ed.), How Political
Parties Work. Perspective from Within (Westport: Praeger, 1994), pp. 285-303.
54 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, pp. 19-20.
55 Joseph A. Schlesinger, “On the Theory of Party Organization,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2
(1984), pp. 369-400.
56 Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” Party Politics, Vol.
8, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5-29.
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the party in central office relates to the role of the parties in making policies. Further,
they also argue that although these three different organizational dimensions have their
own focuses, they co-exist and inter-relate each other.57
For the purpose of analysis, this study follows the analytical framework of party
organization proposed by Katz and Mair for three reasons. Firstly, compared to the the
other analytical frameworks of party organization, it is likely that Katz and Mair’s
analytical framework is more comprehensive in covering all dimensions of party
organization. Secondly, the similar analytical framework has been widely utilized by
many scholars when they analyze the organizational features of parties in established
democracies.58 Thirdly, a similar analytical framework has also been employed to
analyze phenomena of party organization in new democracies.59
It is also important to note that the concept of party organization is strongly
intertwined with the concept of party models. By exploring party organization,
therefore, one can categorize parties into a certain model. Krouwel argues that party
organization becomes one of the most prominent variables in categorizing party
models.60 Moreover, organizational development of parties in fact reflects sequences in
development of party models. Katz and Mair point out that, “the development of the
parties in Western democracies has been reflective of a dialectical process in which
each of the party models generates a reaction which stimulates further development,
thus leading to yet another type of party, and to another set of reactions and so on”.61
Scholars also employ various approaches in order to develop a comprehensive
party model. Mair and Mudde, for instance, propose four variables to classifying party
models, i.e., origins and sociology (referring to historical and socio-structural factors),
transnational links (referring to the relationship among parties with the same ideology in
different countries), policy and the ideology of parties as well as party name as name or
57 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party
Organization,” The American Review of Politics, Vol. 14 (1993), pp. 593-617. See, also Peter Mair,
“Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22; Peter Mair, Party System Change.
Approaches and Interpretations, pp. 120-54.
58 V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961); Russel J.
Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced
Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), to name a few.
59 See, for instance, Ingrid van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in
Southern and East-Central Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Paul Webb and Stephen
White (eds.), Party Politics in New Democracies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
60 André Krouwel, “Party Models,” in Richards S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party
Politics, p. 249.
61 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), p. 6
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label of a party reflect its own ideological identity. They also argue that a combination
of the historical factor and ideological factor is the best approach to develop party
models since the historical factor can explain the long-term development of parties,
while the ideological factor can explain the real identity of parties (what they are rather
than what they do).62
Based on their goal orientation as well as their relationship with society,
Neumann develops eight party models, i.e., the patronage, principles, personage,
programmatic, individual representation, social integration, total integration and
democratic integration parties.63 Meanwhile, based on the relationship between parties
and their members, Duverger classifies four party models, i.e., the direct, indirect, cadre
and mass parties.64 Focusing on their organizational networks and functions, however,
Sartori introduces five models of party, i.e., the legislative-electoral, quasi-mass or pre-
mass, electoral mass, semi-apparat and apparat mass parties.65
Moreover, based on their formal organizations, their programmatic
commitments, their strategy and behavioral norms, Gunther and Diamond develop five
party models, namely the elite, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist and movement
parties. More specifically, the elite party consists of the local notable and clientelistic
parties. In the mass-based party, there are the denominational and fundamentalist parties
(the religion party), the pluralist-nationalist and ultranationalist parties (the nationalism
party) and the Leninist and class-mass parties (the socialist party). Meanwhile, the
ethnicity-based party in turn can be divided into the ethnic and congress parties. In this
typology, the electoralist party can be distinguished into the personalistic, catch-all and
programmatic parties. Lastly, the movement party consists of the left-libertarian and
postindustrial extreme right parties.66
To consolidate these various party models, Krouwel proposes five party models,
namely the elite party, the mass party, the electoralist catch-all party, the cartel party
and the business-firm party. He argues that these models are based on similarities in
62 Furthermore, see Peter Mair and Cas Mudde, “The Party Family and Its Study,” Annual Review of
Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 211-29.
63 Sigmund Neumann, “Toward A Comparative Study of Political Parties,” in Sigmund Neumann,
Modern Political Parties. Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1956), pp. 400-05.
64 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern States, pp. 5-16
and 62-90.
65 Giovanni Sartori, “Party Types, Organization and Functions,” West European Politics, 28:1(2005), pp.
5-32.
66 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” Party Politics,
Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 167-99.
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focus and crucial features of the party models develop by other scholars in the past. As
he points out:
Not all party models that have been proposed are totally unique. Among the proposed
models there is substantial similarity and overlap, and numerous party types that have
been suggested are merely reformulations of an already existing model.67
In addition, Katz and Mair explain that each of party models may or may not
contribute to democracy depending on various factors, including changes in civil
society and changes in the relationship between parties and the state.68 It is also
important to note that there is no a certain party model that is dominant at any given
time. Especially in the modern era, therefore, it is possible to see the existence of all
party models in a party system. It is even possible for a party to have some elements as
well as represent more than one ideal model.69 Two factors contribute to such
conditions. Once a party has been institutionalized as a particular model, the basic
nature of the party may be frozen so that it becomes resistant to pressure for change.
Also, there is no strong correlation between social context on one side, and the
ideology, platform and strategy of a party on the other side.70
For the purpose of analysis, this study applies the party models summarized by
Krouwel, namely the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel
party. It is important to note that one party model, namely the business-firm party, is
excluded from this study. This is due to the fact that the business-firm party is a recent
phenomenon taking place only in European countries.71 In building the analytical
framework, therefore, each of these party models will be elaborated further into three
different organizational dimensions, namely the organization of the party on the ground,
the organization of the party in central office and the organization of the party in public
office.
As mentioned earlier, the theories of party organization and party models as
discussed above are based on the experiences of the United States and Western
European countries or established democracies. As the development of party
organization and party models is influenced by a particular factor and it also takes place
67 André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 249-69.
68 Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 5-28.
69 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,”p. 172.
70 Hans Daalder, “The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies,” in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther
(eds.), Political Parties and Democracy, p. 174.
71 André Krouwel, “Party Models,” p. 260.
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in particular contexts, however, it is important to review the existing literature on party
organization and party models in developing countries as well.
3. Party Organization in Developing Countries
Generally speaking, the development of party organization in new democracies takes
place in the following conditions. Firstly, it has been regularly interrupted by a long
period of authoritarian regimes.72 Secondly, different to parties in Western democracies
in which they emerged in the context of a competitive oligarchy, parties in developing
countries emerged from hegemonic regimes.73 Thirdly, parties in these countries exist
around extreme poverty and economic dependence associated with late
industrialization,74 a high social fragmentation and heterogeneity and the strength of
traditional religious and ethnic bases of identification.75 Fourthly, the development of
party organization and party models in these countries takes place under international
norms as well as traditional values so that parties in these countries experience the so-
called “indigenization”.76
As a consequence, the development of party organization in these countries does
not simply follow a linear process similar to the development of party organization in
established democracies, ranging from the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the
electoralist party to the latest stage of the cartel party. Therefore, it is possible that the
development of party organization in developing countries takes a different path from
the development of party organization and party models in the United States and
Western European countries. As van Biezen points out, “Because parties in new
democracies appeared in a different historical, social and cultural context, we should not
expect them to be like in the old democracies”.77
72 See, Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World,” in Richard S.
Katz and William Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, pp. 387-95.
73 Ingrid van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-
Central Europe, pp. 24-27.
74 Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” pp. 16-17.
75 Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World.”
76 Mitra and Enskat point out that through the indigenization, “parties acquire local roots when they find a
niche in locally embedded values and networks, and learn to articulate their special interests in idiom of
the modern state and use their proximity to power and patronage in order to promote the interests of their
followers”. Subrata K. Mitra and Mike Enskat, “Introduction,” in Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat, and
Clemens Spieß (eds.), Political Parties in South Asia (Westport, Connecticut, London: Prager, 2004), p.
7.
77 Ingrid van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-
Central Europe, p. 27.
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Randal and Svåsand explain that the establishment of party organization in
developing countries takes various trajectories. Some of them have been terminated at
the stage of the elite-based party. Parties in other developing countries have also
reached the stage of the electoralist party or the cartel party. Further, they explain that
parties in developing countries lack experience with the stage of the mass-based party.
It is not surprising if the development of party organization in these countries has
typically been foreshortened from the elite-based party to the electoralist party or even
the cartel party.78
It should also be acknowledged that the degree of party institutionalization in
developing countries is different. Some studies have come to the conclusion that parties
in developing countries resemble the ideal-type of the elite-based party. Based on the
organizational features of parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America countries, Randall,
for instance, argues that parties in this area tend to be dominated by a single leader. As a
consequence, decision-making process inside these parties is almost fully oriented top
down. Moreover, she explains that these parties put an emphasis on the role of personal
and family networks of charismatic leaders when they create and maintain the political
linkage with their members or supporters. As a result, they are often viewed simply as
ephemeral vehicles for the personal ambition of their charismatic leaders.79
Kitschelt also points out that clientelistic politics is very dominant in Asian and
Latin American countries because of the absence of a redistributive welfare state. As a
result, allocation of patronage becomes the most important factor in the relationship
between parties and their members or supporters. He also argues that voters in
developing countries largely do not elect parties based on their platforms, but they rely
more on material incentives.80 Similarly, in analyzing parties in South Asian countries,
Spieß also reaches the similar conclusion that parties in these countries have excessive
factionalism as they are based on dynastic or family rule. Consequently, party systems
in this area tend to be regionalized and their institutionalization is weak.81
Meanwhile, Erdmann argues that contemporary African parties have the
following features. Firstly, they have barely distinguishable platforms. Secondly, their
78 Vicky Randal and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” pp. 17-18 and 83-
84.
79 Vicky Randall, “Conclusion,” in Vicky Randall (ed.), Political Parties in the Third World (London:
Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 174-91.
80 Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities,” Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6/7 (2000), pp. 845-79.
81 Clemens Spieß, “Epilogue: Rethinking Party Theory in the Light of South Asian Experience,” in
Subrata K. Mitra, Mika Enskat, and Clemens Spieß (eds.), Political Parties in South Asia, pp. 329-42.
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bureaucratic organization is weak. Thirdly, they rely on informal relations through
which clientelism and patronage play a dominant role. Fourthly, strong personalism
dominates formal internal structure of parties. Fifthly, they experience a high degree of
factionalism. Sixth, they lack internal democracy.82 These organizational features
indicate that parties in developing countries adopt the elite-based party model.
Other studies also show that, to a limited extent, parties in developing countries
contain some elements of the mass-based party model. As Randall argues, similar to
parties in Western countries, the concept of social cleavage is also important for parties
in developing countries.83 However, different to the social cleavages in Western
countries which are based on economic divisions, the social cleavages in developing
countries are based more on ethnic divisions as shown by African parties84 and some
parties in Latin America.85 Similarly, parties in Southeast Asian countries are also
associated with certain ethnic groups so that they are ethnically-based organizations
rather than ideologically-based organizations.86 Therefore, polarization among parties in
these countries is rarely based on the left-right ideological spectrum.
Moreover, some studies argue that parties in these countries tend to adopt the
electoralist party model. This argument is based on the fact that these parties are rarely
in a position to offer ideologies so that they prefer to position themselves in the centre
of different ideology. Even if they have ideologies, their ideologies are eclectic and
vague. In general, parties in these countries lack coherent platform.87 Often, their
relationship with other social organizations is very weak or absent. Moreover, even if
parties have a link with social organizations, such as women, youth, student, peasant
groups and trade unions, the role of these social organizations is limited within the
organization of parties. In this sense, their role is important just in a frame of mobilizing
supports in election period.88 In other words, parties in these countries view their
members only in a frame to gain supports rather than as a significant element of internal
82 Gero Erdmann, “Party Research: Western European Bias and the “African Labyrinth,”
Democratization, 11:3 (2004), pp. 63-87.
83 Furthermore, see Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World,” pp.
387-95.
84 Gero Erdmann, “Party Research: Western European Bias and the “African Labyrinth.”
85 Furthermore, see Robert H. Dix, “Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American
Political Parties,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1992), pp. 488-511.
86 See, Aurel Croissant, “Conclusion: Electoral Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Aurel Croissant and Beate
Martin (eds.), Between Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast
Asia (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), pp. 351-64.
87 Vicky Randall, “Political Parties and Social Structure in the Developing World.”
88 Vicky Randall, “Conclusion.”
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organization. Consequently, they have blurred membership figures and members of
parties also lack strong loyalty so that they have a high frequency of party-switching.89
In addition, Perkins argues that the organizational features of parties in new
democracies, more specifically in Eastern European countries are determined by various
structural conditions, i.e., the historical legacy of the party (past strategies constrain
future choices of political actors), the porous bureaucracy, the availability of effective
media to parties, the availability and support of social organizations to parties, the
nature of the past regime, the size of the country, the early success of a ruling party and
the ability of the parties to control local resources. These factors, in turn, have led to the
emergence of the electoralist party in these countries.90
More recently, some studies indicate that parties in developing countries can be
categorized as the cartel party. This is due to the fact that, as pointed out by Randall,
“the boundary between the ruling party and government or bureaucracy in these
countries is also often extremely hazy”.91 Further, van Biezen explains that parties in
these countries are closely linked to the state in three dimensions. Firstly, they are
highly dependent on the state in terms of party finance. This situation takes place due to
the fact that parties in these countries lack capability to derive income from membership
fees. Secondly, to a large extent, they are also managed by the state. Thirdly, they have
various controls over key resources of the state.92
To sum up, the development of party organization and party models in these
countries does not simply follow a linear process to the development of party
organization in Western countries, ranging from the elite-based party, the mass-based
party, the electoralist party to the cartel party. However, it does not necessarily mean
that the organizational features of parties in developing countries are completely
different from the organizational features of parties in Western countries. As explained
above, many studies indicate that some parties in developing countries tend to adopt the
elite-based party model, while other parties resemble the ideal-type of the mass-based
party, the electoralist party, or the cartel party models.
89 Ibid.
90 Doug Perkins, “Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and Media in Party
Formation,” Party Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), pp. 355-75
91 Vicky Randall, “Conclusion,” p. 179.
92 See Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecký, “The State and the Parties. Public Funding, Public Regulation
and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracy,” Party Politics, Vol. 13. No. 2 (2007), pp. 235-54.
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4. The Analytical Framework
4.1. The Ideal-Type of the Elite-Based Party Organization
Historically speaking, the elite-based party surfaced in the nineteenth century in
Northern European countries. The elite-based party emerged in the following contexts.
Firstly, there was highly restricted suffrage through which political participation of the
society was limited to certain groups and persons. Secondly, ascribed status was very
dominant in competition among parties. Thirdly, political activities largely revolved
around the distribution of privileges.93
In the late of the nineteenth century and early the twentieth century, various
versions of the elite-based party arose in Southern European countries, the United States
and some developing countries. According Krowel, the alternative versions of the elite-
based party are the personage party (Neumann), the caucus (Ostrogoski), the
parliamentary origin party (Duverger), the individual representation party (Neumann
and Kirchheimer), the notables party (Neumann), the elite party (Beyme), the modern
cadre party (Koole), the local cadre party (Epstein), the traditional local notable party
(Katz and Mair, Lapalombara and Weiner) and the legislative-electoral party (Sartori).94
In general, organization of these parties has the following features. As pointed
out by Katz and Mair, these parties are “basically committees of those people who
jointly constituted both the state and civil society”.95 Within these parties, organization
of the party on the ground as well as organization of the party in central office plays an
insignificant role, while organization of the party in central office plays a very dominant
role.96 In addition, these parties tend to be the office-seeking party so that their goal is to
occupy as many positions as possible both in the executive branch as well as in the
legislative branch of government.97
93 Furthermore, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” pp. 8-10; Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond,
“Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77; Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of
Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77.
94 Furthermore, see André Krouwel, “Party Models,” pp. 250-52.
95 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” p. 9.
96 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: Three Faces of Party
Organization,” p. 602; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State,” pp. 1-22;
Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational
Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz
(eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, p. 115.
97 Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party
Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz
(eds.), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, pp. 136-65; André Krouwel, “Party Models,”
pp. 249-69.
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The party on the ground. The organizational structure of the party on the
ground in the elite-based party is very weak since the party elites are able to create and
maintain the political linkage with their supporters directly. In doing so, they employ
patronage and clientelism as well as their interpersonal networks with their supporters.98
In such a mechanism, there is a mutual relationship through which the party elites
become the patrons and their supporters act as the clients. As the patrons, the party
elites provide material and non-material facilities for their supporters. In return, as the
clients, supporters provide political support for the party elites.99
To some extent, the organizational structure of the party on the ground serve as
an instrument of the party elites when they attempt to provide material support for their
supporters, such as money, jobs in the government and government contracts. Through
the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the party elites can also provide
non-material support by providing platforms favorable for their supporters.100 In this
context, the organizational structure of the party on the ground in the elite-based party
provides a significant contribution for institutionalization of patronage, clientelistic and
interpersonal network mechanisms between the party elites and their supporters.101
Supporters therefore have a sense of obligation to vote for the party elites in
elections and they also must support the party elites with positions in the government.
By employing patronage, clientelism and interpersonal networks, therefore, the party
elites are able to create and maintain the political linkage with their supporters not just
during election period. In this sense, they are able to create and maintain the political
linkage with their supporters by conducting long-term, on-going, intensive and
reciprocal activities.102
Moreover, as the party elites depend on the exchange of obligations and services
through patronage, clientelistic and interpersonal network mechanisms, they disregard
the role of an ideology when they create and maintain the political linkage with their
98 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties. A New Typology,” pp. 175-77;
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supporters. In this sense, the role of an ideology in the elite-based party is replaced by
the role of charismatic leaders. Moreover, platforms of the elite-based party in fact
reflect the interests of the party elites.103
As patronage, clientelistic, or interpersonal network mechanisms take place in
daily life activities, the party elites pay little attention to the need for election
campaigns. In order to attract voters, therefore, the party elites prefer the application of
a low-risk strategy, such as relying on their own personal charisma104 as well as by
employing their personal contacts105 rather than employing the organizational structure
of the party on the ground. Not surprisingly, the role of the party on the ground is also
weak or absent during election period.106
In the elite-based party, there are no special requirements to become supporters.
The elite-based party allows anyone to become its supporters as long as he or she
provides obligations as the clients for the party elites. In this sense, the elite-based party
prefers to have “supporters” rather than “members”. Consequently, firstly, the elite
based party disregards the existence of a formal membership system. Secondly, there is
no specific level of membership in the elite-based party. Thirdly, the relationship
between the party elites and their supporters is based on a subordinate rather than on an
equality relationship.107
To make sure that the supporters provide their obligations to vote for the party
elites and to support the party elites when they have a position in the government, the
loyalty of the supporters is paramount. For the elite-based party, therefore, quality of the
supporters is more important than quantity of the supporters. As a consequence,
supporters of the elite-based party are small and elitist. However, it does not necessarily
mean that the elite-based party makes no significant efforts to attract supporters. The
elite-based party attempts to get supporters but just on the consideration that its
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supporters are willing to serve as the clients of the party elites.108 In this sense, the elite-
based party focuses on a particular group who has a personal relationship with the party
elites rather than on a wide array of groups in society.109
Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party on
the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the elite-
based party, the organizational structure of the party on the ground is managed by the
same persons who manage the organizational structure of the party in public office. In
general, however, the existence and role of these two organizations is weak. Compared
to the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the elite-based, the
organizational structure of the party on the ground plays a more significant role.110
The party in central office. The domination of the party elites also takes place in
the organizational structure of the party in central office. The party elites serve as party
leaders or they appoint party leader. In recruiting a leader, the party elites adopt a self-
recruitment process which is based on their personal initiatives. Moreover, officials of
the party come mainly from upper-class origin. Such a mechanism is employed by the
party elites in order to make sure that the interest of officials of the party in central
office is in accordance with the interests of the party elites.111 Such a mechanism is also
necessary to make sure that officials of the party in central office act as the clients of the
party elites. Through a self-recruitment process, therefore, the patron-client relationship
is institutionalized within the elite-based party.112
The role of the party elites is also dominant in the decision-making process in
the organization of the party in central office. In this sense, the decision-making process
in the elite-based party is based on a top-down mechanism so that the role of supporters
is excluded. Moreover, the organizational structure of the party in central office in the
elite-based party is minimal and centralized. It also lacks modern management
principles, such as discipline, a division of authority, transparency and accountability.
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Similar to the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the
organizational structure of the party in central office is controlled by the party elites.113
It is also important to note that the personal wealth of the party elites play a
dominant role in party finances. As the elite-based party disregards a formal
membership, consequently, it is not able to generate membership fees. In addition, if the
party elites have a position in the government, the elite-based party also receives a state
subvention. Depending on the financial contributions from the party elites, therefore,
the elite-based party lacks sustainable financial resources.114
Furthermore, as the party elites have their own resources to make direct contact
with their supporters, they tend to disregard the existence of the organizational structure
of the party in central office. If the organizational structure of the party in central office
exists in the elite-based party, however, it consists of relatively close alliances or cliques
and it is characterized by particular factional organization. Moreover, the party elites
also disregard the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office in
creating and maintaining the political relationships between the party elites and their
supporters. Similar to the organizational structure of the party on the ground, therefore,
the organizational structure of the party in central office in the elite-based party lacks
social activities in election period and beyond.115
With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party
in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, in the
elite-based party, the organizational structure of the party in central office is completely
subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office. In this sense,
officials of the party in public office have dominant roles in managing the
organizational structure of the party in central office. Similar to the organizational
structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the organizational structure of the party
in central office serves just as a tool for the party elites to obtain positions in public
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office. It is also important to note that compared to the other organizational faces, the
face of the party in central office is the weakest face in the elite-based party.116
The party in public office. The most prominent face in the elite-based party is
the organizational structure of the party in public office, either in the legislative branch
or in the executive branch of government. Regarding the organizational structure of the
party in the legislative branch of government, legislators of the elite-based party are
seen as the only group who play a dominant role in managing the organizational
structure of the party on the ground as well as the organizational structure of the party in
central office. They also typically make claims that they are leaders of society and
representatives of the interests of society. With regard to the model of representation,
therefore, legislators of the elite-based party act as trustees for their supporters.117
Moreover, legislators of the elite-based party spend less time when they are
involved in making policies. They also tend to make political compromises with other
political actors. In this sense, they conduct debates on policy issues which are diffused
and unfocused. It is also important to mention that they disregard the role of an ideology
as it makes them difficult to establish political compromises with other political actors.
In general, legislators of the elite-based party defend their own interests when they are
involved in making policies.118
To support their roles in making policies, legislators of the elite-based party
employ their personal networks. On the other hand, they disregard the role of the party
on the ground as well as the role of the party in central office. Moreover, they also
disregard the role of social organizations. In this context, legislators of the elite-based
party lack support from internal organization as well as external organization when they
are involved in making policies.119
Since their main goal is to gain and secure their positions in public office,
typically, legislators of the elite-based party have little ambition to establish an
opposition force to the executive branch of government. They also have minimal
ambitions of hegemony when they are involved in making policies. Moreover, they are
tolerant of and collaborative with other political actors so that it is not too difficult for
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them to develop coalitions with other political actors. Therefore, in regard to policy-
making, legislators of the elite-based party prefer either to share their power with other
political actors or to act as a stabilizer within a political system.120
4.2. The Ideal-Type of the Mass-Based Party Organization
The mass-based party appeared for the first time in late nineteenth century in Western
European countries. The mass-based party emerged in the following settings. Firstly,
there was mass suffrage so that the right to vote was not limited. Secondly, the political
system was more democratic marked by the strong competition among parties and an
active role of social movements. Thirdly, the political goals and conflicts largely
revolved around social reformation or opposition to the established system.
Consequently, parties competed on the basis of representative capacity. Historically
speaking, the mass-based party emerged initially among certain elements of society,
particularly working-class and religious groups so that the socialist party or the religious
party has been regarded as the most appropriate manifestation of the mass-based
party.121
The relationship between the formation of the mass-based party and social
structures in Western European countries had been explored by Lipset and Rokkan. By
adopting Talcott Parsons’ classification of the functions of a social system, these
scholars argued that the national revolution as well as the industrial revolution served as
the most important variables in determining the formation of the mass-based party since
they led to social cleavages. In turn, these social cleavages were transformed into parties
through which the proponents of the secular governments established the secular-
nationalist parties, the proponents of the church created the religious parties, the owners
and employers formed the capitals parties, the labor and workers established the
working-class parties. Moreover, these social cleavages were also transformed into a
party system in which there was a rivalry between the secular-nationalist parties and the
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religious parties on one hand, and the capitalist parties versus the working-class parties
on the other hand.122
Some variants of the mass-based party are the mass party (Michels and
Duverger), the class-mass and the denominational mass parties (Kirchheimer), the
external origin party, the branch-based mass party, the cell-based devotee party
(Duverger), the democratic or total integration party, the principle party (Neumann), the
mass-bureaucratic party (Panebianco), the programmatic party (Neumann and
Wolinetz), the pluralist mass-based party, the fundamentalist party, the Leninist-party,
the pluralist nationalist party, the religious fundamentalist party (Gunther and Diamond)
and the organizational mass party (Sartori).123
Overall, however, these parties have the following characteristics. Firstly, they
serve “as a bridge or linkage” connecting society and the state.124 Secondly, within these
parties, there is a strong connection between the organizational structure of the party on
the ground, the organizational structure of the party in central office and the
organizational structure of the party in public office. More specifically, the
organizational structure of the party on the ground delegates its power to the
organizational structure of the party in central office. In turn, the organizational
structure of the party in central office scrutinizes and controls activities of the
organizational structure of the party in public office.125 Thirdly, these parties are defined
as the policy-seeking party as organization of the mass-based party is based on the
purpose of maintaining ideological consistency.126
It is important to note that different to other variants of the mass-based party, the
religious fundamentalist party has different characteristics. In the religious
fundamentalist party, there is little interpretation of the ideology and platforms of the
party since it is based on religious doctrines. Moreover, the relationship within the
122 Furthermore, see S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter
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religious fundamentalist party and its members is characterized by hierarchical,
undemocratic or absolutist relationship. In this context, the religious fundamentalist
party disciplines and emphasizes devotions to its members.127 Additionally, “through
unintended and unfavorable processes,” however, the religious fundamentalist parties
have transformed into secular parties marking the era of secularization and
democratization in Western European countries during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century.128
The party on the ground. In the mass-based party, the role of the party on the
ground is very significant in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the
party and its members. In doing so, the organizational structure of the party on the
ground conducts various activities which, in general, can be distinguished into two
types. The first type is political or ideological activity, such as operating schools,
publishing ideological and policy papers, holding policy discussion, running
communication media and training officials of the party. The second type is social
activity, such as providing food, employment services, basic education and conducting
recreational activities. The organizational structure of the party on the ground carries
out such activities in and beyond election periods.129 Through the organizational
structure of the party on the ground, therefore, the mass-based party creates and
maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting on-going, intensive and
reciprocal activities.130
Moreover, the mass-based party is generated by a certain ideological motivation.
The ideology of the party, in turn, is translated into the comprehensive platforms of the
party. Further, the role of the ideology and platforms of the party is very important not
only in creating, but also in maintaining the political linkage with members of the party.
As the mass-based party has a certain ideological base, consequently, platforms of the
mass-based party are designed for a particular group in society. Bound together by the
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same ideology and platforms, there is a strong collective consciousness between the
party and its members.131
In order to maintain such a collective consciousness, the mass-based party also
has its own channels of communication, such as party’s newspapers, policy papers,
personal contacts or schools. On one hand, these channels of communication allow the
members to articulate their interests. Moreover, they are also important for members of
the party in order to control or supervise leaders and officials of the organization of the
party at all levels. In addition, these channels of communication are very important in
disseminating and maintaining the ideology and platforms of the party to members of
the party.132
Through the organizational structure of the party on the ground, the mass-based
party conducts political and social activities in its daily activities, including in election
period. Election campaigns remain important for the mass-based party in order to
achieve both quantity and quality of members. In election period, the organizational
structure of the party on the ground conducts campaigns by advertising candidates
through mass media, by promoting candidates through direct voter contacts, by holding
public meeting and rallies, by registering voters, or by providing child-care program for
members of the party. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party on the
ground employs labor-intensive activities and internal channels of communication in
mobilizing members of the party in election period.133
The existence of a formal membership system is very important for the mass-
based party. As Duverger points out, “without members, the party would be like a
teacher without pupils”.134 Moreover, a formal membership system within the mass-
based party is based on comprehensive definitions of rights and obligations. In this
sense, all members of the party have equal rights and obligations to leaders and officials
of the party. There is also a certain level of membership in the mass-based party, such
as the electors, supporters and militants. Compared to the other party models, therefore,
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the mass-based party has a more prominent system regarding a formal membership
system.135
The role of the party on the ground is also important in recruiting members of
the party. Typically, the mass-based party employs two kinds of membership
enrollments. First is open recruitment in which there are no particular requirements to
become a member of the party. Second is restricted recruitment in which the party
applies special requirements to a particular level of membership. In the mass-based
party, therefore, the membership recruitment is not only highly selective, but it also
appeals to a particular social, religious, or ethnic group on the basis of social cleavages.
In other words, the mass-based party focuses on a particular group in society.136
With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party
on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, these two
organizational structures in the mass-based party have a strong engagement. The
organizational structure of the party in central office is very important in providing
support for and in guiding the organizational structure of the party on the ground. It is
also very important as a central coordinator for activities of the party on the ground.
Moreover, the organization of the party in central office is also important as the voice or
guardian of the organization of the party on the ground. Also, the organizational
structure of the party on the ground is very important for the organizational structure of
the party in central office to provide resources that are necessary for the existence and
successes of the mass-based party in general.137
The party in central office. In the mass-based party, members of the party play
a significant role in the recruitment process of leaders and officials of the party in
central office. Through party convention, members of the party have authority and
legitimacy to recruit leaders of the party. They also delegate their authority to leaders of
the party in recruiting officials of the party in central office. Further, members of the
party provide mandates to leaders of the party to manage the organizational structure of
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the party in central office. In this sense, the recruitment process of leaders and officials
of the party is based on a bottom-up mechanism. It is also important to note that the
recruitment process is carried out through the inner-party educational systems so that it
is based on highly selective, competitive, intensive indoctrination and acceptance of the
ideology of the party.138
The organizational structure of the party in central office in the mass-based party
is typically realized by a “representative bureaucracy” with clear political-
administrative functions.139 Different to the party organization in central office within
the elite-based party, the party organization in central office within the mass-based party
is managed by more modern management principle. As argued by Sartori, the mass-
based party in fact is “an organizational party” which is characterized by “an extensive
organizational structure.140 In this sense, there are clear structures and division of
authority in the organizational structure of the party in central office in the mass-based
party.141
In conducting the decision-making process, leaders and officials of the party in
central office rely on the role of the ideology and platforms of the party. Since members
of the party become the main actors in the mass-based party, these leaders and officials
also involve the role of members of the party in the decision-making process of the
party in central office. In this sense, the decision-making process in the party in central
office is based on a bottom-up mechanism. It is also important to mention that the party
in central office is managed by amateur politicians so that they manage politics as an art
rather than as a vocation.142 When the numbers of members increase, however, it is
difficult for all of them to be involved in the decision making process. Not surprisingly,
the contemporary mass-based party experiences a phenomenon of oligarchy in which
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just a few representatives of members of the party can participate in the decision-
making process.143
The mass-based party is regarded as a self-financing party since it relies on
membership fees as its primary financial resource. The membership fee is very
important in financing activities of the party in central office. It is also important as an
instrument to maintain political commitment as well as a sense of belonging among
members of the party. The mass-based party also relies on other financial resources,
such as income from investments, publications and various events organized by the
party and donations from private individuals, companies and affiliated social
organizations.144
With these permanent financial resources, the organizational structure of the
party in central office in the mass-based party is able to conduct various activities in
election period and beyond. For daily activities, for instance, the organizational
structure of the party in central office conducts regular meetings in order to guarantee
the implementation of the ideology and platforms of the party and to maintain
commitment of members to the party. It also carries out other activities guaranteeing
participation of members of the party in the wider political process. In addition, the
organizational structure of the party in central office increases the frequency of such
activities in election period.145
The existence and roles of the organizational structure of the party in central
office are very important for the organizational structure of the party in public office.
More specifically, the organizational structure of the party in central office is very
important in monitoring and in supervising officials of the party in public office on
behalf of the organizational structure of the party on the ground. In this sense, the
organizational structure of the party in central office serves as an important agent
through which the organizational structure of the party in public office could be held
accountable by members of the party. Moreover, the organizational structure of the
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party in central office also becomes a mediating agent for the relationship between the
organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of
the party in public office.146
The party in public office. The organizational structure of the party in public
office is very important in the mass-based party in transforming the ideology and
platforms of the party into public policies. In this sense, legislators of the mass-based
party cannot rely on their own interests. Instead, they must act in line with the ideology
and platforms of the party. Moreover, their actions must reflect the interests of members
of the party as well. In terms of the model representation, therefore, legislators of the
mass-based party act as delegates for members of the party.147
In making policies, legislators of the mass-based party typically defend the
ideology and platforms of the party radically so that they spend much time in making
policies. They also carry on debates on policy issues which are intense, protracted,
issue-focused and extensive. Moreover, members of the party are able to participate
actively in the process. With a clear ideological stand and the involvement of members
of the party, legislators of the mass-based party have high political consistency in
transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.148
In carrying out their roles in making policies, legislators of the mass-based party
receive various means of support from affiliated social organizations. The supports are
institutionalized into the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the
organizational structure of the party in central office. In addition, supports for
legislators of the mass-based party are realized by various organizations, such as, by
research units and think tanks. In this sense, legislators of the mass-based party employ
internal organization when they are involved in policy-making.149
Since the mass-based party attempts to transform its ideology and platforms into
public policies, legislators of the mass-based party tend to hold power alone in making
policies so that they have a strong ambition for hegemony. Moreover, with a clear
ideological standing, it is not an easy for legislators of the mass-based party to share
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power and to develop collaborations with other political actors. Therefore, legislators of
the mass-based party are neither tolerant of nor collaborative with other political actors
when they are involved in making policies. As they do not have to rely on
infrastructures provided by the government, legislators of the mass-based party do not
reluctant to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government
either.150
4.3 The Ideal-Type of the Electoralist Party Organization
The electoralist party has been a growing phenomenon of party organization since the
mid twentieth century. There were several conditions which provided a significant
contribution to the emergence of the electoralist party, such as demands on social
amelioration among society, an increasing level of economic growth and a maturation
of welfare states. These conditions, in turn, determined the deideologization process
through which society became more pragmatic and its engagement with political parties
became looser. In addition, the electoralist party emerged in a party system in which
parties’ competition was based on policy effectiveness.151
There are some variations of the electoralist party, including the catch-all party
(Kirchheimer), the professional-electoral party (Panebianco), the rational-efficient party
(Downs), the multi-policy party (Downs), the programmatic party (Wolinetz), the non-
partisan party (Ignazi), the personalistic party (Gunther and Diamond), the electoral
mass party (Sartori), the rational-efficient party and professional machine model
(Wright, Schumpeter, Downs, Pomper) and the party machine (Seiler).152
In general, these parties share the similar organizational features. Firstly, they
act as a broker in the relationship between society and the state. In this context, they
aggregate and present the interests of society to the state as well as becoming an agent
of the state in defending state policies.153 Secondly, with the electoralist party, the
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organizational structure of the party on the ground is very weak as the party has a weak
political linkage with its supporters. On the other hand, the organizational structure of
the party in central office is very dominant.154 Thirdly, aiming to win elections by
maximizing its votes, these parties can be categorized as the vote-seeking party.155
The party on the ground. Different to the mass-based party with the intention to
transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, the main goal of
the electoralist party is to gain as many votes as possible. In doing so, the electoralist
party prefers to implement an effective strategy, i.e., mobilizing supporters of the party
rather than creating and maintaining the political linkage with members of the party.
Similar to the elite-based party, therefore, the electoralist party prefers to have
supporters rather than members. In this sense, the electoralist party disregards the
organizational structure of the party on the ground beyond election period. In the
electoralist party, therefore, the role of the party on the ground is important just to create
a political image that the party conducts serious efforts to establish and maintain the
political relationships with its supporters. In this sense, the electoralist party creates and
maintains the political relationships with its supporters by conducting short-term,
occasional and result- oriented activities.156
In creating and maintaining the political relationships with its supporters, the
electoralist party disregards the role of the ideology and platforms of the party.157 It also
relies on pragmatic and eclectic platforms of its candidates of legislator. Moreover, the
electoralist party sets its platforms based on public mood as well as direction of the
party leaders. In this context, the electoralist party attracts its supporters by proposing
various platforms covering the needs of society at large, such as economic development
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and the maintenance of public order.158 As a consequence, it experiences a high
frequency of supporter-switching from election to election.159
It is also important to mention that the electoralist party pays much attention to
the need of election campaigns in order to gain as many votes as possible. In conducting
campaign activities, the electoralist party employs modern techniques. To mobilize its
supporters in election period, instead of developing the organizational structure of the
party on the ground, the electoralist party prefers to utilize external channels of
communication, such as television, radio and newspaper. It also prefers to employ
various techniques, such as media spots, telemarketing and continued polling. In this
sense, the electoralist party employs capital intensive mechanisms and external channels
of communication when it conducts its campaign activities.160
As maximizing votes becomes the main objective of the electoralist party, the
quantity of supporters is very important. Moreover, the recruitment process of
supporters is not selective. For the electoralist party, an individual’s identity is more
important than a group’s identity so that it is not surprising if it disregards a formal
membership system.161 It is also important to note that instead of focusing on a
particular group of society based on a certain social segment or class, the electoralist
party attempts to secure its access to a wide range of groups in society. In this sense, the
electoralist party attempts to get supporters from different social backgrounds.162
With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party
on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office, in the
electoralist party, the party on the ground is subordinate to the party in central office. As
the party in central office employs various external organizations to mobilize supporters
of the party, it marginalizes the existence and role of the party on the ground. Moreover,
the party on the ground is also subordinate to the party in public office. In this sense, the
organizational structure of the party on the ground in the electoralist party acts just as a
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“cheer leader” for the organizational structure of the party in central office as well as for
the organizational structure of the party in public office.163
The party in central office. The organizational structure of the party in central
office in the electoralist party is realized by a group of professionals with advanced
skills in managing a political party.164 In addition, the group of professionals can be
distinguished into three categories, namely professional staff on the party payrolls,
professional political consultants and professional staff paid by the government but
engaged in essentially party political works. In the context of the electoralist party,
however, the organizational structure of the party in central office is managed by the
professional staff on the party payroll.165 Moreover, the recruitment process of these
staff is based on technical and managerial skills principles. Different to the recruitment
process of the central office in the mass-based party, therefore, the recruitment process
of the central office in the electoralist party is not based on political criteria, such as
years of experience in the party or service to the party.166
In managing the party in central office, this group of staff employs technocratic
principles, such as applying efficient and effective principles. Moreover, the decision-
making process in the party in central office is conducted by a top-down mechanism so
that it excludes supporters of the party. In this respect, supporters of the party cannot
participate actively in the decision-making process. They cannot articulate their interests
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and they cannot supervise these staff either. Such a condition occurs due to the fact that
the electoralist party disregards the role of ideology.167
Since the electoralist party disregards a formal membership system, it is not able
to collect membership fees. To finance activities of the party in central office, however,
the electoralist party receives financial supports from affiliated interest groups and some
companies owned by the party. It also depends on a state subvention as its primary
financial income which takes various forms, such as subventions to legislators, national
and regional government grants, free or easy access to media coverage, financial aid to
partisan media and publications and per capita voter grants.168
In the electoralist party, the role of the organizational structure of the party in
central office is very important in mobilizing supporters in election period. Therefore,
the organizational structure of the party in central office conducts various campaign
activities. Nevertheless, as the electoralist party disregards a strong political linkage
with its supporters, similar to the role of the organizational structure of the party on the
ground, the role of the organizational structure of the party in central office is just
relevant in election period. In this sense, the organizational structure of the party in
central office lacks activities beyond election period.169
With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party
in central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, in the
electoralist party, the party in central office has a strong relationship with the party in
public office. Some of the professional officials of the party in central office are usually
officials of the party in public office at the same time. Even if they are different persons
from officials of the party in public office, they share similar interests. In managing the
party in central office, moreover, they rely on officials of the party in public office. In
this sense, the organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the
organizational structure of the party in public office.170
The party in public office. Legislators of the electoralist party have autonomy
both from the party and from supporters of the party in carrying out their role in making
policies. Since the electoralist party lacks political relationships with its constituents, on
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one hand, legislators of the electoralist party disregard the interests of supporters of the
party. As a result, what they do in policy-making most of the time is not in line with the
interests of supporters of the party. On the other hand, it is also possible for legislators
of the electoralist party to neglect the state interests. Acting as a broker in between
society and the state, legislators of the electoralist party act as political entrepreneurs.171
In making policies, legislators of the electoralist party propose moderate and
eclectic policies which are based on collective bargaining and public mood.
Consequently, they spend less time on making policies. Moreover, if they conduct
debates on policy issues, the debates are conducted just as a formality so they are
diffused and unfocused. In this sense, legislators of the electoralist party lack political
consistency in transforming the platforms of the party into public policies.172
In making policies, legislators of the electoralist party tend to rely on other
social organizations. To a certain extent, they also rely on the state. However, they do
not rely on the role of the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the
organizational structure of the party in central office. In this context, they exclude the
involvement of supporters of the party in policy-making.173
Further, legislators of the electoralist party act as facilitators of compromise
among political actors in making policies. In this respect, they act autonomously as the
guarantor against unreasonable exploitation of one political actor by another. They also
position themselves toward the centre among different ideologies. In this sense, they
lack ambition for hegemony when they are involved in making policies. In this sense, it
is not too difficult for legislators of the electoralist party to develop collaborations with
other political actors so that they are typically tolerant of and collaborative with other
political actors. On the other hand, it is not easy for legislators of the electoralist party
to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government since they tend
to establish the political linkage with the state.174
4.4. The Ideal-Type of the Cartel Party Organization
Emerging in the 1970s in Western European countries, the cartel party is a further
development of the electoralist party. The appearance of the cartel party has marked a
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modern political era in which goals of politics became more self-referential. There was
also a shift of party competition from the pursuit of hegemony or domination to the
building of a shared mutual interest. The emergence of the cartel party also increased
the professionalization of politics in which the role of experts and professionals has
been more dominant in managing party organization. In this sense, the rise of the cartel
party reflected a new political phenomenon in which party organization has been
managed by technocratic principles.175
According to Krouwel, there are three stages in the development of the cartel
party. The first stage is the inter-party cartel in which a party with no goal orientation
attempts to maintain its power in public office. In doing so, it creates coalitions on the
most important policy issues with other parties. The second stage is the formation of the
state-party cartel. In this stage, parties inside the inter-party cartel disconnect
themselves from their supporters in order to engage with the state. In addition, there is
mutual symbiosis between the inter-party cartel and the state. On one hand, the inter-
party cartel employs resources of the state to ensure its own collective survival as well
as to colonize the state institutions. On the other hand, it allows the state to regulate its
organization. As a result, there is ambiguous differentiation between the organization of
the inter-party cartel and the institution of the state since the inter-party cartel serves as
an agent of the state and the state becomes a partisan institution. The third stage is the
tripartite power cartel in which the state-party cartel broadens their coalitions with other
powerful interest groups. In this stage, therefore, there is a political engagement
between several parties, the state and some powerful interest groups.176
In general, the cartel party has the following features. Firstly, the cartel party
consists of several parties in favor of developing collusion and cooperation and in
securing their positions in the state. In this sense, the cartel party establishes a strong
political linkage with the state and, at the same time, makes a distance with society.177
Secondly, in the individual party within the cartel party, the relationship between the
organization of the party on the ground and the party in central office is very weak.
Moreover, the relationship between these organizational structures is based on a
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“stratarchical” relationship in which the organizational structure of the party on the
ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office act relatively
independently from each other. Meanwhile, the organizational structure of the party in
public office is the most dominant face.178 Thirdly, aiming to secure its position in the
state, the cartel party is categorized as the office-seeking party.179
The party on the ground. The main goal of the individual party within the cartel
party is to secure its position in the state. In this sense, it prefers to develop political
collaboration with other parties rather than to create and maintain the political linkage
with its supporters. Consequently, the individual party within the cartel party disregards
the existence of the party on the ground. It also disregards the role of the party on the
ground in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its
supporters. Such conditions take place not only in election period, but also beyond.180
The individual party within the cartel party pays much attention to the need of
election campaigns in order to maximize its votes. To attract voters, instead of
proposing its own policies, the individual party within the cartel party utilizes policies
and programs of the state. In this sense, the ideology and platforms of the individual
party within the cartel party are fuzzy. They also become increasingly centralistic and
more nationalized. Moreover, in conducting campaign activities, the individual party
within the cartel party employs various techniques, such as using polling and relying on
the role of professional campaign strategists. The individual party within also utilize
various external channels of communication. In election campaigns, therefore, the
individual party within the cartel party involves capital intensive as well as many
external channels of communication.181
Along with the change of voting behavior in which parties are not able to rely on
the loyalty of their members, the individual party within the cartel party disregards a
formal membership system. Compared to the elite-based party, therefore, the individual
party within the cartel party prefers to have “supporters” rather than “members” in a
greater degree. Different to the electoralist party, however, the individual party within
the cartel party disconnects itself from its supporters so that the relationship between the
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individual party within the cartel party and its supporters is loose. Moreover, instead of
focusing on a certain social segment or class, the individual party within the cartel party
attempts to gain its support from a wide range of groups in society.182
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the organizational structure of the
party on the ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office in the
individual party within the cartel party is characterized by stratarchy. In such a
relationship, the officials of these two organizational structures have autonomy in
managing their own organizational structures. Consequently, these organizational
structures lack coordination. In general, the relationship between the party on the
ground and the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is
loose.183
The party in central office. In the individual party within the cartel party, the
organizational structure of the party in central office is manifested by a group of
professionals with high skills in managing a party. The party in central office consists of
contractual staff, consultants and outside experts possessing a variety of specific
technical skills. Moreover, all of the staff of the party in central office is recruited with
technical and managerial skill considerations in mind. Different to the organization of
the party in central office in the mass-based party which is organized by amateur
democrats, the organization of the party in central office in the individual party within
the cartel party is managed by professional consultants. On the other hand, different to
the organization of the party in central office in the electoralist party, the organization of
the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party is managed by
the professional political consultants as well as the professional staff paid by the state.
In this sense, the role of the state is very dominant in the recruitment process of these
professional staff.184
In managing the party in central office, these professional officials employ
technocratic principles, such as such as relying on expertise or competence, autonomy,
mobility, self-regulation, efficiency and carrier-orientation. Moreover, they organize the
party in central office by considering contribution of the party to the efficiency of the
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entire social system and by neglecting the role of ideology. As a consequence, the
decision-making process in the party in central office is also based on efficiency and
effectiveness principles. In this context, supporters of the party are completely excluded
from the decision-making process in the party in central office.185
The individual party within the cartel party depends on a state subvention as its
primary financial resources. A state subvention is important not only to finance its
campaign activities, but also to organize the party in central office. In addition, a state
subvention takes various forms, such as subvention for legislators, national and regional
government grants, free or easy access to media coverage, financial aid to partisan
media and publications and per capita voter grants. However, the individual party
within the cartel party lacks membership fees.186
Similar to the role of the organizational structure of the party on the ground, in
the individual party within the cartel party, the role of the organizational structure of the
party in central office is insignificant in creating and maintaining the political
relationships with supporters of the party beyond election period. Its role is also
insignificant in mobilizing supporters in election period. In mobilizing its supporters,
the individual party within the cartel party relies on the state institutions. Therefore,
compared to the organization of the party in central office in the electoralist party, the
organization of the party in central office in the individual party within the cartel party
plays a less significant role in conducting activities in and beyond election period.187
There are three possibilities regarding the relationship between the
organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure of
the party in public office in the individual party within the cartel party. Firstly, the
organizational structure of the party in central office becomes simply more autonomous
from the party in public office. Secondly, the organizational structure of the party in
central office becomes more subject to the control of the organizational structure of the
party in public office. Thirdly, the organizational structure of the party in central office
is simply marginalized by the organizational structure of the party in public office. In
most cases, however, the organizational structure of the party in central office tends to
be subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in public office.188
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The party in public office. Legislators of the individual party within the cartel
party have no obligation to act in line with the interests of their supporters. In this sense,
they have greater autonomy in carrying out their roles in making policies. On the other
hand, in order to secure their positions in legislature, they strongly rely on the state
interests. In this sense, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party act as
agents of the state.189
In policy-making, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party
defend policies of the state. In doing so, they spend less time when they are involved in
making policies. They also conduct debates on policy issues which are diffused and
unfocused.190 Moreover, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party
receive various means of support from the state. More specifically, they receive support
from public institutions, other executive government agencies and other quasi non-
governmental organizations. On the other hand, they lack support from the
organizational structure of the party on the ground and from the organizational structure
of the party in central office. They also lack support from social organizations. In this
sense, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party depend on the state
institutions when they are involved in making policies.191
Since they have strong engagement with the state, legislators of the individual
party within the cartel party have no ambition to establish an opposition force to the
executive branch of government. Moreover, in order to secure their access to the state,
they prefer to share power with legislators from other participants of the cartel party in
order to ensure that there are no “winners” or “losers” among participants of the cartel
party. In this context, they attempt to manage competition among political actors so that
there is no hegemony of certain political actors in the cartel party. Therefore, they are
tolerant of and collaborative just with political actors from other participants in the
cartel party. In contrast, legislators of the individual party within the cartel party prevent
collaborations with political actors from non-participants of the cartel party due to the
fact that they attempt to monopolize the route to the state. In this sense, they have
ambition for hegemony over political actors from non-participants of the cartel party
189 Ibid.
190 Steven B. Wolinetz, “Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party
Organization in Contemporary Democracies,” pp. 153-59.
191 Ibid.
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when they are involved in making policies. Therefore, they are neither tolerant of nor
collaborative with political actors from non-participants of the cartel party.192
4.5. Summary of the Analytical Framework
From the elaboration above, we can see that each of the party models can be divided
further into three different organizational structures, namely the organization of the
party on the ground, the party in central office and the party in public office. Moreover,
each of the organizational structures has its own features. A summary of the ideal-type
of each party model in the three different organizational dimensions is presented in the
following table.
192 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The
Emergence of the Cartel Party,” p. 17-21.
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Table 2.1 Ideal-Types of Party Models in Three Faces
Party Models/Faces The elite-based party The mass-based party The electoralist party The cartel party
The party on the ground
- The party creates and
maintains the political linkage
with its supporters by
conducting long-term, on-
going, intensive and reciprocal
activities
- The party relies on clientelism
and interpersonal networks of
the party elites in creating and
maintaining political linkage
with its supporters
- The party employs labor-
intensive activities and
external organizations to
attract voters
- The party disregards a formal
membership system
- The party focuses on
supporters from a particular
group in society
- The party on the ground is
independent from the party in
central office
- The party creates and
maintains the political linkage
with its members by
conducting long-term, on-
going, intensive and reciprocal
activities
- The party relies on its
ideology and platforms in
creating and maintaining
political linkage with its
members
- The party employs labor-
intensive activities and the
party organization to attract
voters
- The party respects a formal
membership system
- The party focuses on members
from a particular group or
class in society
- The party on the ground
provides resources that are
necessary for the existence
and success of the party in
central office. While the party
in central office is seen as the
voice or guardian of the party
on the ground
- The party creates and
maintains the political linkage
with its supporters by
conducting short-term,
occasional and one way
activities
- The party relies on its
pragmatic platforms in
creating and maintaining
political linkage with its
supporters
- The party employs capital-
intensive activities and
external organizations to
attract voters
- The party disregards a formal
membership system
- The party focuses on
supporters from a wide array
of groups in society
- The party on the ground is
subordinate to the party in
central office
- The party lacks efforts to
create or maintain the
political linkage with its
supporters
-
- The party employs capital-
intensive activities and the
state agencies to attract
voters
- The party disregards a formal
membership system
- The party focuses on
supporters from a wide array
of groups in society
- Stratarchy
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Party Models/Faces The elite-based party The mass-based party The electoralist party The cartel party
The party in central office
- The party elites serve as or
recruit the party leader
- The party organization is
managed by elitism,
clientelism or interpersonal
network mechanism
- The party depends on the
financial contribution of the
party elites
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office
conducts activities just in
election period
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office is
subordinate to the
organizational structure of the
party in public office
- Members of the party recruit
the party leader
- The party organization is
managed by ideological
considerations
- The party depends on
membership fees
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office
conducts activities in and
beyond election periods
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office is
the agent by which the
organizational structure of the
party in public office could be
held accountable by members
of the party
- The party leader comes from
professionals
- The party organization is
managed by technocratic
principles
- The party depends on a state
subvention, donation from
private individuals, companies
and affiliated social
organizations and companies
owned by the party
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office
conducts activities just in
election period
- The organizational structure of
the party in central office is
subordinate to the
organizational structure of the
party in public office
- The party elites recruit the
party leader from
professionals
- The party organization is
managed by technocratic
principles
- The party depends on a state
subvention
- The organizational structure
of the party in central office
lacks activities in and beyond
election periods
- The organizational structure
of the party in central office
is subordinate to the
organizational structure of
the party in public office
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Party Models/Faces The elite-based party The mass-based party The electoralist party The cartel party
The party in public office
- Legislators act as trustees
- Legislators defend their
personal interests when they
are involved in making
policies
- Legislators employ their own
personal infrastructure to
support their role in policy-
making
- Legislators lack ambition to
establish an opposition force
to the executive branch of
government
- Legislators are tolerant of and
collaborative with other
political actors when they are
involved in making policies
- Legislators act as delegates
- Legislators defend the
ideology and platforms of the
party when they are involved
in making policies
- Legislators employ the party
organization to support their
role in policy-making
- Legislators have an ambition
to establish an opposition
force to the executive branch
of government
- Legislators are neither tolerant
of nor collaborative with other
political actors when they are
involved in making policies
- Legislators act as
entrepreneurs
- Legislators defend their
personal interests when they
are involved in making
policies
- Legislators employ external
organizations to support their
role in policy-making
- Legislators lack ambition to
establish an opposition force
to the executive branch of
government
- Legislators are tolerant of and
collaborative with other
political actors when they are
involved in making policies
- Legislators act as agents of
the state
- Legislators defend the state
interests when they are
involved in making policies
- Legislators employ the state
institutions to support their
role in policy-making
- Legislators lack ambition to
establish an opposition force
to the executive branch of
government
- Legislators are tolerant of
and collaborative just with
political actors coming from
other participants of the
cartel party when they are
involved in making policies
Source: Compilation by the Author.
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5. Summary
To explore how Islamic parties organize at the regional level in post-Suharto
Indonesia, this study follows the rational choice institutionalism way of thinking.
Therefore, this study assumes that by taking into account incentives and constraints
provided by the existing socio-political structures, Islamic political actors apply a
certain strategy when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their
chances of winning elections.
In developing the analytical framework, this study follows party models
proposed by Krouwel, namely the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the
electoralist party and the cartel party. This study also applies the analytical
framework of party organization introduced by Katz and Mair in which the party
organization is divided into three different organizational faces, i.e., the party
organization on the ground, the party organization in central office and the party
organization in public office. As the analytical framework of this study, therefore,
each of the party models is divided into these three different organizational
dimensions. Based on the development of party organization in established
democracy as well as in developing countries, this study develops various criteria in
each of these three different organizational faces.
As discussed in this chapter, there are six criteria to explore the
organizational features of the party on the ground, namely the efforts to create and
maintain the political linkage, the instruments to create and maintain the political
linkage, the strategy to attract voters during election period, the membership, the
backgrounds of members or supporters and the relationship between the
organizational structure of the party on the ground and the organizational structure of
the party in central office.
To examine the organizational features of the party in central office, there are
five criteria, i.e., the recruitment process of leaders and officials of the party, the
instruments to manage the central office, the party finances, the activities of the
central office in and beyond election periods as well as the relationship between the
organizational structure of the party in central office and the organizational structure
of the party in public office, more specifically in local legislature.
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Meanwhile, to examine the organizational features of the party in public
office, more specifically in legislature, there are also five criteria, that is the model of
representation, the consistency of legislators to transform their personal interests, the
ideology and platforms of their parties and the interests of the state into public
policies, the supporting infrastructures in policy-making, the ambition to establish an
opposition force to the executive branch of government and finally the political
relationships among legislators when they are involved in making policies.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the empirical method of this study. In doing so, it is 
divided into four main parts. The first part explains the research method applied in this 
study, namely qualitative research. The second part describes the unity of analysis as 
well as the locus of the study. Meanwhile, the third part describes data-gathering 
techniques employed in this study, together with a discussion on how the field research 
was conducted. The final part deals with techniques and procedures of data analysis, 
including the way in which analysis in this study is carried out.  
 
1. Qualitative Research 
Denzin and Lincoln define qualitative research as an activity to “study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them”.1 They also point out that “qualitative research involves 
the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials… that describe routine 
and problematic moments and meaning in individual’s lives”.2  Moreover, in order to 
seek out the variety of explanations and interpretations, according to Glesne, the role of 
fieldwork through which qualitative research interacts with their respondents is very 
important in qualitative research.
3
 
 This study applies the qualitative research method for three reasons. Firstly, the 
qualitative method is the most appropriate method to be employed when the aim of a 
study is to explore people’s subjective experiences, including their interpretations on 
those experiences. In this sense, the qualitative method provides social researchers an 
opportunity to explore further the meaning, process and context of a unit of analysis.
4
 
Secondly, the qualitative method also allows social researchers to study a phenomenon 
in-depth as well as in detail.
5
 By applying the qualitative method, therefore, social 
researchers are able to capture the real condition of a phenomenon. Thirdly, as a matter 
                                                          
1
 See, Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln (eds.), The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), p. 3. 
2
 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
3
 C. Glesne, Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 5. 
4
 Furthermore, see Fiona Devine, “Qualitative Analysis,” in David Marsh and Gerry stoker (eds.), Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (New York: Palgrave 2002), pp. 197-215.  
5
 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002), p. 
14. 
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of fact, the qualitative method has conventionally been applied in political science, 
especially in the context of micro-level analysis.
6
 As this study intends to explore the 
organizational features of several Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia, 
therefore, the qualitative research is compatible to this study.   
As explained by Creswell, there are at least five approaches in the qualitative 
method, namely narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographical and case 
study.
7
 Compared to the other approaches, the case study method becomes the standard 
method in social science. However, there is no general agreement regarding the precise 
definition of the case study method. Creswell, for instance, defines the case study 
method as a method of study which explores one or more cases within a bounded 
system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed and in-
depth data collection by involving multiple sources of information.
8
 Meanwhile, 
Gerring defines the case study method as an intensive research of a single unit for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.
9
 
Further, Yin argues that the case study research is properly used when a study is 
to answer “how” and “why” questions.10 In the context of political science, the case 
study research is generally more useful when a study has seven characteristics. For 
instance, when the strategy of a study is “exploratory” rather than “confirmatory”, when 
a study focuses more on “causal mechanisms” than “causal effects” and when a study 
has “useful variance” which is available for only a single unit or a small number of units 
so that basically the same case is not studied several times.
11
 
In the context of this study, the case study research is selected for the following 
reasons. As mentioned earlier, this study attempts to explore the organizational features 
of Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia. Therefore, this study attempts to 
answer how Islamic parties organize and why these parties organize the way they do. In 
this context, this study also intends to conduct explanation rather than confirmation 
                                                          
6
 Fiona Devine, “Qualitative Analysis,” pp. 197-215. 
7
 For the comparison of these five approaches at the glance, see John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry 
and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2007), pp. 76-81.  
8
 See, John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches, p. 
73; Robert E. Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonnas S. Lincoln (eds.), 
The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005), pp. 445-48. 
9
 John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 98, No. 2 (2004), pp. 351-54. 
10
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), pp. 10-11. 
11
 Furthermore, see John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” p. 352. 
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analysis. Moreover, this study also focuses on causal mechanism rather than causal 
effects.  
 
2. Case Selection  
One can argue that a study of all the Islamic parties which participated in the 1999, 
2004 and 2009 elections in all regions must be conducted in order to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the 
local level in post-Suharto Indonesia. Nevertheless, such a study requires an enormous 
amount of effort. This is due to the fact that there were eighteen parties which can be 
categorized as Islamic parties in the 1999 election, while there were seven parties in the 
2004 election and eight in 2009. It should also be acknowledged that up to January 
2009, there were 33 provinces, 399 districts and 98 municipalities in Indonesia. These 
numbers continue to increase as there are many demands for new provinces, districts 
and municipalities.  
To understand the phenomenon of how Islamic parties organize at the local level 
in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study conducts a multiple-case study.
12
 To be more 
specific, in selecting the Islamic parties to be observed, this study applies the 
information-oriented selection strategy. Flyvbjerg argues that the information-oriented 
selection strategy is useful to maximize the utility of information from a large sample.
13
 
By applying the information-oriented selection strategy, therefore, cases in this study 
are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content.  
The information-oriented selection strategy, further, can be divided into four 
strategies, namely the paradigmatic cases, critical cases, extreme or deviant cases and 
maximum variation cases strategies.
14
 For the purpose of analysis, this study applies the 
maximum variation case strategy in order to obtain a comprehensive explanation. By 
applying the maximum variation cases, therefore, this study focuses on several major 
Islamic parties in Indonesia which succeeded in gaining significant votes and seats in 
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections so that they represent major forces of political Islam 
in post-Suharto Indonesia. In selecting Islamic parties to be observed, moreover, this 
                                                          
12
 For a more detailed discussion on the multiple-cases design, see, for example, Robert K. Yin, Case 
Study Research. Design and Methods, pp. 53-60; John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It 
Good for?” pp. 350-52. 
13
 Flyvbjerg explains that there are five types in the information-oriented selection strategy, i.e., 
extreme/deviant cases, critical cases, paradigmatic cases and maximum variation cases. Furthermore, see 
Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 
2 (2006), p. 230. 
14
 Ibid. 
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study also considers two major groups of Islamic parties in Indonesia which also 
represent the characteristics of all Islamic parties in the Islamic world, namely the 
Muslim-nationalist parties and the Islamist parties as explained in Chapter 1. Based on 
these considerations, this study focuses on six Islamic parties as its units of analysis, 
i.e., the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), the National 
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), the Reform Star Party (Partai 
Bintang Reformasi or PBR), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or PPP), the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or 
PKS) and the Star and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB). 
Further, this study selects the Tasikmalaya district in West Java province as the 
research area as the district has some peculiarities. Historically speaking, the district has 
deep historical roots in Islamic radical movements. Muslims in the district also 
represent characteristics of Muslims with a strong Islamic sentiment. It is also important 
to note that the six Islamic parties mentioned above gained significant votes and seats in 
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections in the district. In this sense, the district has become 
one of the bases for all Islamic parties in Indonesia to gain support. Moreover, similar to 
some regions in Indonesia, there is also a growing demand for the implementation of 
sharia in the district. We will return to general features of the district more 
comprehensively in the following chapter.  
With regard to the time frame of the study, the term of post-Suharto in this study 
refers to a period in which, as a young democracy, Indonesia attempts to establish a 
democratic system after more than thirty-two years under the New Order 
authoritarianism system. More specifically, the term of post-Suharto denotes to the 
period since the Suharto’s resignation in May, 1998. Also known as the period of 
reformasi (reformation), the term also refers to an uneasy period for Indonesia to 
implement the consolidation of democracy as well as the decentralized system in terms 
of the central and regional government relationship.  
 
3. Data-Gathering Techniques 
In order to produce insightful findings, this study combines three data-gathering 
techniques, namely in-depth interviews, direct observation and documentary analysis 
which are extremely useful to collect comprehensive information. It is important to note 
however that the in-depth interviews serve as the primary data-gathering techniques in 
this study. Meanwhile, direct observation and documentary analysis are treated as the 
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supporting or complementary data-gathering technique. By combining these three data-
gathering techniques, therefore, this study applies a triangulation method.
15
  
 
3.1. In-Depth Interview 
Glesne defines an interview as an “oral exchange that takes place between at least, two 
persons, but other possibilities include one or more respondents”.16 In conducting the in-
depth interviews, this study applied elite and specialized interviews. According to 
Manheim and Rich, the elite interview refers to an interview which is conducted with 
persons representing some particular groups within society. Meanwhile, the specialized 
interview denotes an interview which is conducted by persons with knowledge and 
information on a specific topic.
17
 In addition, Silverman explains that the role of the 
specialized interview is important to get a second opinion and to validate data collected 
from the elite interview.
18
 
During the field research in the Tasikmalaya district, more than sixty-seven 
respondents were interviewed. The elite interview was conducted with forty-nine 
officials from the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, i.e., at 
the sub-district, village and sub-village levels. It was also carried out with prominent 
leaders of the Islamic parties at the district level and some prominent officials of these 
parties at the national level in Jakarta. Moreover, the elite interview was also conducted 
with some leading legislators from the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district 
Legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD). 
Eighteen respondents coming from outside observers were also interviewed. 
These outside observers included two bureaucrats, a staff of the General Election 
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU), head of the Election Supervisory 
Board (Badan Pengawas Pemilu or Bawaslu), heads of major Islamic organizations, 
i.e., the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU), Muhammadiyah 
and Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam or PERSIS), a manager of an Islamic boarding 
school, a cultural observer, an academic, a journalist, an NGO activist and a 
representative of students in Siliwangi University, a thug (preman), a police officer and 
                                                          
15
 Triangulation is generally considered as a process of using multiple sources to clarify meaning in order 
to verify information. See, for instance, Robert E. Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies,” pp. 712-13.  
16
 C. Glesne, Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction, p. 67. 
17
 Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in Political 
Science (New York & London: Longman, 1986), pp. 132-38. 
18
 Furthermore on various advantages of the specialized interviews, see David Silverman, Interpreting 
Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 159-60. 
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two ordinary people. In addition, the specialized interviews were also conducted with 
heads of two secular-nationalist parties in the district, i.e., the Functional Group Party 
(Partai Golongan Karya or Partai Golkar) and the Indonesian Democratic Party 
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or PDIP).
 19
  
It is important to note that some respondents belonged to more than one category 
as they had different positions. For instance, some respondents were officials of the 
Islamic parties in central office and, at the same time, they were also legislators. 
Another example, one respondent had a dual status as a party’s legislator and, at the 
same time, as a head of an Islamic organization. In this case, the in-depth interviews 
were focused on their experiences and information from the main position which they 
had been categorized.  
In addition, during the field research, it was not too difficult to choose 
representatives of officials of the Islamic parties in central office and representatives of 
legislators from these Islamic parties. However, problems arose when this study had to 
select representatives of officials of the Islamic parties on the ground. This is partly due 
to the fact that these Islamic parties had established their organizational structure in 
hundreds of villages and sub-villages in the district.  
To deal with such problems, this study applied “the purposeful sampling 
strategy” in selecting the respondents.20 To be more specific, this study combined four 
types in the purposive sampling strategy, namely the snowball or chain strategy, the 
maximum variation strategy, the confirming and disconfirming case strategy and the 
stratified purposeful strategy.
21
 By using the snowball or chain strategy, some 
respondents were selected by considering the recommendations of other respondents. 
By applying the maximum variation strategy, some respondents were selected by 
considering their ability to provide a diverse variation and to identify important 
common patterns. Meanwhile, by employing the confirming and disconfirming case 
strategy, some respondents were selected in order to elaborate on initial analysis, to seek 
exceptions and to see variations of information. Moreover, by employing the stratified 
purposeful strategy, all of the respondents were selected on the basis of area, age, 
experience and social background. 
                                                          
19
 The profiles of these respondents can be found in Appendix 1. 
20
 Creswell explains that the purposeful sampling strategy is useful “because it can purposefully inform an 
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study”. John W. Creswell, 
Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches, p. 125. 
21
 Ibid, pp. 126-29. 
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With regard to the interview process, the average duration for each interview 
was ninety minutes.
22
 At the beginning of each interview, there was a so called 
“informed consent” through which the respondents were provided with a general 
introduction to this study.
23
 In this short introduction, the respondents were informed 
about the main purposes of this study. Moreover, they were also informed about 
information needed for this study. As the topic of the interviews covered sensitive 
issues for some respondents, the short introduction also explained that information from 
the interviews would remain confidential and just for academic purposes.  
In conducting the interviews, this study also applied the standardized open-
ended interview. As explained by Patton, “the standardized open-ended interview 
consists of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged with the intention of taking 
each of the respondents through the same sequence and asking each of the respondents 
the same questions with essentially the same words”.24 In the context of this study, a set 
of questions was prepared in the interview guide prior to the interviews. The questions 
in the interview guide were formulated with certain respondents in mind so that each 
respondent had specific questions in accordance with their categories.  
Therefore, officials of the Islamic parties at the sub-village, village and sub-
district levels were questioned about their experiences and impressions when they 
manage the organizational structure of the Islamic parties on the ground. Similarly, 
leaders and officials of the Islamic parties in central office in the district as well as 
officials of the Islamic parties in central office at the national level were questioned 
about their experiences and impressions when they manage the organizational structure 
of the Islamic parties in central office at these levels. Meanwhile, legislators from the 
Islamic parties were questioned about their experiences and impressions when they 
were involved in making policies in the legislature. The same form was also applied to 
the outside observers who were questioned about their information and interpretation of 
                                                          
22
 In conducting the in-depth interviews, I was supported by three research assistants. The role of these 
research assistants was very important, especially in gaining access to the respondents and arranging 
schedule of the interviews. Moreover, their role was also very important in providing assistances during 
the interview process, especially in helping to understand what the respondent meant. Since the role of the 
research assistants was very important, there was a short methodological training for these research 
assistants prior to the interview activities so that they learned to understand the aims of this study, to 
identify and to get access to the respondent and to raise as well as to respond to questions during the 
interview process. 
23
 See Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, Political Science Research Methods 
(Washington: CQ Press, 2001), p. 219. 
24
 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, pp. 343-44. 
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how the Islamic parties in the district organize and why these parties organize the way 
they do.
25
 
When the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties on the ground were 
conducted, the interviews were initiated with general questions. Afterward, the more 
complex questions were posed. At the end of each interview, the respondents were 
given an opportunity to provide important information which was not covered by the 
interview guide. Moreover, the interviews were cross referenced with each other so that 
the information was double-checked. The same technique and procedure were also 
applied in the interviews with the respondents from other categories. 
It is important to mention that although the interviews were based on the 
interview guide, in some cases, the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the 
same manner as the interview guide had anticipated to minimizing a high degree of 
standardization. During the interview process, the respondents were also given an 
opportunity to provide their own opinions. Moreover, to avoid mistakes about what the 
respondents actually said, the interviews were tape-recorded. Meanwhile, to record 
information as comprehensive as possible, extra notes were taken as well. For instance, 
when the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties in central office were conducted 
in workplace of the central office, extra notes regarding activities of the central office 
were taken. In addition, the field notes also covered information that was not covered by 
the interview guide, such as personal impressions about the respondents. 
The interviews took place in a diverse set of locations. Some interviews with 
officials of the Islamic parties at the sub-village, village and sub-district levels were 
conducted in the home of these respondents. Some of them were also conducted in the 
workplace of the Islamic parties at sub-districts level. The interviews with officials of 
the Islamic parties in central office were conducted in the workplace of the central 
office in the district. Moreover, the interviews with officials of the Islamic parties in 
central office at the national level were conducted in the national legislature and in the 
workplace of these parties in Jakarta. Meanwhile, the interviews with legislators from 
the Islamic parties were mostly conducted in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. 
Other interviews were carried out in Islamic boarding schools, in small mosques 
(mushola) and in restaurants. 
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 The interview guides in their ideal-types can be found in appendix 2. 
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3.2. Direct Observation 
The direct observation technique has some advantages for a social researcher, for 
example, a researcher can obtain additional information about the topic being studied. 
Direct observation also can add new dimensions for understanding either the context or 
the phenomenon being studied. Moreover, direct observation is useful for exploring real 
phenomena.
26
 Not surprisingly, as explained by Silverman, direct observation is very 
important in social science as observation in social science “is fundamentally about an 
understanding the routine rather than what appears to be exciting”.27 
An intensive direct observation was carried out between November 6, 2008 and 
February 6, 2009 in the Tasikmalaya district. During direct observation, some 
workplaces of the Islamic parties at the sub-village level, the village level and the sub-
district level were visited. To observe activities of central office, direct observation also 
took place in workplaces of the Islamic parties at the district level. Some visits were 
conducted in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature as well, in order to observe activities 
of legislators from the Islamic parties. 
It should also be acknowledged that during direct observation, field notes were 
taken as soon as possible in direct conjunction with the analytical framework. The field 
notes included episodic records containing additional information,
28
 such as conditions 
of the organizational structure of the Islamic parties at the sub-village level, village and 
sub-district levels, activities of the Islamic parties in the central office at the district 
level and situations in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. In addition, the field notes 
were made in a form of a sketch map so that they would be easier to understand. Soon 
after short notes were made, the notes were expanded. In addition, the information from 
direct observation was managed by making some categories derived from the analytical 
framework.  
 
3.3. Documentary Analysis 
Another technique in data-gathering employed in this study is documentary analysis. 
This study employs documentary analysis due to the fact that documents provide 
                                                          
26
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, p. 109-13. 
27
 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction, p. 
30.  
28
 According to Johnson, Reynolds and Joslyn, episodic records are records that are not part of an 
ongoing, systematic record-keeping program but are produced and preserved in a more casual, personal 
and accidental manner. See, Janet Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, Political 
Science Research Methods, pp. 238-44. 
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additional information as well as preliminary information which can be explored further 
through the in-depth interviews and direct observation.
29
 Moreover, Yin explains 
several advantages of documentary analysis. Firstly, it is helpful in verifying the correct 
spelling that might have been mentioned in the interviews. Secondly, it can provide 
other specific details to confirm information from other sources. Thirdly, it can be 
useful in making inferences or other new questions for the next interviews.
30
 In the 
context of this study, documentary analysis was carried out in order to find patterns and 
processes of events related to the organizational features of the Islamic parties in the 
Tasikmalaya district. 
In practice, documentary analyses were conducted before, during and after the 
field research. Before the field research, information on the district as well as the 
Islamic parties in the district was collected. In this sense, the role of documentary 
analysis was very important in providing initial information about the Tasikmalaya 
district as the area of the study and the Islamic parties in the district as the units of 
analysis. During the field research, documentary analysis was important in supporting 
activities of the in-depth interviews and direct observation. Moreover, the role of 
documentary analysis in this study was also significant in understanding patterns and 
developing interpretations in the data analysis process.  
More specifically, the documentary analysis technique was applied in order to 
collect information on the Tasikmalaya district, including its social, cultural, economic 
and political conditions. Documentary sources came from the government institutions, 
such as the bureau of statistics, the legislature and the KPU in the district. Documentary 
analysis was used to collect information on the Islamic parties in the district as well. In 
this context, documentary sources came from party’s constitutions and party’s reports. 
In order to develop interpretations, other scholarly sources related to the Islamic parties 
were also employed in the data analysis process. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
This study takes into account reliability and validity issues.
31
 In order to develop valid 
interpretations, this study combines several data analysis techniques. Creswell points 
                                                          
29
 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, p. 295. 
30
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, pp. 101-06. 
31
 According to Hammersley, reliability refers to “the degree of consistency with which instance are 
assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observers on different occasions”. 
Meanwhile, validity denotes to “the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
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out that the qualitative research should take the following procedures, i.e., managing 
data, reading data, describing, classifying, interpreting data and presenting data.
32
 These 
procedures must be conducted comprehensively through an on-going process from the 
first step to the last step.
33
  
In the context of this study, all of information collected from the interviews was 
transcribed into a form of textual data. Since this information served as the primary 
data, in the transcription process, it was treated carefully by conducting checks and 
rechecks among the information in tape-recorder, the information in the field notes and 
the textual data. After all of the information collected from the interviews had been 
transcribed into a form of textual data, they were categorized. In this process, they were 
selected and grouped into three categories, namely the information on the organizational 
structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, the information on the organizational 
structure of the Islamic parties in central office and the information on the 
organizational structure of the Islamic parties in public office. Additionally, in 
categorizing this data, the textual data was also combined with field notes made during 
direct observation and summaries derived from documentary analysis. 
Afterwards, the textual data was read several times in order to get a 
comprehensive sense of this data. In doing so, some notes, codes and reflections on 
pieces of information were made. In this step, all of the information was again treated 
carefully by conducting check and recheck activities. By going to such effort, this study 
attempts to obtain validity. As Miles and Huberman point out, in order to attain validity, 
interpretations and arguments have to be tested on their plausibility, their sturdiness and 
their conformity by using triangulation, making contrasts or comparisons, checking out 
rival explanations and getting feedback from the respondents.
34
 Similarly, Silverman 
explains that validity can be achieved by double-checking all of the information among 
the respondents.
35
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
phenomena to which it refers.” Hammersley quoted in David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data. 
Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction, p. 145 and 149. 
32
 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches, pp. 
150-55. 
33
 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New 
Methods (Baverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp. 21-23; David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data. 
Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction, pp. 240-41. 
34
 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New 
Methods, pp. 230-43. 
35
 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction, pp. 
156-60. 
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After the managing and reading of the data was conducted, interpretations and 
arguments regarding the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the three 
different levels were described in as much detailed as possible.
36
 In developing 
interpretations and arguments, this study applies two data analysis techniques proposed 
by Miles and Huberman, namely the conceptual coherence and plausibility.
37
 In this 
sense, if interpretations and arguments had correlation with the analytical framework, 
therefore, they were made. On the other hand, if interpretations and arguments had no 
correlation with the analytical framework, they were treated and re-evaluated again. 
Moreover, if interpretation and arguments sounded plausible, then interpretations and 
arguments were made. On the other hand, if they seemed implausible, these tentative 
interpretations and arguments were treated and re-evaluated.  
In developing its interpretations and arguments, this study also combines the 
deductive and the inductive analyses.
38
 This study applies the deductive analysis as it 
applies the analytical framework of party organization and models which is mostly 
based on the experience of Western countries to explain the phenomenon of the 
organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level in Indonesia. On the other 
hand, this study also employs the inductive analysis as arguments and interpretations in 
this study are based mainly on the empirical data.  
In the context of the deductive analysis, this study applies the pattern matching 
technique, while in the context of the inductive analysis this study uses explanation-
building technique.
39
 More specifically, in applying the pattern matching technique, 
interpretations and arguments in this study were based on simple patterns of 
information. They were also based on rival explanations of the data. Meanwhile, in 
applying the explanation-building technique, the interpretations and arguments in this 
study were developed by making initial propositions, revising the initial propositions 
and then comparing the revision to the analytical framework.  
                                                          
36
 It is important to mention that conducting the fieldwork in less than three months provided a limited 
opportunity to capture the comprehensive phenomena on the topic. During data analysis, consequently, I 
found some pieces of information that needed to be further explored and confirmed. However, since it 
was not possible to maintain long-distance communication with the respondents, further exploration and 
confirmation could not be carried out. Some lacking necessary details, to be sure, might have affected 
interpretations and arguments in this study. 
37
 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New 
Methods, pp. 215-30. 
38
 The deductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are used to explain real-world 
events. Meanwhile, the inductive analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are built from 
empirical events. See, for instance, Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis. 
Research Methods in Political Science, pp. 17-20. 
39
 Furthermore, see Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, p. 136-44. 
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In the last step, interpretations and arguments in this study had been mostly 
presented in the form of narrative texts. As the interviews were conducted in the 
Indonesian language, quotations from the interviews were adjusted so that they would 
be easier to understand. Major findings of the study were also displayed in some tables 
so that they would be easier to understand. 
In general, data analysis in this study can be categorized into these steps. Firstly, 
following the theory of party organization proposed by Katz and Mair, data analysis in 
this study is based on the three different organizational faces, namely the organizational 
structure of the Islamic parties on the ground, the organizational structure of the Islamic 
parties in central office and the organizational structure of the Islamic parties in public 
office. Therefore, the real conditions and situations of the Islamic parties in these three 
different aspects are explored.  
Secondly, applying the party models summarized by Krouwel, data analysis in 
this study is also based on four major party models, namely the elite-based, mass-based, 
electoralist and cartel parties. In this sense, the Islamic parties are categorized into a 
certain party model. As the reality is never as clear-cut as the analytical framework 
expects it to be, it is possible that each of the three different organizational structures 
contains some elements of the ideal-type of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, 
the electoralist party, or the cartel party. In other words, it is possible that each of the 
Islamic parties contain some hybrid features. Since some elements are more prominent 
than the others, however, each of these parties is categorized into a certain party model. 
The empirical analysis is presented in detail in Chapter 5 to Chapter 7. 
Thirdly, after exploring the organizational features of these six Islamic parties in 
the three different dimensions, the comprehensive feature of these parties is discussed. 
Such an analysis is very important in answering how these parties are organized. The 
analytical process is continued by explaining the way these parties organize. In doing 
so, this study will apply the analytical perspective as discussed in Chapter 2, namely 
rational choice institutionalism. Such an analysis is very important in providing answers 
why these parties organize the way they do. Lastly, some theoretical and practical 
implications of these findings are discussed. The last step of analysis in this study is 
presented in Chapter 8. 
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5. Summary 
In order to understand the organizational features of the Islamic parties at the local level 
in post-Suharto Indonesia, this study applies the qualitative research, more specifically, 
the case study research. Moreover, by applying the information-oriented selection 
strategy, more specifically the maximum variation case, this study focuses on six 
Islamic parties as its units of analysis. Moreover, because of its peculiarities, the 
Tasikmalaya district is selected as the locus of the study. Meanwhile, in collecting 
information on how and why Islamic parties organize, this study applies the 
triangulation method by combining the in-depth interviews, direct observation and 
documentary analysis techniques. As the primary source, however, this study relies on 
the interviews. Finally, this study combines various techniques in the data analysis 
process in order to attain valid findings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TASIKMALAYA DISTRICT AND ITS ISLAMIC PARTIES 
 
Before going further to the empirical analysis, it is important to describe the socio-political 
conditions of the Tasikmalaya district which serves as the research area of this study. In 
doing so, this chapter describes features of the local population, the organizational profile 
of the executive branch of government and the political support of political parties in the 
district, including the profile of the legislative branch of government. This chapter also 
portraits a general picture of the Islamic parties in the district as the unit of analysis in this 
study, including their ideologies, platforms, organizational structures and political 
achievements in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. 
 
1. The Tasikmalaya District 
The Tasikmalaya district is located around 106 km southeast of the West Java capital, 
Bandung in Preanger (Priangan) regions.
1
 It is bordered by the Majalengka and Ciamis 
districts, the Tasikmalaya municipality to the North, the Garut district to the West, the 
Ciamis district to the East and the Indian Ocean to the South. Covering an area of 271251 
square kilometers, the district is topographically divided into two areas, the lowlands in the 
southern area and the mountainous region in the north. Covered by forest and a 
predominantly rural area, it is also often known as “the thousand hills district” in West Java 
province.
2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Historically, Preanger was a residency (an administrative level between provincial and district governments) 
which was established during the British colonialism in 1811-1816. The Preanger Resident covered some 
districts, including Bandung, Cianjur, Ciamis, Cimahi, Garut, Sumedang and Tasikmalaya. In addition, in the 
1950s, the residential level was completely removed from the government system in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
see Nina H. Lubis, Kehidupan Kaum Menak Priangan 1800-1942 (Bandung: Pusat Informasi Kebudayaan 
Sunda, 1998), pp. 33-34.  
2
 Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District (2007). 
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Figure 4.1  
Indonesian Map 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_adm_2002.jpg. 
 
Figure 4.2 
West Java Map 
 
Source: http://www.bpkp.go.id/unit/Jabar/Peta_administratif_jawa_barat.jpg. 
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1.1. Local Population 
The district is located in the centre of the Sundanese areas, the second largest ethnic group 
in Indonesia.
3
 In 2007 the district had a total population of 1686633 consisting of 855252 
female and 831381 male residents. Regarding the ethnic distribution, the major ethnic 
group in the district is Sundanese (94.7 percent). Other minor ethnic groups are Cirebon, 
Javanese, Batak, Betawi and Chinese. Islam is the most dominant religion in the district 
(99.5 percent) with a small number of Protestants and Catholics.
4
 It is also important to 
mention that the majority of the Sundanese are orthodox Muslims. They implement Islamic 
tenets in their daily activities strictly, such as wearing a scarf for woman and implementing 
Islamic rituals and ceremonies. Dominated by Muslim, the district is also well known as 
“the Muslim town” in West Java province. 
Most of the Sundanese Muslims in the district are Sunni. The other Muslims follow 
other branches in Islam, including Shia and Sufism. In addition, the Sundanese Muslims 
have different characteristics to the Javanese Muslims as their Muslim identity is strongly 
related to their Sundanese identity. In this sense, the Sundanese Muslims combine practices 
of Islam with their Sundanese cultures. To a certain extent, however, they also have a 
strong identification with the wider Islamic community. As Newland points out:  
Being Muslim for the Sundanese, then, is associated with being indigenous to West Java, 
where affiliation with Islam tends to suggest a certain ethnic purity. A Muslim identity 
also connects the Sundanese with the wider Islamic community (ummat) theologically 
centered on Mecca, which has had a decisive influence on the religious and political 
thought of the Sundanese living in the Priangan Mountains.
5
   
A detailed historical account of the spread of Islam in the district is beyond the 
scope of this study. However, it should be acknowledged that Islam was spread in the 
district through various modes. Some historians argue that Islam arrived in this district 
from Mecca. Other scholars believe that Islam came to this district from Persia (Iran) and 
                                                          
3
 Moriyama explains that the Sundanese people had realized that they had different language, culture and 
ethnicity with Javanese for long time ago. This awareness had been stronger since the Dutch colonialism 
came in power. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sundanese people established various 
organizations in order to show their own identities distinguishing them from the Javanese people as the largest 
ethnic group in Indonesia. Furthermore, see Mikihiro Moriyama, “Discovering the “Language” and the 
“Literature” of West Java: An Introduction to the Formation of Sundanese Writing in 19 th Century West Java, 
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996); Edi S. Ekadjati, “Paguyuban Pasundan: A Sundanese Revival 
1913-1918, Journal of Asian and African Studies, No. 66 (2003). 
4
 Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District (2007). 
5
 Lynda Newland, “Under the Banner of Islam: Mobilizing Religious Identities in West Java, The Australian 
Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000). 
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Gujarat (India). Moreover, similar to the Islamisation of Indonesia in general, the 
Islamisation in the district was also structurally shaped by various interlocking groups and 
institutions, namely the sultanates with their maritime economic power along Java’s coast, 
a group of foreign Muslim scholars serving in the bureaucratic and ritual posts of the 
sultanates and the Sufi mystical teachers.
6
 In West Java province in general and in the 
district in particular, the spread of Islam came from two regions, namely Banten and 
Cirebon in the sixteenth centuries. According to Wessing, in the early days, Islam in this 
region was strongly influenced by shamanistic practices. The spread of Islam in this area 
was also strongly mystical in which Islamic teachers were recognized to have great magical 
powers.
7
    
There are at least three historical events through which the district cannot be 
separated from Islamic radical movements in Indonesia. Firstly, there were several Islamic 
revolts which took place during the Dutch and Japanese colonialism. These Islamic revolts 
were organized by Sufism groups, Islamic teachers and various Islamic boarding schools. 
Secondly, another Islamic radical movement took place after the declaration of 
independence in 1945, namely the Islamic State Movement (Darul Islam Indonesia or DII). 
Led by S.M. Kartosuwiryo, the movement aimed to establish an Islamic state and to 
implement sharia (Islamic laws) in Indonesia. The movement spread to five other 
provinces in Indonesia, including Aceh, West Sumatera and South Sulawesi in 1948-1962.
8
 
Despite the fact that the movement failed to achieve its goals, it has inspired various 
Islamic radical groups in the district to preserve the demand of the establishment of an 
Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in the district until recently. Thirdly, there 
was an ethnic riot in 1996 stimulated by police brutality and abuse towards an Islamic 
                                                          
6
 Furthermore, see Horikoshi Hiroko, A Traditional Leader in A Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in 
West Java (Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), p. 39. 
7
 Furthermore, Robert Wessing, “A Change in the Forest: Myth and History in Java,” Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1993). 
8
 Horikoshi argues that the movement was based on the long-standing failure of Islamic parties to realize an 
Islamic state or to provide united leadership to the Islamic community. Furthermore, see Hiroko Horikoshi, 
“The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process,” Indonesia, 
Vol. 20 (1975). See also, Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion, pp. 237-76; Kees van 
Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981).  
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teacher. In this riot, several police offices, churches and Chinese-owned businesses were 
destroyed.
9
 
The influence of Islam on the political attitude of the local population is very strong. 
The dominant actors in maintaining a strong relationship between Islam and politics in the 
district are Islamic teachers (kyai or ulama).
10
 The role of Islamic teachers in the district is 
very significant in determining not only religious aspects, but also the socio-political 
dimensions of the local population. Moreover, the relationship between Islamic teachers 
and the local population is based on the patron-client mechanism. In such a relationship, 
Islamic teachers serve as the patrons who provide material as well as spiritual resources for 
the local population. The local population in return acts as the clients who provide 
obedience and respects to Islamic teachers. Through such a relationship, these Islamic 
teachers have a so-called “traditional authority” to lead the local population.11 They also 
have “sacred authority” in which Islamic teachers have the privilege to interpret Islamic 
tenets and these interpretations are strictly followed by the local population.
12
 In general, 
Islamic teachers in the district play a pivotal role in linking the local population and other 
actors in the larger system, including with party politics.
13
 
Nowadays, the role of Islamic teachers in determining the political attitude of the 
local population is not as decisive as it was in the past due to several factors. The manager 
of the Sukahideung Islamic boarding school in the district, an Islamic boarding school with 
no affiliation with any political party, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, explains that the role of 
Islamic teachers in determining the voting behavior continues to decline as there is a 
growing political pragmatism among these Islamic teachers.
14
 Moreover, since the fall of 
Suharto or the reformation period, as argued by a cultural observer, Acep Zamzam Noer, 
                                                          
9
 The chronology of the Tasikmalaya riot in 1996 is available at 
http://www.tempointeractive.com/ang/har/1997/970107_1-e.htm.  
10
 Horikoshi distinguishes Islamic leaders in Indonesia into two types, namely ulama and kyai. Coming from 
the Islamic teachers’ family, the former refers to the Islamic teacher who plays moral and religious roles in 
society. Meanwhile, the latter refers to Islamic teacher with charismatic personalities. The position of kyai is 
superior to ulama in the local popualtion. Furthermore, see Horikoshi Hiroko, A Traditional Leader in a Time 
of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java, pp. 344-46. 
11
 Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion (London: The University of California Press, 
1973), pp. 186-94. 
12
 Furthermore, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), pp. 57-60. 
13
 Horikoshi Hiroko, A Traditional Leader in A Time of Change: The Kijaji and Ulama in West Java, pp. 375-
81. 
14
 Interview with Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, December 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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many Islamic teachers has acted as political brokers in the relationship between political 
parties and their electorates as well as between candidates for governor, district head and 
mayor and their voters.
15
 As a consequence, the political trust in Islamic teachers among 
the local population has been declining.  
On the other hand, there is also a growing political pragmatism among the local 
population. The deputy manager of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school in the 
district, Abdul Haziz Affandy, explains that since the modification of the electoral system 
from the close-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list 
proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections and because of a 
growing mechanism of money politics, the local population has become more pragmatic in 
its political activities, including in their voting behavior.
16
 Similarly, the manager of the 
Cipasung Islamic boarding school in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, argues that the local 
population has become more rational in their political attitude so that they are able to 
distinguish in Islamic teachers between their status as religious leaders or politicians.
17
 
The role of Islamic social organizations is also very important in maintaining a 
strong relationship between Islam and politics. There are three main Islamic organizations 
which determine the socio-political preferences of the local population in the district. The 
biggest Islamic organization is the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama or 
NU) representing traditionalist Muslims
18
 with strong elements of Sufism.
19
 Meanwhile, 
the Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam or PERSIS)
20
 and the Muhammadiyah
21
 represent 
modernist (puritan) Muslims.  
                                                          
15
 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
16
 Interview with Abdul Haziz Affandy, December 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
17
 Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
18
 Furthermore on the NU, see Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and 
Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 
19
 On Sufism in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, “Origins and Development of the Sufi Orders 
(Tarekat) in Southeast Asia,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-23; Julian Day Howell, 
“Modulations of Active Piety: Professors and Televangelists As Promoters of Indonesian “Sufisme”,” in Greg 
Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 40-62. 
20
 Furthermore on the PERSIS, see Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam. Islamic Reform in Twentieth 
Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1970).  
21
 Furthermore on the Muhammadiyah, see, Syamsuddin, M. Sirajuddin, Religion and Politics in Indonesia 
Islam: The Case of Muhammiyah in Indonesia New Order (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 
1991); Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree. A Study of the Muhammadiyah 
Movement in a Central Javanese Town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983). 
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To a lesser extent, the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in the district also play 
an important role in maintaining the relationship between Islam and politics. In 2005, there 
were 634 Islamic boarding schools and 61778 Islamic students (santri).  Not surprisingly, 
the district is also known as “the Islamic boarding schools town” in Indonesia. Among 
these Islamic boarding schools, there are three major Islamic boarding schools, namely the 
Cipasung, Miftahul Huda and Suryalaya Islamic boarding schools.  
The Cipasung Islamic boarding school was founded in 1931 by a charismatic 
Islamic teacher, Ruchyat. Adopting a modern educational system, the school provides 
educational curricula covering not only religious lessons, but also modern skills, such as 
technology and computer studies. It also conducts educational activities from elementary 
school to university level. After the death of Ruchyat, the school was led by another 
charismatic leader, Ilyas Ruchyat, son of. At the moment, the school is led by Acep Adang 
Ruchyat, the little brother of Ilyas Ruchyat. In 2003, the school had more than five 
thousand students and alumni coming from many regions in Indonesia as well as some 
neighboring countries.
22
 In addition, the school is affiliated with the NU in which some 
leaders and teachers in the school serve as officials of the NU in the district.
23
  
Meanwhile, the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school was founded in 1967 by 
another charismatic Islamic teacher, Choer Affandi, who served as the leader of the Islamic 
State Movement in the 1950s in the district. Applying Salafism, the school focuses heavily 
on Islamic studies. Different to the Cipasung Islamic boarding school in which its 
educational curricula are set by a wider spectrum of persons, the educational curricula of 
the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school are guided only by Choer Affandi and his 
decedents. Since the death of Choer Affandi, the school has been led by his first son, Asep 
A. Maoshul Affandy. In 2007, the school had more than three thousands students and 
alumni coming from different regions in Indonesia and some neighboring countries.
24
 
Although some leaders and teachers of the school serve as officials of the NU in the district 
and in the West Java province, the school has no formal relationship with the NU.
25
 
                                                          
22
 More information about the school is available at http://www.cipasung.com.  
23
 Interview with Acep Adang Ruchyat, November 22, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
24
 More information about the school is available at http://www.miftahul-huda.com.  
25
 Interview with Abdul Haziz Affandy, December 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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The oldest Islamic boarding school in the district is the Suryalaya Islamic boarding 
school which was founded by Syaikh Abdullah bin Nur Muhammad in 1905. Similar to the 
Cipasung Islamic boarding school, the Suryalaya Islamic boarding school implements a 
modern approach in its educational system covering not only religious lessons, but also 
other modern subjects. Based on two major branches in Sufism, namely Qadiriyah and 
Naqsabandiyah, the school provides educational activities from elementary school to 
university level. In addition, it is internationally known as the leading drug rehabilitation 
center. Currently, the school is led by another charismatic Islamic teacher, Ahmad 
Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin, the son of Syaikh Abdullah bin Nur Muhammad. In 2007, the 
school has more than three thousands students and of alumni coming from various regions 
in Indonesia and some neighboring countries.
26
 
The relationship among these Islamic organizations, Islamic boarding schools and 
the Islamic parties is very strong. The local population assumes that the NU and Cipasung 
Islamic boarding school have a strong relationship with the National Awakening Party 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB) as Ilyas Ruchyat became one of initiators of the 
party. Meanwhile, the Muhammadiyah is close to the National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional or PAN) and the PERSIS has a political relationship with the Star and 
Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB). The local population also assumes that the 
Mifathul Huda Islamic boarding school is close to the United Development Party (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), while the Suryalaya Islamic boarding school is close to 
the Functional Groups Party (Partai Golongan Karya or Golkar Party).
27
 
Regarding the socio-economic conditions, it is important to mention that the local 
population in the district experiences various problems. In 2007, for instance, the per capita 
Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of the district was Rp. 5601223.41 (€ 373.41) 
so that it was categorized as one of the districts with a low per capita GRDP in West Java 
province.
28
 Another example, the poverty level reached 28.55 percent of the total 
population, while the unemployment level reached 7.9 percent in 2007.
29
 The purchasing 
                                                          
26
 More information about the school is available at http://www.suryalaya.org or http://www.suryalaya.net.  
27
 Interview with anonymous, January 3, 2009 (Tasikmalaya). 
28
 Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) of the Tasikmalaya District in 2007. 
29
 Ibid. 
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power was also very low reaching only Rp. 558928 (€ 37.26).30 Not surprisingly, the 
district was also categorized as one of the poorest districts in West Java province. 
Moreover, in 2007, 27.5 percent of the total population in the district was not able to 
complete elementary school, while 53.3 percent of them finished elementary school. This 
information shows that the educational attainment in the district is very low.
31
  
Similarly, the self-financing ability of the district is also very limited. In 2007, for 
example, the local origin income of the district contributed Rp. 34726029176 (€ 
2515068.61) to the total income of the district that reached Rp. 956897001611 (€ 
63,793,133.44). In other words, the local origin income (known as Pendapatan Asli Daerah 
or PAD) only contributed 3.63 percent to the total income. Not surprisingly, in terms of the 
self-financing capacity, the district has depended on subsidies from the central government 
since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001.
32
  
In general, the local population in the district has two interesting peculiarities. 
Firstly, Islam is embedded in the way of life of the local population. Secondly, the local 
population has experienced various socio-economic problems. Such a combination has, in 
turn, facilitated the local population in adopting a strong Islamic sentiment. As argued by 
Mujani and Liddle, Islamic sentiments in Indonesia are stronger among those who are less 
educated in general, those who are educated in religious rather than secular schools, those 
whose household incomes are relatively low and those who live in village areas.
33
 Not 
surprisingly, the local population in the district is categorized as Muslims with a strong 
Islamic sentiment. 
 
1.2. Executive Branch of Government 
During the New Order period in 1966-1998, similar to other regional governments in 
Indonesia, the executive branch of government in the district lacked the authority to 
manage the district. In this period, the central government appointed the district head 
(bupati) who mostly came from the military. Not surprisingly, the executive branch of 
government served as the instrument of the central government in order to establish and 
                                                          
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 The Tasikmalaya District Government’s Report in 2008. 
33
 Furthermore, see Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Politics, Islam and Public Opinion,” Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2004), 109-23. 
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maintain the centralized system. Meanwhile, the role of the legislative branch of 
government (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) was insignificant in making 
policies. During the New Order period, the legislative branch of government acted just as 
rubber-stamps for policies made by the central government through the executive branch of 
government in the district.  
Since the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy 
(otonomi daerah or otda) in 2001, the condition has shifted. Based on new provisions on 
regional government, similar to other district and municipal governments in Indonesia, the 
executive branch of government in the district has authority to manage the district in 
various sectors, i.e., public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, 
industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives and manpower. In 
addition, following the implementation of the direct presidential election in 2004, the 
district has also implemented the direct district heads elections (known as pemilihan kepala 
daerah langsung or pilkadasung) since 2006.
34
 
Figure 4.3  
The Tasikmalaya District Administrative System
35
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Furthermore on the direct elections of governor, district head and mayor in Indonesia, see Priyambudi 
Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb, “Indonesia and the Quest for “Democracy”,” in Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi 
Sulistiyanto (eds.), Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada) 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 1-37. 
35
 Derived from Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 6/2004 on Tasikmalaya Government Structure. 
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        Based on Tasikmalaya Regulation (Peraturan Daerah or Perda) No. 6/2004 on 
Tasikmalaya Government Structures, as shown in Figure 4.3, the executive branch of 
government consists of the district head and vice. In managing the district, they are 
supported by an executive secretariat, a legislative secretariat, agencies, technical 
institutions and sub-district governments. It is important to note that the village government 
has autonomy in arranging their own affairs so that government at the village level is not a 
part of the executive branch at the district level. 
Further, there are twelve agencies in the district, namely the educational, regional 
income, health, transportation, farming, fishery & marine, forestry, agriculture, commerce, 
industry & cooperation, mining & energy resource, public works, regional settlement, 
spatial plan & environmental, population, labor and family planning agencies. Meanwhile, 
there are six offices (the public safety and national unity, archive and library, social 
empowerment, tourism and culture, agricultural instructor and research and development 
offices), three boards (the regional development planning, internal controlling and training, 
education and personnel boards) and a civil service police unit within technical institutions. 
After the implementation of the decentralized system and the establishment of the 
Tasikmalaya municipality in 2001, the district has thirty-nine sub-districts and three 
thousand and fifty-one villages, including Singaparna sub-district as the capital of the 
district.
36
  
Table 4.1  
Profile of Sub-Districts 
 
No. Sub-District Area (ha) Number of 
Village 
Population  
M F 
1 Cipatujah 22,440 15 n/a n/a 
2 Karangnunggal 128.210 14 35,826 35,984 
3 Cikalong 13,291.966 13 27,364 27,276 
4 Pancatengah 19,905 11 21,980 21,806 
5 Cikatomas 15,032.83 9 20,228 20,112 
6 Cibalong 5,959.973 6 14,161 14,014 
7 Parungponteng 4,718.894 8 15,903 15,751 
8 Bantarkalong 6,294.810 8 15,090 14,722 
9 Bojongasih n/a n/a n/a n/a 
10 Culamega 6,211.5 5 11,058 11,023 
                                                          
36
 Before the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, the Tasikmalaya municipality was an 
administrative area within the Tasikmalaya district. 
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No. Sub-District Area (ha) Number of 
Village 
Population  
M F 
11 Bojonggambir 12,261 10 18,148 18,029 
12 Sodonghilir 10,671 12 29,068 28,638 
13 Taraju 5,552 9 15,991 16,556 
14 Salawu 5,969.193 12 25,475 26,928 
15 Puspahiang 5,171 8 15,107 15,306 
16 Tanjungjaya 3,637 7 18,859 19,132 
17 Sukaraja 4,185.312 8 21,561 21,423 
18 Salopa 10,695.531 9 20,780 20,928 
19 Jatiwaras 7,705.997 11 23,058 22,769 
20 Cineam 770.290 10 16,038 16,812 
21 Karangjaya 4,748.130 4 5,917 6,171 
22 Manonjaya 4,215 12 25,653 26,338 
23 Gunungtanjung 1,389.80 7 13,535 14,825 
24 Singaparna 2,178.837 10 27,856 28,592 
25 Mangunreja 2,265.832 6 16,303 16,814 
26 Sukarame 1,562.572 6 18,824 19,439 
27 Cigalontang 11,913 16 35,499 34,733 
28 Leuwisari 5,416.55 7 16,049 16,404 
29 Padakembang 1,809 5 14,991 16,022 
30 Sariwangi 8,505.29 8 14,036 14,211 
31 Sukaratu 3,361.104 8 20,465 20,443 
32 Cisayong 4,709.708 13 22,604 23,971 
33 Sukahening 2,561.651 7 12,928 13,185 
34 Rajapolah 1,692.04 8 18,569 18,989 
35 Jamanis 723.773 8 15,982 15,104 
36 Ciawi 4,223 11 27,624 27,809 
37 Kadipaten 3,564.638 6 14,693 14,853 
38 Pagerageung 6,368.450 10 23,873 2,380 
39 Sukaresik 1,708.400 8 16,240 16,038 
Source: http://tasikmalayakab.go.id/index.php. 
 Tatang Farhanul Hakim has served as the district head since 2001. Born on March 
18, 1961, he started his political career as a member of the Golkar in the 1970s. Afterwards, 
he decided to move to the PPP in 1978. He started his career in the PPP by serving as an 
official of the party at the village level, before holding a position as the vice head of the 
party in the district in 1987-1998. His political career continued to advance when he was in 
charge as the head of the PPP in the district in 1999-2006. Afterwards, he served as a 
legislator for the PPP in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in the periods of 1992-1997, 
1997-1999 and 1999-2001. Supported by the PPP and Golkar Party, in turn, he was 
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appointed as the district head by the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in 2001.
37
 When the 
district conducted the 2006 direct district head election, he was re-elected by gaining 24.24 
percent of the total votes.
38
 
In addition, Tatang Farhanul Hakim is one of a small number of district heads in 
Indonesia to come from an Islamic party. According to Bush, among the five hundred 
governors, district heads and mayors who were directly elected until June 2007, only 4.9 
percent of them came from Islamic parties and 2.7 percent of them came from a coalition of 
these parties. The others were candidates from a coalition of Islamic parties and secular-
nationalist parties (37 percent), from secular-nationalist parties (33 percent) and from a 
coalition of secular-nationalist parties (23 percent).
39
  
Since 2001, Tatang Farhanul Hakim has introduced various sharia-based 
regulations. He introduced Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the 
Tasikmalaya District in 2001-2005 through which the development process in the 
Tasikmalaya district was based on Islamic principles. When he was re-elected in 2006, this 
policy was continued under a new provision, namely Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 17/2006 
on Tasikmalaya Medium-Term Development Plan in 2006-2010. He also introduced 
Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 3/2001 on Security and Order Based on Morality, Religion, 
Local Ethics and Values in the Tasikmalaya district. 
Moreover, he also introduced various sharia-based regulations in the form of 
district head’s decree (Surat Keputusan Bupati) and a district head’s letter (Surat Edaran 
Bupati). Until 2008, there were at least three sharia-based regulations in these forms, i.e., 
the District Head Decree No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 on Quran Literacy Obligation for Pupils 
and Bride Muslim Dress in the Tasikmalaya District, the District Head Circulation Letter 
No. 451/1271/Sos on Wearing of Muslim Dress for Government Apparatus in the 
Tasikmalaya District and the District Head Circulation Letter No. 556.3/SE/03/Sos/2001 on 
Management of Swimming Pools in the Tasikmalaya District.  
Tatang Farhanul Hakim argues that through these provisions, he attempts to achieve 
several goals. The first goal is to maintain Islamic culture in the district as the majority of 
                                                          
37
 Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
38
 General Election Commission’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District (2006). 
39
 Bush Robin, “Regional Sharia Regulation in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in Greg Fealy and Sally 
White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 174-91. 
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the local population is Muslim. The second goal is to establish an Islamic society in the 
district so that the district will be able to serve as a barometer of the Islamic movements in 
West Java province. And the third goal is to unite the Muslim community in the district. He 
also argues that, instead of facilitating the reemergence of the Islamic radical movements, 
more specifically the Islamic State Movement, these provisions aim to prevent the rise of 
such movements in the district in particular and in Indonesia in general. 
40
 
Various reactions emerged when Tatang Farhanul Hakim introduced these 
provisions. According to Acep Zamzam Noer and an academic from Siliwangi University, 
Subhan, some Islamic organizations in the district, such as youth organizations inside the 
NU, did not support these provisions. On the other hand, various fundamental 
organizations, such as the Taliban and Mujahidin and some Islamic boarding schools, such 
as the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school, supported these provisions.
41
 These 
provisions were supported by the Islamic parties, including the Muslim-nationalist parties, 
as well as the secular-nationalist parties. The head of the Golkar Party in the district, Eman 
Sulaiman, explains that his party decided to support these provisions as they were in 
accordance with the ideology and platforms of his party.
42
 Similarly, the head of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan or PDI-P) 
in the district, Ade Sugianto, argues that since they were in line with the ideology and 
platforms of his party, there was no reason for his party to reject these provisions.
43
  
However, many people criticized the implementation of these provisions. Acep 
Zamzam Noer, for instance, argues that such provisions in fact reflect political maneuvers 
of Tatang Farhanul Hakim and his proponents in order to gain their political support. In this 
sense, it has nothing to do with the intention to establish an Islamic state in the district. 
44
 
Similarly, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab explains that these provisions have failed to increase the 
social welfare of the local population, including in the religious sector.
45
 These illustrations 
suggest that the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in the 
district has been hijacked by local elites in order to serve their own personal interest. Not 
                                                          
40
 Interview with Tatang Farhanul Hakim, December 4, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
41
 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya); Interview with Subhan, November 
15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
42
 Interview with Eman Sulaeman, December 16, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
43
 Interview with Ade Sugianto, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
44
 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya) 
45
 Interview with Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, December 26, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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surprisingly, the implementation of the decentralization system and regional autonomy 
since 2001 has failed to increase the social welfare of the local population.
46
    
 
1.3. Political Parties and Legislature  
Since the 1955 election, the district has been known as one of the political bases for the 
Islamic parties in Indonesia to gain political support in elections. In the 1957 election, the 
major Islamic parties in the district were the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims 
Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Masyumi Party), the Renaissance of 
Islamic Scholars Party (Nahdlatul Ulama Party or NU Party) and the Indonesian Islamic 
United Party (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or PSII). Despite the fact that all of these 
parties experienced a significant defeat at the national level in the 1955 election, they were 
still able to gain significant votes and seats in the district in the 1957 election. In addition, 
these Islamic parties competed with secular-nationalist parties, i.e., the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), the Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(Partai Nasionalis Indonesia or PNI), the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia or PSI), the Free Indonesian Party (Partai Rakyat Indonesia Merdeka or PRIM) 
and the Sundanese Choice Movement (Gerakan Pilihan Sunda or Gerpis).  
Table 4.2  
Distribution of Votes and Seats in the 1957 Election47 
Party Votes 
(from a total of 392,036 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 35 seats)
 
 
Masyumi Party 123,570 11 
NU Party  74,369 7 
PKI  67,940 6 
PNI  63,745 6 
PSI  15,995 2 
PRIM  12,036 1 
PSII  11,683 1 
Gerpis  9,213 1 
Others 13,485 - 
   Source: Library of Indonesia Studies, Cornell University. 
                                                          
46
 A similar condition also takes place in many regions in Indonesia. Furthermore, see M. Ryaas Rasyid , 
“Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia. 
Decentralization and Democratization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 63-71; 
Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform,” Critical Asian 
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2004, pp. 615-36. 
47
 Special thanks to Kevin Evans for providing this information. 
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However, these Islamic parties in the district experienced a significant decline in the 
New Order’s elections.48 In the 1971 election, although the NU Party was able to gain 
17.62 percent of votes and 7 percent of seats, the party was not able to prevent the political 
domination of the Golkar. Similarly, although it was able to gain third position, the 
Indonesian’s Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Parmusi) which was a 
reinvention of the Masyumi Party gained one seat. Other Islamic parties, namely the 
Indonesian Unite Islam Party (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or PSII) and Islamic 
Education Movement Party (Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah or PERTI) were even 
not able to obtain a single seat in the district.  
Table 4.3  
Distribution of Votes and Seats in the 1971 Election 
 
Party Votes 
(from a total of 590,934 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 39 seats)
49 
 
Golkar  447,511 24 
NU Party 104,130 7 
Parmusi  24,564 1 
PSII  5,303 - 
PNI  4,034 - 
IPKI  2,427 - 
Parkindo  1,271 - 
Perti  1,087  
Catholic Party 381 - 
Murba Party  226 - 
TNI-Polri - 7 
     Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1997). 
The political domination of Golkar in the district remained stable after the 1971 
election. Many factors contributed to this condition. The main factor is the party fusion 
policy proposed by the New Order government. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Islamic 
parties and the secular-nationalist parties in the 1971 election were forced to merge into a 
single party. In the context of the Islamic parties, the NU Party, Parmusi, Perti and PSII 
were forced to merge into the PPP. Meanwhile, the PNI, IPKI, Parkindo, Catholic Party and 
Murba were induced to establish a single secular-nationalist party, namely the Indonesian 
                                                          
48
 Furthermore on the New Order’s elections, see Syamsuddin Haris, "General Elections under The New 
Order,” in Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth (eds.), Elections in Indonesia. The New Order and Beyond 
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 18-37. 
49
 In the 1971 election, seven seats of the total thirty-nine seats in the Tasikmalaya Legislative Council were 
allocated for the military (TNI) and police (Polri). 
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Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI). As a consequence of the party 
fusion policy, the PPP and PDI experienced various internal conflicts during the New Order 
period. Moreover, the implementation of the sole ideology in which the PPP was forced to 
adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation also became another contributing factor to 
the failure of this party to increase the level of its political support. 
Table 4.4  
Distribution of Votes in the New Order’s Elections 
 
Party 1977 
(%) 
1982 
(%) 
1987 
(%) 
1992 
(%) 
1997 
(%) 
Golkar  58.49 61.11 71.78 68.37 70.33 
PPP 39.37 32.77 15.94 20.67 28.81 
PDI 2.14 6.12 12.28 10.96 0.86 
   Source: General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1997). 
The political constellation in the district has shifted since the fall of the New Order 
authoritarian regime in 1998. In the 1999 election, forty-eight parties competed in the 
district, including sixteen Islamic parties. As a result, three secular-nationalist parties and 
five Islamic parties were able to gain significant votes and seats. The secular-nationalist 
parties in the 1999 election which gained significant votes and seats were the PDI-P which 
was reinvention of the PDI, the Golkar Party and the Justice and Union Party (Partai 
Keadilan dan Persatuan or PKP). Meanwhile, the Islamic parties which succeeded in 
gaining significant votes and seats in this election were the PPP, the PKB, the PAN, the 
PBB and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK). In the 1999 election, as shown in the 
following table, the PPP succeeded in replacing the Golkar as the winning party in the 
district.  
Table 4.5 
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the 1999 Election  
 
Party Votes 
(from a total of 1,162,348 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 45 seats)
 
 
PPP 298,399 11 
Golkar 257,163 9 
PDI-P 214,125 8 
PKB 133,464 5 
PAN 64,322 3 
PBB 54,685 2 
PKP 16,495 1 
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Party Votes 
(from a total of 1,162,348 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 45 seats)
 
 
PK 15,869 1 
TNI-Polri - 5 
       Source: General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (1999). 
 Further, the 1999 election produced forty-five legislators for the period of 1999-
2004 in which five of them were representatives of the military (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia or TNI) and police (Polisi Republik Indonesia or Polri). The organizational 
structure of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period was divided into a head, 
three deputies and five commissions focusing on government, economy, finance, 
development and social welfares issues. Regarding the profile of these legislators, as shown 
in Table 4.6, all of the legislators in this period were Muslims. Moreover, most of them 
were males and they had bachelor and diploma degrees.  
In this period, Ade Sugianto from the PDI-P served as the head of the legislature, 
supported by Tatang Farhanul Hakim from the PPP, Dede T. Widarsih from the Golkar and 
Uyun Moch. Yunus from TNI/Polri as the deputies. As mentioned earlier, the Tasikmalaya 
District Legislature in this period elected Tatang Farhanul Hakim as the district head for the 
period of 2001-2006. Moreover, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period also 
supported the sharia-based policies which were proposed by Tatang Farhanul Hakim. In 
general, however, there was no significant political achievement made by the Tasikmalaya 
District Legislature in this period. 
Table 4.6  
Profile of the Legislators in 1999-2004  
 
No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
1 
2 
 
3 
4 
Ade Sugianto 
Tatang Farhanul Hakim/ 
Didin Badrudin 
Dede T. Widarsih 
Uyun Moch Yunus 
Head 
Vice Head 
 
Vice Head 
Vice Head 
PDI-P 
PPP 
 
Golkar 
TNI-Polri 
M 
M 
 
F 
M 
Bachelor 
High School 
 
High School 
n/a 
Islam 
Islam 
 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission A (Government) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Heri Hendriana 
Arip Rachman 
Dedi Sumadi T. 
Agus Mansyur 
Nandang Zenal Mustofa 
Adang Roosman 
Asep Nurjaeni 
Momon Sam’an Kertajani 
Head 
Vice Head 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Amanah (PAN) 
PDI-P 
TNI-Polri 
PPP 
PPP 
Golkar  
Golkar  
PKB 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Master 
Bachelor 
n/a 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Master 
Bachelor 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
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No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
Commission B (Economy) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Ajen Zaenal Mustofa 
Lucky Dayapermana 
Laela Suroya 
Ruhimat 
Satim Sukarsa 
Iip Samsul Arief 
Tetep Abdulatip 
Omon Alhadi 
Head 
Vice Head 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
 
PPP 
Amanah (PK) 
PDI-P 
PPP 
Golkar  
Amanah (PAN) 
PKB 
TNI-Polri 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
High School 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
n/a 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission C (Finance) 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Acep Sutrisna 
Subarna 
Endang Hadis 
Asep Ahmad S.  
Undang Ishak Abdullah 
R. Rahmat Heryadi 
Ade Komaludin  
Basir Sirajudin Ahmad 
Endang Hidayat 
Pu’yat Purwayadi 
Head 
Vice Head 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PDI-P 
PPP 
Golkar  
PPP 
Golkar  
PDI-P 
Amanah (PAN) 
Amanah (PBB) 
PKB 
TNI-Polri 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Master 
Bachelor 
Master 
High School 
Bachelor 
n/a 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission D (Development) 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Encap Supriatna 
Aa Suparman K.  
Dedi Mulyadi 
U. Ruzhanul Ulum 
Dju’an 
Cion Wirawan 
Basuki Rahmat 
Atang Suryana Ansorulhaq 
Syahrul 
Head 
Vice Head 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Golkar  
PPP 
PDI-P 
PPP 
Golkar  
PDI-P 
Amanah (PKP) 
PKB 
TNI-Polri 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
n/a 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission E (Social Welfare) 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Ade Muhamad Yasin  
Arifin 
Yadi Mulyadi 
Sobariah 
Adang Sofyan Toha  
Muhamad Ma’mun 
Head 
Vice Head 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PPP 
Golkar  
PDI-P 
PPP 
Amanah (PBB) 
PKB 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (1999). 
In the 2004 election, there were twenty-four parties in the district, including seven 
Islamic parties. As a result, three secular-nationalist parties and six Islamic parties gained 
significant votes and seats. Most of them were parties gaining votes and seats in the 1999 
election. The new parties were the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat or PD) which adopted 
Pancasila and the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or PBR) which adopted 
Islam as their ideological foundation. In this election, the Golkar Party was able to defeat 
the PPP although the PPP increased its votes and seats. In addition, PKB was able to 
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maintain its support, while the PAN, PBB and some others experienced a significant 
decline in their votes and seats. Interestingly, the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) which was a reinvention of the PK and the PBR succeeded in 
increasing the level of their political support in this election.  
Table 4.7 
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Nine Parties in the 2004 Election 
 
Party Votes 
(from a total of 891,996 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 45 seats) 
Golkar Party 243,376 12 
PPP  241,363 12 
PDI-P 98,169 7 
PKB 69,482 5 
PKS 57,118 4 
PAN 39,865 2 
PD  30,566 1 
PBR 34,504 1 
PBB 28,097 1 
   Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (2004). 
The 2004 election produced 45 legislators for the period of 2004-2009. The 
organizational structure of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in this period was divided 
into a head, three deputies and four commissions, namely government, economy, 
development and social culture. The profile of the legislators in this period was slightly 
different with their counterparts in the previous period. As shown in Table 4.8, although 
most of the legislators were males, the proportion of females increased. Moreover, three 
Islamic parties were able to send their female representatives, namely the PKB, PPP and 
PKS. The number of legislators who had a master degree also increased. Similar to the 
previous period, these legislators came from an Islamic background.  
In this period, U. Ruzhanul Ulum from the PPP served as the head of the legislature, 
supported by Adang Roosman from the Golkar Party and Aef Syaripudin from the PDI-P as 
the deputies. Different to the legislators in the previous period in which they were 
representatives of the military and police, all of the legislators in this period were elected 
through the 2004 election. Similar to the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in the previous 
period, however, there was no significant performance made by the Tasikmalaya District 
Legislature in this period. In addition, a similar condition also takes place in other areas in 
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Indonesia. Not surprisingly, as indicated by the AsianBarometer surveys, political trust in 
the legislative institution among the Indonesian people continues to decrease.
50
 
Table 4.8  
Profile of the Legislators in 2004-2009 
 
No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
1 
2 
3 
U. Ruzhanul Ulum 
Adang Roosman 
Aef Syaripudin 
Head 
Vice Head 
Vice Head 
PPP 
Golkar Party  
PDI-P 
M 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission I (Government) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Dede T. Widarsih 
Agus Mansur 
Momon Sam’an Kertajani 
Arifin 
Aris Jauhari 
Ade M. Yasin 
Cecep Badrul Mutakin 
Dindin Suryana 
Iip Syamsul Arief 
Ucu Dewi Syarifah 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PKB 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PDI-P 
Amanah (PAN) 
PKS 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
Master 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission II (Economy) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Subarna  
Herry Andrianto  
Udin Djuana 
Asep Nurjaeni  
Asep Hussein 
Evi Elvinadianty 
Adjid Ahmad Adjidin 
Laela Suroya 
Demi Hamzah Rahadian 
Dadi Supriadi 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PPP 
PDI-P 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PKB 
Amanah (PAN) 
PKS 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
F 
M 
M 
Master 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Master 
Master 
High School 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission III (Development) 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Nandang A.H. 
Danny Ahfa 
Asep Hidayat 
Erry Purwanto 
Anas Sunarsa Kalyubi 
Encap Supriatna 
Ruhimat 
Cecep Nurul Yakin 
Tatang Setiawan/Ajen Zaenal 
Mustofa 
Ade Abdurachmat 
Haris Sanjaya 
R. Hedi Hadiat 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PKB 
PDI-P 
PKS 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PPP 
PDI-P 
PKB 
Amanah (PD) 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
High School 
Master 
Master 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
Master 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission IV (Socio-Culture) 
36 
37 
38 
Ismail A.S. 
Tetep Abdullatif 
S. Herman Hidayatullah 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
PDI-P 
PKS 
Golkar 
M 
M 
M 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
                                                          
50
 Matthew Carlson and Turner, “Popular Perceptions of Political Regimes in East and Southeast Asia,” 
Democratization, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 377-398. 
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No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Agoeng N.S 
Neng Madinah Ruhiat 
Apip Ifan Permadi 
Ucu Subandri 
Syamsudin 
Dede Saeful Anwar 
Muhammad Noer 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Golkar  
PPP 
PPP 
PDI-P 
PKB 
Amanah (PBR) 
Amanah (PBB) 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (2004). 
  
The 2009 election was followed by thirty-eight parties in the district, including 
seven Islamic parties. As a result, four secular-nationalist parties and four Islamic parties 
gained significant votes and seats. Most of them were parties which gained significant 
votes and seats in the 2004 election. Another secular-nationalist party which succeeded in 
obtaining votes and seats was the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya 
Peduli Bangsa or PKPB). In this election, the PPP was able to defeat the Golkar Party 
again. In addition, the PAN and PKS succeeded in increasing their seats. Meanwhile, the 
PKB was able to maintain the number of its seats. In this election, the PBB and PBR 
experienced a significant decline so that they failed to pass the required 2.5 percent 
electoral threshold.  
Table 4.9  
Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the 2009 Election 
 
Party Votes 
(from a total of 826,429 votes) 
Seats 
(from a total of 50 seats) 
PPP 224,215 14 
Golkar Party 123,941 8 
PD 99,559 7 
PDI-P 90,049 7 
PKB 73,029 5 
PKS 56,926 5 
PAN 62,230 3 
PKPB 21,408 1 
  Source: The General Election Commission in the Tasikmalaya District (2009). 
The 2009 election produced the Tasikmalaya District Legislature for the period of 
2009-2014. Consisting of fifty legislators, the structure of the Tasikmalaya District 
Legislature in this period is similar to the previous period. However, the profile of 
legislators in this period is rather different with the previous one. As shown in Table 4.10, 
female representation as well as the number of legislators holding master and bachelor 
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degrees has increased. Similar to the previous periods, however, all members come from an 
Islamic background. In this period, Ruhimat from the PPP serves as the head of the 
legislature, supported by Mochamad Ariep Arseha from the Golkar Party, Ade Sugianto 
from the PDI-P and Ucu Asep Dani from the PD as the deputies.  
Table 4.10 
Profile of the Legislators in 2009-2014 
 
No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Ruhimat 
Mochamad Ariep Arseha 
Ade Sugianto 
Ucu Asep Dani 
Head 
Vice Head 
Vice Head 
Vice Head 
PPP 
Golkar Party 
PDI-P 
PD 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Master 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Master 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission I (Government) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Aef Syaripudin 
R. Toni Hanip  
Yamin Yusuf 
U. Ruzhanul Ulum 
Abud 
Iwan Kurniawan 
Yayan Abdullah 
Ucu Subandri  
Nandang AH 
Ucu Dewi Syarifah 
Rossy Hermawaty 
Demi Hamzah Rahadian 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PDI-P 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PPP 
PD 
PD 
PDI-P 
PKB 
PKS 
PKS 
Amanah (PAN) 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
F 
M 
High School 
High School 
Master 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission II (Economy) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Cecep Nurulyakin 
Ferry Willyam 
Yoga Juanda 
Hidayat Muslim 
Apip Ifan Permadi 
Budiman S Pirmansyah 
Dede T. Widarsih 
Arip Rachman 
Haris Sanjaya 
Syamsudin 
Dadi Supriyadi 
Deni Ramdani 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PPP 
PD 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PPP 
Golkar Party 
PDI-P 
PKB 
PKB 
PKS 
Amanah (PAN) 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Master 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Master 
Bachelor 
Master 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Commission III (Development) 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
39 
Aris Jauhari Suhayatin 
Ajen Zenal Mustopa 
Hedi Hediat 
Subarna 
Ujang Sukmana 
Erry Purwanto 
Agoeng Novansyah 
Ade Abdurrachmat  
Momon Sam’an Kertajani 
Asep Hidayat 
Nana Suryana 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PD 
PPP 
PPP 
Golkar Party 
Golkar Party 
PDI-P 
PKB 
PKS 
Amanah (PKPB) 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
Master 
High School 
Master 
Bachelor 
Master 
Bachelor 
Master 
High School 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
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No Name Position Fraction Sex Education Religion 
Commission IV (Social Welfare) 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Andi Sulanjani 
Maftuh Farid 
Asop Sopiudin 
Mimi Rohmiati 
Siti Nurjanah 
Mansur Supriadi 
Titin Sugiartini 
Ade Anwas  
Oleh Soleh 
Uteng Warsito 
Yane Sriwigantini 
Head 
Vice Head 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
PD 
Golkar Party 
PPP 
PPP 
PPP 
PD 
PDI-P 
PDIP 
PKB  
PKS 
Amanah (PAN) 
M 
M 
M 
F 
F 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
F 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
High School 
Bachelor 
High School 
High School 
High School 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Bachelor 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Source: Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (2009). 
The illustrations above show that the historical root of the Islamic parties in the 
district is very deep. While they experienced a defeat in the 1955 election at the national 
level, some of them were able to gain votes and seats in the 1957 election in the district. 
The condition shifted during the New Order period, while the Golkar was able to maintain 
its political domination. Since the fall of the New Order government, however, the Islamic 
parties were able to gain their supports again. Since the 1999 election, the PPP has been 
able to maintain the level of its political support, although the party experienced defeat by 
the Golkar Party in the 2004 election. Three other Islamic parties, i.e., the PAN, PKB and 
PKS, have relatively been able to maintain their achievements in these elections, while the 
PBR and PBB continued losing their political support.  
By comparing the profile of the legislators in the period of 1999-2004 with their 
counterparts in the period of 2004-2009, in terms of educational background and female 
representation, one can argue that the competencies of these legislators has increased. 
However, so far, there have been no exceptional performances made by these legislators as 
the executive branch of government has played a dominant role in making policies in the 
district. Almost a decade after the implementation of the decentralized system in Indonesia, 
therefore, the Tasikmalaya District Legislature has not been able to conduct its functions 
properly. We will return to this issue in Chapter 7. 
 
2. The Islamic Parties 
It should be acknowledged that the requirements to establish a new political party in 
Indonesia have been more difficult since the implementation of the 1999 election. In the 
1999 election, according to Law No. 2/1999 on Political Party, a party can establish its 
103 
 
organizational structures at the central level (Jakarta), provincial, district or municipal, sub-
district and village levels.
51
 Moreover, Law No. 3/1999 on Election stated that a party must 
establish its organizational structures in at least fifty percent of the total provinces and in at 
least fifty percent of the total districts or municipalities in each of those provinces.
52
 Based 
on this provision, forty-eight parties participated in the 1999 election. 
In the 2004 election, these provisions were changed by Law No. 31/2002 on 
Political Party. According to this provision, a party must establish its organizational 
structures in at least fifty percent of the total provinces, in at least fifty percent of the total 
districts or municipalities in each of those provinces and in at least twenty-five percent of 
the total sub-districts in each of those districts or municipalities. The provision also stated 
that the organizational structure of a party at every level must have its workplace.
53
 Based 
on this provision, twenty-four parties participated in the 2004 election. In this sense, this 
provision succeeded in reducing the number of parties in the 2004 election. 
In the 2009 election, this provision was also changed by Law No. 2/2008 on 
Political Party. According to this provision, a party must establish its organizational 
structures in at least sixty percent of the total provinces, in at least fifty percent of the total 
districts or municipalities in each of those provinces and in at least twenty-five of the total 
sub-districts in each of those districts or municipalities. Each of them must also have its 
workplace.
54
 Based on this provision, thirty-eight parties participated in the 2009 election. 
Therefore, even though the requirements to create a new political party were higher than 
the previous ones, this provision was not able to reduce the number of parties in the 2009 
election.  
 
2.1. The PAN 
The PAN in the district was founded in 1998, shortly after its establishment in Jakarta. 
Adopting Pancasila as its ideology, the party declares that it is an open and a self-reliant 
party. The party’s constitution states that the party adopts democratic principles as well as 
Islamic values. Moreover, the party aims to bring about religious morality, humanity and 
                                                          
51
 Article 11 of Law No. 2/1999 on Political Party.  
52
 Article 39 Paragraph 1b and 1d of Law No. 3/1999 on Election. 
53
 Article 2 Paragraph 3b and 3d of Law No. 31/2002 on Political Party. 
54
 Article 3 Paragraph 2c and 3d of Law No. 2/2008 on Political Party. 
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pluralism in order to be a blessing for the universe (rahmatan lil alamin). It also aims to 
establish the so-called “new Indonesia” which respects and enforces religiousness, people’s 
sovereignty and social welfare.
55
 The ideology of the party in turn is transformed into four 
major platforms, i.e., the maintaining religious values, improving law enforcement and 
establishing good, clean and efficient governance, maintaining people’s sovereignty, 
maintaining the social welfare by developing masyarakat madani,
56
 and improving 
standard of living in society, especially in the education and health sectors. Further, these 
major platforms are divided into various sectors, such as law and politics, national defense, 
economy, religion, education, gender and environment.
57
  
In the law and political sectors, for instance, the party aims to establish a 
decentralized system and regional autonomy. It is important to note that the party has its 
own interpretation on a decentralized system. Firstly, instead of at the district and 
municipal levels, the party argues that regional autonomy should be implemented at the 
provincial level. Secondly, it proposes a federalist system regarding the central and regional 
government relationship in Indonesia. Thirdly, it puts an emphasis on equal developments 
among regions. Fourthly, it tries to increase revenue sharing between the central and 
regional governments.
58
 However, the party has no specific platforms focusing on the 
district.
59
 Considering its ideology and platforms, we can argue that the PAN is “the most 
secular party” among the other Islamic parties. 
 
 
                                                          
55
 Article 3-5 of the party’s statue (2005). In addition, party’s constitution in Indonesia consists of two major 
provisions, namely statue (Anggaran Dasar or AD) and rules (Anggaran Rumah Tangga or ART). The 
former outlines ideology, vision, mission, principles and purposes of the party, while the latter defines 
organizational structures of the party. Party constitution is legalized in a national convention which is 
followed by party leaders at the national level, representatives of the party at the provincial level, 
representatives of the party at district or municipality level and representatives of members from all regions in 
Indonesia. It is normally applied for a period of five years and may be renewed.  
56
 In Indonesian, the term “masyarakat madani” is employed interchangeably with civil society. The term in 
fact refers to the concept of Madinah society during the Prophet Muhammad encompassing pluralism, 
tolerance and democracy. Initially, the term was introduced by Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and it was 
developed further by Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia in the early 1990s. See, for example, Nurcholish 
Madjid, Islam Agama Peradaban: Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah (Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 1995). 
57
 Furthermore, see Article 7 of the party’s statue (2005). 
58
 Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan 
Program 2004-2009 (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2004), pp. 226-39; Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 
Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya (Jakarta: KPU, 2003), pp. 79-84. 
59
 The PAN’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005.  
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Figure 4.4  
Organizational Structure of the PAN
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4., the organizational structure of the PAN in central office in 
the district is manifested by the DPD (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah). Adopting the 
organizational structure of the Muhammadiyah, DPD consists of collegial leadership 
                                                          
60
 Derived from article 9-10 and 16-18 of the party’s statue (2005); Article 25 and 28-31 of the party’s rule 
(2005). 
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between the executive council and the advisory board (Majelis Pertimbangan Partai or 
MPP). The main function of the executive council of the DPD is to manage the party in the 
district. Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders and intellectuals, the main function of 
the MPP is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party as well as to supervise the 
executive council of the DPD. In doing its functions, the executive council of the DPD is 
supported by some deputies. It is also supported by autonomous agencies which are 
established by the party national leadership in Jakarta, such as the youth organization 
(Barisan Muda Partai Amanat Nasional or BM PAN) and Simpatik (the paramilitary 
force).  
Meanwhile, the organizational structures of the party on the ground are represented 
by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) at the sub-district level. The organizational 
structure of the party on the ground is also represented by the DPRt (Dewan Pengurus 
Ranting) at the village, area at the sub-village and sub-area at the group levels among 
households. Similar to the DPD, there is also collegial leadership between the executive 
council and the advisory board in these organizational structures. In addition, in serving its 
functions, the executive council of these organizational structures is also supported by a 
deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy. 
In the 1999 election, the party in the district was able to gain 5.53 percent of the 
votes and three seats. Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, it experienced a decline when it 
gained 4.24 percent of the votes and two seats. In the 2009 election, however, it succeeded 
in increasing the level of its political support by achieving 7.53 per cent of the votes and 
three seats. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support mainly from the 
electorates in Leuwisari sub-district and some sub-districts that are recently included in area 
of the Tasikmalaya municipality, such as Tawang, Cipedes and Cihideung sub-districts. 
Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, the party obtained its support mainly from the electorate 
in Electoral Areas 1 and 6.
61
 In the 2009 election, the party gained its support from these 
areas as well as Electoral Area 3.
62
  
                                                          
61
 In the 2004 election, the Tasikmalaya district had been divided into seven electoral areas (daerah pemilihan 
or dapil). Electoral Area 1 consisted of Sariwangi, Singaparna, Sukarame, Mangunreja, Cigalontang and 
Tanjungjaya sub-districts. Electoral Area 2 covered Jamanis, Ciawi, Kadipaten, Pagerageung and Sukaresik 
sub-districts. Meanwhile, Electoral Area 3 included Leuwisari, Padakembang, Sukaratu, Cisayong, 
Sukahening and Rajapolah sub-district. Then, Electoral Area 4 contained Salopa, Jatiwaras, Cineam, 
Karangjaya, Manonjaya and Gunungtanjung sub-districts. Electoral Area 5 involved Karangnunggal, 
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2.2. The PKB 
In the district, the PKB was founded in 1998, soon after its declaration in Jakarta. 
According to the party’s constitution, the PKB adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. The 
party’s constitution states that the party adopts nationalism and democratic principles. 
Employing a symbol which is similar with the symbol of the NU, it also adopts Islamic 
values, especially Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah.
63
 The party aims to reach major and minor 
goals. As the major goals, the party aims to bring about the national goals as stated in the 
preamble of the national constitution. It also aims to bring about democracy which is based 
on Pancasila and people’s sovereignty in the frame of the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or NKRI). For the minor goals, the party 
makes an effort to bring about a just and prosperous society as well as democratic, open, 
clean and good attitude (akhlakul karimah) practices.
64
  
The ideology of the party in turn is translated into various platforms which can be 
divided into seven sectors, namely religion, politics, economy, law, social-culture, 
education and defense. In the political sector, for instance, the party insists in improving the 
performance of the state institutions and to implement law and human rights enforcement. 
The party also insists on the maintaining of the NKRI. Meanwhile, in the economic sector, 
the party has a strong commitment to implement a people-based economy in which 
economy is based on just and fair market mechanisms.
65
 
Regarding the implementation of a decentralized system, the party intends to 
establish a prosperous and a democratic society at the local level based on self-reliance, 
participation and multiculturalism. In doing so, the party tries to shift the paradigm of a 
decentralized system, from the administrative decentralization to the devolution of power. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Cikalong, Pancatengah and Cikatomas sub-districts, while Electoral Area 6 comprised Cibalong, 
Parungponteng, Bantarkalong, Bojongasih, Culamega, Cipatujah and Sukaraja sub-districts. Finally, Electoral 
Area 7 consisted Bojonggambir, Sodonghilir, Taraju, Salawu and Puspahiang sub-districts.  
62
 Similar to the 2004 election, in the 2009, election the Tasikmalaya district had been divided into seven 
electoral areas. 
63
 Article 3-7 of the party’s statue (2005). Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah is an Islamic doctrine adopted by the NU 
as well. The concept refers to a way of thought that chooses a compromise between the extreme rationalism 
(aqli) and the extreme skripturalism (naqli). In this sense, many argue that Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah in fact is 
moderate Islamic doctrine. Moreover, the concept also refers to a way of life based on the Quran, Sunna of 
the Prophet and his rightly-guided Successors and four schools in Islamic jurisprudence. 
64
 Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Parpol Peserta Pemilu 2004. Perjalanan dan Profilnya, pp. 95-96. 
65
 Article 8 of the party’s statue (2005). 
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Another effort is that the party attempts to manage natural resources in regional 
governments in order to improve the prosperity of the local population. Moreover, it also 
makes an effort to establish a regional autonomy in which the regional governments are 
accountable, transparent, clean, public-service oriented and participative.
66
 However, the 
party lacks platforms focusing on the district.
67
 
Figure 4.5  
Organizational Structure of the PKB
68
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 Furthermore, see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, Partai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi dan 
Program 2004-2009, pp. 250-97. 
67
 The PKB’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006. 
68
 Derived from article 12-14 of the party’s statue (2005). 
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The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested 
by the DPC (Dewan Pengurus Cabang). Adopting the organizational structure of the NU, 
the DPC consists of collegial leadership between Dewan Tanfidz (the executive council) 
and Majelis Syuro (the advisory board). Consisting of a head, a deputy head and a 
secretary, Dewan Tanfidz of the DPC has the main function of organizing the party in the 
district. It is supported by three organizations, namely divisions, bodies and autonomous 
agencies, such as the National Guard (Garda Bangsa or paramilitary forces) and Women’s 
National Awakening Movement (Pergerakan Perempuan Kebangkitan Bangsa or PPKB). 
Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders and intellectuals, Majelis Syuro of the DPC has 
the main functions of maintaining the ideology and platforms of the party as well as to 
supervise Dewan Tanfidz of the DPC. 
The organizational structures of the party on the ground are represented by the 
DPAC (Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level which consists of collegial 
leadership between Dewan Tanfidz and Majelis Syuro. In implementing its functions, 
Dewan Tanfidz of the DPAC is supported by some sections, bodies and autonomous 
agencies. There are also the DPRt (Dewan Pengurus Ranting) at the village level and the 
DPARt (Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting) at the sub-village level. These organizational 
structures consist of collegial leadership between Dewan Tanfidz and Majelis Syuro as well. 
In conducting its functions, Dewan Tanfidz of these organizational structures is supported 
by bodies and autonomous agencies. 
In the 1999 election, the party was able to gain 11.48 percent of the votes and five 
seats. Meanwhile, in the 2004 election, despite the fact that it experienced a significant 
decline by gaining 7.31 percent of the votes, the party succeeded in maintaining its seats. 
Similarly, by gaining 8.83 percent of the votes, the party succeeded in maintaining its seats 
in the 2009 election. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support mainly 
from the electorate in Singaparna, Bantarkalong and Kawalu sub-district. Meanwhile, in the 
2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained its support from the electorate in Electoral Area 1 
in which there is the Cipasung Islamic boarding school as well as Electoral Area 5.  
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2.3. The PBR 
The PBR in the district was founded in 2004, shortly after its creation in Jakarta. Officially, 
the party adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. Using a symbol which is similar to the 
PPP’s symbol, the party aims to bring about masyarakat madani in Indonesia which is 
prosperous, just, self-reliant and democratic, under a blessing from God in the frame of the 
NKRI.
69
 Since 2006, the party has reinterpreted its ideological base from conservatives 
Islam to religious-socialism through which the party is based on Islamic-socialism.
70
 
Further, the ideology of the party is translated into five missions, i.e., to improve and 
establish Islamic morality and ethics, to realize national independence and dignity, to 
advocate for the marginalized people, to strengthen the implementation of democracy and 
human rights, to support law enforcement, to implement bureaucratic and administrative 
reform and to maintain the NKRI.
71
 
Since 2006, the party in the district has focused on internal agendas in order to 
develop its organizational structures. Firstly, the party focuses on establishing the party 
organization from the district to village levels. Secondly, it aims to extend its social and 
political networks. Thirdly, it puts an emphasis on the image-building of the party. 
Fourthly, it tries to increase the role of advocacy, legislation and lobby. Fifthly, it attempts 
to improve its financial income, including mobilization and utilization of resources. 
Sixthly, it insists in increasing the quality of party leadership at every level. Seventhly, it 
aims to bring about social activities focusing on poor people.
72
 
The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested 
by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) which consists of collegial leadership between the 
executive council and the expert board. The executive council has a main function of 
managing the party in the district. In conducting its functions, the executive council of the 
DPC is supported by deputies, a secretary and its deputies and a treasurer and its deputies. 
It is also supported by divisions and the legislators from the party (fractions). In this sense, 
the legislators from the party are subordinate to the DPC. Meanwhile, the expert board 
consists of intellectuals, professionals, social leaders, as well as youth leaders. The expert 
                                                          
69
 Article 3-5 of the party’s statue (2006).    
70
 Furthermore on the new ideology of the party, see Burzah Zarnubi, Membangun Bangsa Mandiri Menuju 
Kemakmuran Sejati (Jakarta: DPP PBR, 2008), pp. 9-10 
71
 Article 6 of the party’s statue (2006).  
72
 The PBR’s Programs in 2006-2011. 
111 
 
board has the main function of conducting academic activities about current and strategic 
problems. 
Figure 4.6  
Organizational Structure of the PBR
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The organizational structure of the party on the ground party in the district is 
represented by the DPAC (Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level which 
also consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the expert board. In 
order to support the executive council of the DPAC, there are some sections. There is also 
the PIRANTI (Pimpinan Ranting) at the village level and the PINAKRANTI (Pimpinan 
Anak Ranting) at the sub-village level. In implementing its function, the executive council 
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of the PIRANTI is supported by the working groups, while the executive council of the 
PINAKRANTI is supported by the area coordinators. 
As the newest party among the Islamic parties, the party succeeded in gaining votes 
and seats in the 2004 election. In this election, the party gained its support from the 
electorate in Electoral Area 3, especially in Padakembang sub-district. However, the party 
was not able to maintain its level of support in the 2009 election so that it failed to pass the 
required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.  
 
2.4. The PPP 
The PPP in the district has existed since 1973. After the Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the 
party changed its ideological foundation from Pancasila to Islam. Using the ka’bah as its 
symbol, the party aims to bring about masyarakat madani which is justice, prosperousity 
and democracy in the frame of the NKRI and under the blessings of God. Further, the party 
sets five goals (lima hidmat), i.e., to realize an Islamic society, to maintain human rights 
based on Islamic values, to create and maintain the NKRI, to create and maintain 
democracy and to establish the social welfare and justice. In realizing these goals, the party 
is based on six Islamic principles, namely religious service (ibadah), consistency 
(istiqomah), truth and justice, democracy, equality and calling people to do good things and 
to forbid bad things (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar).  
The ideology of the party in turn is transformed into various platforms which can be 
categorized into the religion, politics, law, education, gender & children as well as foreign 
affairs sectors. In the political sector, for instance, the party insists in maintaining the NKRI 
and people’s sovereignty. In the economic sector, the party has a commitment to implement 
a democratic economy focusing on small and medium enterprises. Believing that the issue 
of terrorism is a global scenario to devastate Islam, in the foreign affairs sector, the party 
refuses to acknowledge the existence of terrorism as it destroys the image of Muslim as 
well as Islam in general.  
Moreover, the party also has various platforms regarding the implementation of a 
decentralized system. For instance, the party tries to manage natural resources at the 
regional level in order to increase the social welfare of the local population. It also attempts 
to establish law enforcement so that there will be legal certainty. No less important, the 
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party aims to develop small and medium enterprises (SMEs) so they can generate regional 
development.
74
 In addition, the party sets specific platforms focusing on Nangro Aceh 
Darussalam province. Relying on the national issues, the party lacks platforms concerning 
the district.
75
  
The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested 
by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) which consists of collegial leadership among the 
executive council, advisory board and expert board. Consisting of religious leaders, the 
main function of the advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party 
and to supervise the executive council of the DPC. Meanwhile, consisting of Islamic 
intellectuals, the main function of the expert board is to provide recommendations to the 
executive council of the DPC based on academic considerations. 
Figure 4.7  
Organizational Structure of the PPP
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In managing the party in the district, the executive council of the DPC is supported 
by division and bodies. Since 1998, the party in the district has had fifteen bodies, such as 
organization, membership and caderization, politics and government, missionary 
endeavors, education and law. The executive council of the DPC is also supported by 
autonomous bodies established by the party national leadership in Jakarta, such as the 
Youth Movement of the Ka’bah (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah or GPK), the Youth Generation 
of the Ka’bah (Angkatan Muda Ka’bah or AMK), the Indonesian Islamic Student 
Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or GMII) and the Woman of United 
Development (Wanita Persatuan Pembangunan or WPP).
77
 
Meanwhile, the organizational structure of the party on the ground in the district is 
represented by the DPAC (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level which 
consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. To 
support the executive council of the DPAC, there is the section. The organizational 
structure of the party on the ground is also represented by branch at the village level which 
also consists of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. 
In serving its functions, the executive council of branch is supported by some working 
groups. 
As mentioned earlier, during the New Order period, the PPP in the district became 
the most significant competitor of the Golkar despite the fact that it experienced a decrease 
in the number of the votes and seats from time to time. In the 1999 election, however, the 
party succeeded in defeating the Golkar by gaining 25.67 percent of the votes and eleven 
seats. Although it succeeded in increasing the number of the votes and seats, the party was 
defeated by the Golkar Party as the winning party in the 2004 election. In the 2009 election, 
however, the party succeeded in defeating the Golkar Party again by gaining 27.13 percent 
of the votes and fourteen seats. In addition, in the 1999 election, the party gained its support 
from the electorates in Sodonghilir, Manonjaya, Cikalong, Karangnunggal, Pagerageung 
and Singaparna sub-districts. Meanwhile, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained 
its votes from the electorate in almost all of Electoral Areas.  
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2.5. The PKS 
The PKS, which was reinvention of the PK in the 1999 election, was founded in 2002 in the 
district. Adopting Islam as its ideology, the party aims to bring about the national goals as 
stated in the preamble of the national constitution and to establish a civil society which is 
just, prosperous and under the blessing from God in the frame of the NKRI. Moreover, the 
party distinguishes its goals into two categories, namely the general goal and the specific 
goal. As the general goal, the party aims to establish a proselytizing party (partai dakwah), 
while the specific goal is that it attempts to increase its political influence in the state and 
society.
78
 
The ideology of the party is translated into various platforms which are divided into 
politics, economy and socio-cultural platforms. In the political platform, for instance, the 
party tries to establish the NKRI which is based on the one and only God so that it rejects 
the idea of secularization. The party also aims to implement sharia and to propose Islam as 
the only solution for national problems. For the economic platform, the party attempts to 
establish an economic system which is based on sharia. Meanwhile, in the socio-cultural 
platform, the party emphasizes health and education platforms and it tries to establish 
Islamic cultures as the main social-cultural platform.
79
 
Since 2008, the party has had specific platforms regarding the implementation of a 
decentralized system and regional autonomy. According to the party’s documents, regional 
autonomy should be controlled and coordinated by the central government. Regional 
autonomy should also be based on justice and proportionality. Moreover, the party declines 
the implementation of regional autonomy which contributes to conflict between the central 
and regional government and which facilitates corruption, collusion and nepotism. In this 
sense, for the party, transparency and accountability are very important in the 
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implementation of the regional autonomy.
80
 In addition, the party in the district has specific 
platforms focusing on the district, such as the providing free health services, implementing 
socio-economic empowerment and supporting the agricultural sectors.
81
 
It is also important to note that there has been a transformation regarding the 
platforms of the party. In the 1999 election, the PK stressed its platforms on the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, the PKS relied more on non-Islamic issues, 
such as campaigning for war on corruption. As pointed out by Bubalo and Fealy, in these 
elections, “the party leaders usually admitted that an Islamized state was an aspiration but 
that formalizing this by declaring Indonesia to be an “Islamic state” was not important”.82 
The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested 
by the DPTD (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah) which consists of collegial leadership 
among the DPD (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah), the advisory board and the sharia board. 
Inside the DPD, there are an executive council, a secretary and its deputies as well as a 
treasure and its deputies. In managing the party in the district, the executive council of the 
DPD is supported by proselytizing areas and divisions. Meanwhile, the advisory board 
consists of a head, a secretary and three commissions, namely legislation, organization & 
areas, cadre & woman, public policy and strategic analysis. The main function of the 
advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party and to supervise the 
DPD. On the other hand, the sharia board consists of a head, a secretary and some 
divisions. The main function of the sharia board is to maintain the implementation of 
Islamic tenets within the party.
83
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Figure 4.8  
Organizational Structure of the PKS
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The organizational structure of the party on the ground is realized by the DPC 
(Dewan Pengurus Cabang) at the sub-district level which is managed by the executive 
council of the DPC. In implementing its functions, the executive council of the DPC is 
supported by a deputy, a secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy. There is 
also the DPRa (Dewan Pengurus Ranting) at the village level. Similarly, in implementing 
its functions, the executive council of the DPRa is supported by a deputy, a secretary and 
its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy. 
In the 1999 election, the PK gained only 1.36 percent of the votes and one seat in 
the district. However, the PKS was able to increase its support in the 2004 election by 
gaining 6.4 percent of the votes and four seats. In the 2009 election, the party was able to 
continue its success by gaining 6.89 percent of the votes and five seats. In addition, in the 
2004 and 2009 elections, the party gained its support from the electorate in Electoral Areas 
1, 2, 3 and 7, especially in Sukaresik, Ciawi and Pagerageung sub-district as the urban area 
in the district.  
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2.6. The PBB 
In the district, the PBB was founded in 1998 after its declaration in Jakarta. Using a star 
and crescent symbol, the party adopts Islam as its ideological foundation. The party’s 
constitution explicitly states that the party aims to achieve two main goals. Firstly, based on 
Islamic doctrines, it aims to bring about the national goals as stated in the preamble of the 
national constitution. Secondly, it aims to bring about the implementation of sharia in 
Indonesia. The party also declares itself as an independent and active party in order to do 
amar ma’ruf nahi munkar.85  Moreover, the party sets seven missions, i.e., to improve 
political consciousness among society, to improve Islamic awareness among elites since 
they are the role models in society, to participate in elections, to articulate and aggregate 
the interests of society, to improve the quality of its members, to maintain the relationship 
between society and the party, to improve the quality of social life and to do amar ma’ruf 
nahi munkar.
86
 
The ideology of the party in turn is translated into various platforms, i.e., politics 
and government, economy, education, human resources, environment, agriculture, 
maritime, defense, information and communication, social-culture, foreign affairs, 
relationship between leaders and society, youth, transmigration, industry service and health 
platforms. For the political platform, for instance, the party tries to consider other 
alternative government systems, i.e., parliamentarism and federalism. For the law platform, 
the party attempts to make the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet as the source of national 
laws. Moreover, the party insists in amending all provisions both at national and local 
levels which are against sharia. Meanwhile, for the economic platform, the party tries to 
implement a sharia-based economy.
87
 Focusing on internal agendas, the party lacks definite 
platform on the district.
88
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Figure 4.9  
Organizational Structure of the PBB
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The organizational structure of the party in central office in the district is manifested 
by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) which consists of collegial leadership among the 
executive council, the advisory board and the conduct board. Supported by a deputy, a 
secretary and its deputy and a treasurer and its deputy, the executive council of the DPC has 
the main functions of managing the party in the district. In serving its functions, the 
executive council of the DPC is supported by some divisions, special bodies and 
autonomous bodies, such as the Youth of Star and Crescent (Pemuda Bulan Bintang or 
PBB), the Women of Star and Crescent (Muslimat Bulan Bintang or MBB) and the 
paramilitary force (Brigade Hizbullah). Meanwhile, consisting of religious leaders, the 
main function of the advisory board is to maintain the ideology and platforms of the party 
and to supervise the executive council of the DPC. On the other hand, the main function of 
the conduct board is to supervise ethical aspects of officials of the DPC and to solve 
disputes within the DPC. 
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The organizational structure of the party on the ground in the district is represented 
by the DPAC (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level which consist of 
collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory board. In implementing 
its function, the executive council of the DPAC is supported by a deputy, a secretary and its 
deputy, a treasurer and its deputy and sections. The organizational structure of the party on 
the ground is also represented by the DPRt (Dewan Pimpinan Ranting) at the village level 
which also consist of collegial leadership between the executive council and the advisory 
board. In conducting its functions, the executive council of the DPRt is supported by a 
deputy, a secretary and its deputy, a treasurer and its deputy and some affairs. 
In the district, the party experienced a continuous decrease. In the 1999 election, the 
party was able to gain 4.7 percent of the votes and two seats. In this election, the party 
gained its support from the electorates in Kawalu sub-district and some sub-districts that 
are recently included in area of the Tasikmalaya municipality, such as Cipedes and 
Indihiang. In the 2004 election, the party was not able to maintain the level of its political 
support by gaining 2.99 percent of the votes and one seat. In this election, the party relied 
on the electorate from Electoral Area 2, especially in Sukaresik sub-district. The condition 
was even worse in the 2009 election when the party was able to gain only 1.08 percent of 
the votes so that it failed to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold.  
 
3. Summary 
From the descriptions above, we can see that the Tasikmalaya district has some salient 
features. The district has a deep historical root in Islamic radical movements, including the 
Islamic State Movement in the 1950s. The district also has a deep ideological root in which 
Islam is embedded in the way of life of the local population. In this sense, the local 
population practices Islamic tenets strictly. Not surprisingly, Islamic tenets and culture 
determines all dimensions of life for the local population. It is also important to note that 
Islamic teachers play an important role in determining the socio-political conditions of the 
local population, including in its political dimension.  
 The Islamic Puritanism as a factor in the district is coupled with a low quality of life 
among the local population. Many young generations in the district are not able to afford 
formal education so that they participate in informal education, more specifically Islamic 
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boarding schools. The poverty level and unemployment rate in the district is also high, 
while the per capita GRDP of the local population is low. Not surprisingly, the district is 
categorized as the poorest districts in West Java province. Along with these factors, Islamic 
Puritanism as a factor has led to a strong Islamic sentiments among the local population. 
Regarding the features of the local politics, in general, the executive branch of 
government, more specifically the district head, have played a dominant role in making 
policies, including in proposing various sharia-based regulations. As a result, the 
legislative branch of government is not able to implement their functions properly. In this 
sense, the policy-making processes in the district are driven by personal or group interests 
rather than the interests of the local population.  
It is also important to mention that, in contrast with the Islamic parties at the 
national level, the Islamic parties in the district have been able to maintain the level of their 
political support. Not surprisingly, the district is regarded as one of the bases for the Islamic 
parties not only at the local level, but also at the national level. However, except the PKS, 
the Islamic parties rely on their national issues. On the other hand, they disregard platforms 
focusing on the regional issues. Also, most of them focus on the internal agendas, 
especially in building their internal organizational structures. Similar to the secular-
nationalist parties, therefore, the Islamic parties lack distinctive set of goals and 
platforms.
90
  
Moreover, there is a significant variation regarding the ideological orientation of the 
Islamic parties. Based on their ideology and platforms, the Muslim-Nationalist parties do 
not propose agendas with strong Islamic nuances. In addition, compared to the other 
Islamic parties, the PAN can be regarded as the most Muslim-Nationalist party. In contrast, 
the Islamist parties propose various platforms with strong Islamic nuances. It should also be 
acknowledged that the PKS has reformulated its platforms after the implementation of the 
1999 election so that they propose more moderate platforms. In general, compared to the 
other Islamic parties, the PBB can be regarded as the most Islamist party.  
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Figure 4.10  
Ideological Spectrum of the Islamic Parties
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As stated in their constitutions, the Islamic parties establish their organizational 
structures which are parallel with the government structures, ranging from the district level, 
the sub-district level, to the village level. Some of them, such as the PPP and PKS, have 
even established their organizational structures at the sub-village level. All of the Islamic 
parties also have various organizational equipments, such as autonomous bodies and 
paramilitary forces. Some of them have also established political linkage with some Islamic 
organizations, especially with the NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS. Then, how do these 
Islamic parties practically manage their organizations in the district? The following 
chapters provide answers of this question. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF  
THE ISLAMIC PARTIES ON THE GROUND 
 
After having described the general profile of the Tasikmalaya district as the locus of this 
study and the Islamic parties in the district as the units of analysis, it is now time to conduct 
empirical analysis. We begin the empirical analysis by exploring the organizational features 
of the Islamic parties on the ground. In doing so, we apply the six criteria as developed in 
Chapter 2, i.e., the efforts made by the Islamic parties to create and maintain the political 
linkage with their members or supporters, the instruments employed by these parties to 
create and maintain this political linkage, the strategies employed by these parties to attract 
voters in election period, the position of these parties regarding a formal membership, the 
background of members or supporters of these parties as well as the relationship between 
the organizational structure of the party on the ground and the party in central office.  
  
1. The PAN: From the Party Organization To Legislative Candidates 
The vanguard of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN) on the 
ground is represented by the organizational structures of the party at the household level 
(sub-area), at the sub-village level (area), at the village level (Dewan Pimpinan Ranting or 
DPRt) and at the sub-district level (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC).
1
 The party’s 
constitution does not specifically mention the functions of these organizational structures. 
In general, however, it points out that each of them must manage the internal as well as 
external activities at its own levels.
2
 
The head of the party in central office in the district (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah or 
DPD), Ade Komarrudin, admits that the party leaders in the district lack information on the 
exact number of these organizational structures.
3
 However, a former official of the area in 
Manonjaya village, Deden Marno, explains that since the beginning of its creation, the 
party did not establish the party organizations in all of households, sub-villages and villages 
in the district. In the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it was even able to 
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establish the party organizations at the sub-district level just in a small number of regions. 
A similar situation also occurred in the implementation of the 2009 election.
4
 
The party decided to establish its organizational structure on the ground in some 
regions for several reasons. Deden Marno explains that after the implementation of the 
1999 election, the party has experienced some difficulties in recruiting officials for the 
party organization on the ground. Since the beginning of its creation, the party has also 
lacked the financial capability to establish its organizational structure on the ground.
5
 As a 
consequence, the party decided to establish its organizational structures on the ground just 
in a certain region in which members and potential supporters of the party existed. In this 
sense, apart from minimizing its constraints, the party also attempts to maximize its 
potency. 
The party organization on the ground has limited facilities so that their officials 
experience many constraints when they conduct their functions. For instance, there is no 
single sub-area, area and DPRt with the workplace so that officials of these organizational 
structures use their private home. Another example, as explained by an official of the DPRt 
in Sukaresik village, Dede Komarrudin, the party organization on the ground lacks 
financial support from the party organization in central office. In this sense, in carrying out 
their administrative function, officials of the party organization on the ground employ the 
facilities of the central office in the district, such and computers and telephones, when they 
implement their functions. As the district covers a wide region, only those who are close to 
the workplace of the central office can use these facilities.
6
  
Experiencing many constraints, officials of the party organization on the ground 
rely on the role of the central office in generating their activities. Deden Marno explains 
that in conducting many social activities in the district, such as organizing sport events, 
arranging social charity, providing free circumcisions for Muslim boys as well as free 
cataract surgery and providing an ambulance car, the party leaders in the central office 
establish coordination with officials of the area and DPRt.
7
 Moreover, officials of the party 
organization on the ground also depend on the role of the party’s legislators in conducting 
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their activities. Dede Komarrudin explains that the party’s legislators usually involve the 
role of these organizational structures when they carry out their activities, such as when 
they conduct Islamic gatherings (pengajian) in their electoral areas.
8
  
Since the implementation of the 2004 election, by and large, the party organizations 
on the ground have relied on the role of the legislative candidates to carry out their 
activities. It should be acknowledged that most of these legislative candidates in the 2009 
election served as officials of the party organizations on the ground, more specifically the 
DPC. Dede Marno states that in the implementation of the 2009 election, the party 
encouraged its legislative candidates to initiate as many social activities as possible so that 
“their existences can be seen and felt by the local population”. In this context, the party 
assumed that when these legislative candidates were able to generate many social activities, 
the local population would see the real contributions of these candidates. In turn, the local 
population would vote either for these candidates or for the party.
9
 
In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different 
strategies in order to attract voters. Yane Sriwirgantini, who became a legislative candidate 
in the 2009 election, explains that she employed some religious events in the district to 
introduce her profile and platforms. In these events, she provided an explanation to the 
audience that all political parties in fact were similar because they had similar goals. She 
also emphasized that “instead of their ideologies, what makes a difference among all of 
parties in fact was commitment of their candidates to help people.” As an official of the 
DPC in Sukaraja sub-district, she also utilized the role of this organizational structure to 
support her candidacy as she lacked the financial capability to establish a winning team. In 
addition, she states that she did not use radio or newspapers in her campaigns as the local 
population were not familiar with these channels of communication.
10
  
Similarly, Dede Komarrudin, who also became a legislative candidate in the 2009 
election, explains that he utilized the role of the party organizations on the ground to 
mobilize his voters. As an official of the DPRt, he tried to provide several assistances for 
people in his village who wanted to articulate their interests to the government, such as by 
providing assistance for these people to make a proposal letter demanding financial aid to 
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the government when they wanted to build a mosque. Moreover, he provided assistance for 
these people when they needed business capital by providing access to financial aid from 
foreign countries and international organizations. Dede Komarrudin also explains that the 
role of the party organizations on the ground is very important in supporting the 
administrative process of his candidacy, especially in observing the counting process in the 
voting day. In addition, Dede Komarrudin also utilized the youth organization (Karang 
Taruna) as he served as the head of this organization in the district.
11
 
Another legislative candidate in the 2009 election, Ratna Dewi, applied a different 
strategy. She explains that in order to attract voters, she tried to recruit what she called as 
“key persons of society” in her electoral area, especially from the youth and religious 
leaders. She believed that these persons had capacity to mobilize their followers to support 
her candidacy. Ratna Dewi also concedes that in order to support her candidacy, she 
employed Islamic events in the local population, such as Islamic gatherings. Also, she 
conducted door to door visits in her electoral area to introduce her profile and platforms.
12
 
With regard to the formal membership system, the party’s constitution explicitly 
mentions the recruitment and dismissal process as well as the rights and obligations of 
members of the party.
13
 The party distinguishes its followers into two categories, i.e., 
members and sympathizers. The former refers to those who support the party with 
membership cards, while the latter refers to those who support the party without 
membership cards.
14
 In addition, Deden Marno explains that nearly before the 
implementation of the 2009 election, the party distributed thousands membership cards in 
the district with health insurance.
15
 According to Dede Komarrudin, the health insurance 
provides financial compensation for members of the party who are ill or die in which the 
amount is between Rp. 1 million (€ 66.6) and Rp. 2 million (€ 133). The party leadership at 
the national level (Dewan Pengurus Pusat or DPP) takes care of the premium.
16
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The party’s constitution also states that there are no specific criteria to be a member 
of the party.
17
 In this sense, members of the party come from a wide array of groups in 
society. Dede Komarrudin explains that despite the fact that the creation of the party was 
strongly related to a prominent figure of the Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, it does not 
simply mean that the party belongs only to members of the Muhammadiyah. He underlines 
that as a modern party, the party tries to attract members and supporters “no matter who 
they are and what their religious backgrounds are”.18 Similarly, Deden Marno asserts that 
“despite the fact that many people in the district wrongly perceive that the party belongs to 
the Muhammadiyah, it does not mean that the party is intended only for members of the 
Muhammadiyah”.19  
The head of the Muhammadiyah in the district, Iip Syamsul Arif also provides 
similar information. He explains that members of the Muhammadiyah in the district 
affiliate with different parties as they believe that all parties attempt to achieve similar 
goals. He also adds that as members of the Muhammadiyah in the district mostly serve as 
public servants, they are disallowed by the government to involve actively in a political 
party.
20
 Information from direct observation also shows that the party attempts to gain 
support not only from members of the Muhammadiyah, but also from members of the 
Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU), Islamic Union (Persatuan 
Islam or PERSIS) and different Sufism groups. 
In managing their organizational structures, officials of the party organization on 
the ground conduct regular coordination and communication with the party leaders at the 
district level. Dede Komarrudin explains that the relationship between officials of the party 
organization on the ground and the party leaders in the district is not based on feudalism 
principles.
21
 Deden Marno also emphasizes that rather than on a top-down mechanism, the 
relationship between these organizational structures is based on a bottom-up mechanism.
22
 
In this sense, the party leaders in the district provide greater autonomy to the party 
organizations on the ground in managing their own organizational structures. On the other 
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hand, the party organizations on the ground provide political supports for the party leaders 
in the district. 
 In summary, the PAN on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party 
tends to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by 
conducting short-term, intensive and one way activities. In this sense, the role of the 
legislative candidates of the party is more significant than the role of the party organization. 
Secondly, in creating and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters, 
the party relies on eclectic platforms of its legislative candidates. Thirdly, in order to attract 
voters, the party employs the labor-intensive activities. However, although some of them 
utilize external organizations to support their candidacy, to a limited extent, the legislative 
candidates of the party still employ the role of the party organizations on the ground. 
Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, the party attempts to 
gain supports from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, there is a mutual relationship between 
the party organizations on the ground and party organization in central office. 
 
2. The PKB: Depending on the NU 
The frontline of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB) on the 
ground is realized by the organizational structures of the party at the sub-village level 
(Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting or DPARt), at the village level (Dewan Pengurus Ranting 
or DPRt) and at the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang or DPAC).
23
 
According to the party’s constitution, each of these organizational structures has its own 
responsibilities, such as to create and maintain the political linkage between the party and 
its members and supporters, to mobilize voters in election period and to manage the 
membership system.
24
 
The head of Dewan Tanfidz in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, concedes that the 
party leaders lack information on the exact numbers of these organizational structures.
25
 
However, an official of the DPAC in Singaparna sub-district, Cecep Abdul Qoyum, 
explains that in the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections the party did not 
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establish the party organizations on the ground in all areas.
26
 According to an official of the 
DPRt in Cibubur village, Husen Zaenal Ali, a similar condition also took place in the 
implementation of the 2009 election.
27
 
The party decided to establish its organizational structures on the ground in several 
areas for some calculative reasons. A former official of the DPRt in Cintaraja village, 
Emen, explains that after the implementation of the 1999 election, members of the party 
have been reluctant to serve as officials of the party on the ground as the party leaders do 
not provide financial incentive to become officials of these organizational structures.
28
 
Cecep Abdul Qoyum adds that since its creation, the party has experienced difficulties in 
recruiting officials of the party organization on the ground with organizational skills.
29
 
Moreover, the head of Dewan Syuro in the district, Endang Hidayat points out that the party 
established its organizational structures on the ground just in some areas as the national 
provision on political parties requires a party to have its organizational structures at the 
sub-district level.
30
 As a result, despite the fact that the party’s constitution requires the 
organizational structures of the party at the sub-village and village levels, the party leaders 
established the party organization at the sub-district level. 
Further, the party disregards the role of the party organizations in creating and 
maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. Instead, it utilizes the role 
of the NU in creating and maintaining the political relationships with its members or 
supporters. In addition, as a mass-based organization, the NU has organizational structures, 
ranging from national to local levels. At the national level, there is the central board. 
Meanwhile, at the provincial level, there is the regional board. The organizational structure 
of the NU at the district or municipal level is represented by the branch board. Also, there is 
the branch at the sub-district level and the sub-branch at the village level. The NU also has 
organizational apparatus, namely institutions, committees and autonomous bodies, such as 
the Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Association (Gerakan Pemuda Anshor or GPA) and Nahdlatul 
Ulama Woman Association (Muslimat). 
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Since 1984 the NU formally has refused to have an affiliation with any political 
parties. The NU has also disallowed its officials at every level to have a position in a 
political party.
31
 However, in practice, as explained by Emen and Cecep Abdul Qoyum, 
most officials of the party organizations on the ground are officials of the NU at the same 
time.
32
 Moreover, the vice head of the NU in the district, Muttaqien, argues that “the PKB 
and NU has structural and cultural relationships”. They have the structural relationship as 
many officials of the PKB at the same time serve as officials of the NU. Meanwhile, they 
have the cultural relationship as all officials of the PKB apply the doctrine of the NU in 
organizing their party, namely Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah.
33
 A cultural observer in the 
district, Acep Zamzam Noer, also points out that the NU in fact serves as a stepping-stone 
for the political actors of the PKB to obtain a certain position in the party as well in the 
government.
34
 
Because the political engagement of the PKB and NU is very strong, it is difficult to 
distinguish activities of these organizations. A social leader in the district explains that he is 
not able to distinguish the difference between activities of the PKB and activities of the NU 
as they are overlap.
35
 Similarly, Cecep Abdul Qoyum asserts that activities of the party 
cannot be separated from activities of the NU as “the PKB is the NU and vice versa”.36 In 
this sense, on many occasions, the party utilizes activities of the NU when it creates and 
maintains the political linkage with its supporters. For instance, the party employs Islamic 
gatherings organized by the NU, namely Yaumul Ijtima and Lailatul Ijtima through which 
the party leaders introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the audiences.
37
 
The party also utilizes activities of autonomous bodies of the NU, such as when the 
GPA celebrates Islamic festivals and provides emergency relief for the victims of natural 
disasters in the district.
38
 The head of the Muslimat in the district, Euis Hasanah, also 
explains that the party has engaged in different social activities conducted by the Muslimat, 
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such as when the Muslimat provides Islamic education, generates economic empowerment 
and provides assistance in the implementation of a hajj pilgrimage.
39
 These illustrations 
suggest that despite the party disregards the role of the party organizations on the ground, it 
is still able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by 
utilizing long-term, on-going, intensive and reciprocal activities of the NU, including its 
autonomous bodies. 
Apart from utilizing the role of the NU and its autonomous bodies, in creating and 
maintaining the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party also employs 
other strategies. Firstly, it attempts to optimize the interpersonal networks of its leaders and 
officials. In this context, the role of the Cipasung Islamic boarding schools is very 
important. A former official of the DPRt in Cintaraja and Cipakat villages, Sahid, explains 
that most officials of the party were alumni of the school.
40
 It should also be acknowledged 
that Acep Adang Ruchyat also serves as one of managers of the school. In addition, 
information from direct observation shows that prior to the implementation of the 2009 
election, all of officials of the party organization on the ground were inaugurated by the 
party leaders in this school. 
Secondly, the party tries to maximize the characteristic of social relationship 
between Islamic teachers and the local population in the district which is based on the 
patron-client relationship. Emen explains that as most officials of the party also serve as 
Islamic teachers in the district, they also utilize their status as religious leaders for political 
purposes, including for creating and maintain the political linkage between the party and its 
members or supporters.
41
 In this sense, the patron-client relationship not only covers the 
religious dimension, but it also includes the political dimension.  
Thirdly, to a certain extent, the party relies on the ideology of Ahlussunnah Wal 
Jamaah which is also adopted by the NU. As explained in the previous chapter, this 
ideology refers to a way of thought which chooses a compromise between extreme 
rationalism (aqli) and extreme skripturalism (naqli) based on the Quran, Sunna of the 
Prophet and his rightly-guided Successors and on four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In 
addition, many argue that this ideology denotes moderate attitudes in Islam. A similar 
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principle is adopted by the PKB so that this party adopts Islam as its ideological base and 
introduces pluralism and tolerance.  
With regard to strategy to mobilize supporters, since the beginning of its creation, 
the legislative candidates of the party has utilized activities of the NU. For example, the 
party was involved in Islamic events and in celebration of different Islamic festivals 
organized by the NU.
42
 Moreover, it has also employed activities of the autonomous bodies 
of the NU. Euis Hasanah, who was also a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, 
concedes that she relied on activities of the Muslimat as she did not receive a significant 
support from the party. She also explains that the role of the Muslimat was more significant 
than the role of radio and newspapers in supporting her candidacy.
43
  
The party has also relied on its charismatic leaders. For instance, in the 
implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it relied strongly on the personal figure of 
Ilyas Ruchiyat and his family in the Cipasung Islamic boarding school. It has also relied on 
the ideological foundation of the party. Cecep Abdul Qoyum explains that in their 
campaign activities, the legislative candidates of the party explained to the local population 
that the party was the only political affiliation for members of the NU.
44
 Since the 
implementation of the 2009 elections the party has also notified a serious movement 
threatening the ideology of the NU, namely the Wahhabism movement which is adopted by 
the PKS. 
Further, Cecep Abdul Qoyum explains that in the implementation of the 1999 
election in which the electoral system was based on the closed-list proportional 
representation system, the role of the party organizations on the ground was essential in 
introducing the ideology and platforms of the party to the local population. Their role was 
also important in distributing party flags, ballyhoos and stickers. However, this condition 
has significantly changed toward the implementation of the 2004 election which was based 
on the open-list proportional representation system. Since the implementation of the 2004 
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election, therefore, most of the legislative candidates of the party have disregarded the role 
of the party on the ground to support their candidacy.
45
 
The party’s constitution explicitly mentions the recruitment and dismissal process of 
members of the party. It also states the rights and obligations of members of the party.
46
 
Moreover, the party distinguishes its members into three categories, namely direct, indirect 
and honorary members. The direct members refer to those who are registered as members 
of the party and are involved in activities of the party. The indirect members refer to those 
who are registered as members of the party, but they are not involved directly in activities 
of the party. Meanwhile, the honorary member denotes to those who are recruited by the 
leadership of the party at the national level (Dewan Pengurus Pusat or DPP) because of 
their contributions to the party.
47
  
Cecep Abdul Qoyum argues that in the implementation of the 1999 election, many 
people were very enthusiastic to become members of the party. At that time, the party also 
provided membership cards. However, the condition shifted prior to the implementation of 
the 2004 election when there has been a growing political pragmatism among the local 
population as well as the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list 
proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional 
representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections.
48
 Moreover, Emen explains that since 
the beginning of its establishment, the party has lacked a membership database.
49
 Huzein 
Zainal Ali also adds that until 2008, just a small number of members had membership 
cards.
50
 
The party’s constitution also states that there are no specific criteria to become a 
member of the party.
51
 In this sense, formally, the party attracts members from a wide array 
of groups. Husen Zaenal Ali concedes that although the party is “a son of the NU,” it does 
not simply mean that members of the party come only from members of the NU. He also 
argues that the party tries to attract members from different Islamic organizational 
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backgrounds.
52
 In practice, however, the situation is different as members of the party 
mostly come from members of the NU. It is even likely impossible for members of the 
Muhammadiyah and PERSIS to become members or supporters of the party. 
In managing their organizational structures, officials of the party organization on the 
ground lack coordination and communication with the party leaders in the district. Emen 
explains that when he served as an official of the DPRt, he rarely conducted coordination 
and communication with the party leaders and officials in the central office.
53
 A similar 
situation also occurred in the implementation of the 2009 election. Husen Zaenal Ali asserts 
that he established coordination and communication with the party leaders and officials of 
the central office just several months before the implementation of the 2009 election.
54
 
Information from direct observation shows that the party leaders tend to disregard the role 
of the party organization on the ground as they prefer to create and maintain the political 
linkage with members and supporters of the party directly. 
To sum up, the PKB on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party 
creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting 
long-term, on-going and intensive activities. Secondly, in doing so, it utilizes the 
organizational structures of the NU, clientelism, interpersonal networks as well as the 
ideology of the party. Thirdly, the party employs the labor-intensive activities in mobilizing 
its supporters in election period. Instead of its internal organization, the legislative 
candidates of the party rely on the role of external organizations, more specifically the NU 
and its autonomous bodies. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. 
Fifthly, the party attempts to attract members and supporters from a particular group, i.e., 
members of the NU. Sixthly, the party organizations on the ground are subordinate to the 
party organization in central office. 
 
3. The PBR: Relying on Patronage Politics 
The organizational structure of the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or PBR) 
on the ground is manifested by the PINAKRANTI (Pimpinan Anak Ranting) at the sub-
village level, PIRANTI (Pimpinan Ranting) at the village level and DPAC (Dewan 
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Pimpinan Anak Cabang) at the sub-district level.
55
 Each of these organizational structures 
has its own functions, such as to manage the party at their levels, to implement the ideology 
and platforms of the party at their levels and to provide regular reports to the party 
organization in central office at the district level (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC).
56
  
The party leader in the district, Dede Saiful Anwar, claims that the party in the 
district has been able to establish the party organizations on the ground in nearly all of 
areas in the district. However, he concedes that he lack information on the exact numbers of 
these organizational structures.
57
 On the contrary, a former official of the DPAC in 
Cikalong sub-district, Jaja Jamaluddin, explains that prior to the implementation of the 
2004 election, the party did not establish its organizational structures at the sub-village and 
village levels in all areas. In this election, the party even established its organizational 
structures at the sub-district level just in a small number of areas.
58
 An official of the 
PIRANTI in Singkir village, Azis Abdul Karim, states that a similar situation continued in 
the implementation of the 2009 election.
59
 Information from direct observation shows that 
the party was not able to establish the party organizations on the ground in all of areas in 
the district.  
According to Jaja Jamaluddin, the party decided to establish the party organizations 
on the ground just in some areas for some calculative reasons. Firstly, the party lacks 
financial capability. Secondly, it experiences difficulties in recruiting officials for the party 
organizations on the ground. Thirdly, members of the party are reluctant to become 
officials of the party organizations on the ground. Fourthly, the party realizes that its 
potential voters exist only in a certain area in the district.
60
  
In addition, the party also decided to establish the party organizations on the ground 
just in the election period. For instance, the party established the party organizations at the 
sub-district level just a few months before the implementation of the 2004 election.
61
 A 
similar condition occurred prior to the implementation of the 2009 election. In addition, in 
the 2009 election the party leaders forced the legislative candidates of the party to establish 
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the party organizations on the ground in their own electoral areas at their own expense in 
order to support their candidacy. Azis Abdul Karim explains that he was elected as the 
executive council of the PIRANTI in his village by his son who proposed his candidacy in 
the 2009 election just eight months before the voting day. He also concedes that he has no 
understanding about what he should do as an official of the party organization on the 
ground.
62
 
Further, the party organizations on the ground have limited facilities. For example, 
there was no single PINAKRANTI and PIRANTI with the workplace so that their officials 
employed their private homes in managing these organizational structures. They also lack 
financial support and technical assistance from the party leader in the district. Jaja 
Jamaluddin explains that, despite the fact that in the implementation of the 2004 election 
some of the party organizations on the ground received facilities from the party leaders, 
such as party shirts, flags and ballyhoos, these facilitates were not enough to cover the real 
necessities.
63
 The situation was not better in the implementation of the 2009.
64
 
In creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters, the 
party employs two mechanisms. Firstly, it utilizes the patronage relationships and 
clientelism. Jaja Jamaluddin explains that prior to the implementation of the 2004 election 
he distributed material goods to some leading Islamic figures in the district who supported 
the party, such as “sugar, instant noodles and sarong”. By doing these efforts, he expected 
that these persons would vote for the party.
65
 Secondly, the party also employs 
interpersonal networks of their leaders and officials. Azis Abdul Karim concedes that he 
utilized his status as an Islamic teacher to introduce the ideology and platforms of the party 
among people in his village. He also utilized the alumni networks of his Islamic boarding 
school.
66
  
In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different 
strategies in order to gain as many votes as possible. Jaja Jamaluddin explains nearly before 
the implementation of the 2004 election, the legislative candidates of the party distributed 
material goods to their potential voters, such as giving carpets to mosques, providing 
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financial aid to some prominent figures in the local population and distributing sport 
equipment.
67
 Another legislative candidate in the 2009 election, Iron Saroni, explains that 
he selected a different strategy by conducting what he called as a “political education” for 
the local population. In his campaigns, therefore, he tried to rely on his platforms and 
agendas. He claims that by applying such a strategy, he tried to conduct “the enlightenment 
process” to the local population. He decided to implement such a strategy as many 
legislative candidates in the 2004 election experienced financial loss due to the fact that 
they provided material goods to people in their electoral areas at their own expense. He also 
implemented such a strategy as he had limited financial capabilities to distribute material 
goods to people in his electoral area. 
68
 
Iron Saroni adds that some of the legislative candidates of the party also utilized the 
role of the party organizations on the ground to support their candidacy. He states that the 
role of the party organizations on the ground was very important in providing political 
observers for these candidates in the manual voting process.
69
 However, as the role of the 
party organizations could not guarantee that these legislative candidates would gain 
significant votes, he also established his own winning team. In addition, Iron Saroni 
concedes that due to a limited financial capability, he did not utilize radio and newspapers 
in his campaigns. Instead, he distributed simple posters and ballyhoos in his electoral area 
at his own expense.
70
 
Regarding the formal membership system, the party’s constitution explicitly 
mentions the requirement process to become a member of the party. It also mentions the 
rights and obligations of members of the party.
71
 In this sense, the formal membership 
system is very important for the party. Practically, however, the situation is completely 
different. Since its initial establishment in 2002 the party has lacked the capacity to develop 
a membership database so that it had no information on the exact figure of its members. 
Moreover, Jaja Jamaludin explains that prior to the implementation of the 2004 election, 
the party provided membership cards only for the party leaders and officials.
72
 Azis Abdul 
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Karim also concedes that although the party leaders claimed that they distributed two-
hundred membership cards in his sub-district before the voting day in the 2009 election, he 
had no information about these membership cards.
73
  
The party’s constitution also explicitly states that there are no specific criteria to be 
a member of the party.
74
 Jaja Jamaluddin explains that in the implementation of the 2004 
election, the party attempted to attract voters from a wide array of groups in the local 
population.
75
 A similar effort was made in the implementation of the 2009 election. Azis 
Abdul Karim concedes that in order to support the candidacy of his son, he tried to attract 
supporters not only from Islamic background, but also from the secular-nationalist.
76
 In 
addition, Iron Saroni asserts that since its creation in 2004 the party has been assumed to 
become “a garbage can party” as its leaders, officials, members and supporters come from 
disappointed persons of other parties, especially the PPP.
77
  
The party adopts the hierarchical system in which each of the organizational 
structures is subordinate to the upper organizational structure.
78
 In practice, however, the 
relationship between officials of the party organization on the ground and the party leaders 
in the district is loose. Jaja Jamaluddin explains that shortly before the implementation of 
the 2004 election, the relationship between officials of the party organization on the ground 
and the party leaders at the district level was relatively good. In the 2004 election, although 
in a limited extent, the party leaders established several coordination and communication 
meetings with these officials. However, the situation changed significantly prior to the 
implementation of the 2009 election when the party leaders lacked communication and 
coordination with officials of the party organization on the ground.
79
 Moreover, Azis Abdul 
Karim asserts that toward the implementation of the 2009 election, there was no single 
forum through which officials of the PINAKRANTI and PIRANTI established 
communication and coordination with the party leaders.
80
 Iron Saroni explains that such a 
condition occurred due to the fact that the party leaders focused on their own candidacy so 
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that they did not manage the party organizations on the ground appropriately.
81
 As a result, 
the party organizations on the ground are autonomous and independent from the party 
leaders in the district.  
In brief, the PBR on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates 
and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting short-
term, non-intensive and one way activities. Secondly, in doing so, it employs the patronage, 
clientelism and interpersonal networks of the party leaders and officials. Thirdly, in order to 
mobilize voters, the party tends to employ the labor-intensive activities. To a limited extent, 
the legislative candidates of the party also employ the role of the party organizations on the 
ground as well as the role of external organizations, such as the NU. Fourthly, the party 
disregards the formal membership system. Fifthly, it tries to attract as many votes as 
possible from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, the party organizations on the ground tend to 
become independent from the party organization in central office. 
 
4. The PPP: Maximizing Many Resources 
The forefront of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) 
on the ground is represented by the organizational structures of the party at the village level 
(branch) and at the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang or DPAC). According 
to the party’s constitution, these organizational structures have four functions, i.e., to 
implement the party’s constitution at their own levels, to recruit their officials, to establish 
and coordinate working groups for branch and sections for the DPAC as well as to 
implement other functions provided by the organizational structure of the party in central 
office at the district level (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC).
82
 
The party has been able to establish the branch and DPAC in all areas since its 
establishment in 1973. A former official of the branch in Tanjungjaya village, Gopur, 
explains that the party has established the branch structure in all of villages in the district 
since the New Order period.
83
 Similarly, an official of the DPAC in Rajapolah sub-district, 
Empep Suryadi, explains that the party has established the DPAC in all of sub-districts 
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since 1973.
84
 Moreover, an official of the branch in Manggungsari village, Eko Hadi Praja, 
explains that the party has even been able to establish the organizational structure of the 
party at the sub-village level, namely the coordinators, although it is not mentioned in the 
party’s constitution.85 
Although just a few of them has their own workplace, the party organizations on the 
ground are able to conduct social activities. Eko Hadi Praja explains that since the 1980’s 
his branch has carried out many activities, such as providing assistances for poor people 
and elderly to access the health service, stimulating economic activities and providing 
financial assistance for poor children to access education.
86
 Similarly, Empep Suryadi 
explains that all of the DPAC has conducted similar activities. He also adds that until 
recently his DPAC has conducted regular meetings in which the party’s legislators establish 
political communication with members and supporters of the party. In this sense, he argues 
that “the party organizations on the ground serve as a political mediator in which members 
and supporters of the party are able to articulate their interests to the party’s legislators”.87 
In creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members and supporters, 
the party employs different instruments. Firstly, the party uses its own organizational 
structures on the ground. It also employs the role of autonomous bodies of the party, such 
as the Youth Movement of Ka’bah (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah or GPK), Youth Generation 
of Ka’bah (Angkatan Muda Ka’bah or AMK) and Women of United Development (Wanita 
Persatuan Pembangunan or WPP). In addition, Empep Suryadi explains that through 
caderization program, officials of these autonomous bodies serve as officials of the party 
organization on the ground.
88
 Moreover, the head of the GPK in the district, Iqbal, explains 
that in carrying out its activities, the GPK usually involves the role of the party 
organizations on the ground as the organizational structures of the GPK does not reach the 
village and sub-district levels.
89
 
Secondly, the party utilizes activities of the NU, including its autonomous bodies. 
For instance, the branch and DPAC participate actively in Islamic gatherings conducted by 
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the NU. The party organizations on the ground also employ various activities carried out by 
autonomous bodies of the NU, such as when they utilize activities of the Muslimat in 
celebrating Islamic festivals in the district. Through these events, the party leaders 
introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the audience.
90
 
Thirdly, the party utilizes programs of the government. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the party has a strong relationship with the district head, Tatang Farhanul Hakim. 
As a prominent member of the party, Tatang Farhanul Hakim concedes that he has a 
mandate from the party leaders to support activities of the party in the district.
91
 Similarly, 
Empep Suryadi argues that as the district head comes from the party, “the success of the 
district head in managing the district also means the success of the party and vice versa”.92 
It should also be acknowledged that the party also has a strong relationship with some 
village heads in the district. According to Gopur, until 2008 there were at least ten village 
heads who at the same time served as officials of the branch and DPAC.
93
 Empep Suryadi 
adds that around 50 percent of village heads are loyal members or supporters of the party.
94
 
In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party also employs such 
instruments to attract voters. Empep Suryadi, who was also a legislative candidate in the 
2009 election, explains that the role of the branch and DPAC was very significant in 
mobilizing supporters, especially for those with a limited financial capability.
95
 Meanwhile, 
Gopur, who also became a legislative candidate in the 2009 election, argues that the role of 
the party organizations on the ground was very important in mobilizing “the ideological 
voters” who had affiliated with the party for a long time.96 Another legislative candidate of 
the party in the 2009 election, Iqbal, explains that he utilized the role of an autonomous 
body of the party, namely the GPK, to support his candidacy.
97
 Neng Madinah Ruchyat 
applied a similar strategy. To support her candidacy, she utilized regular Islamic gatherings 
organized by an autonomous body of the NU, i.e., the Muslimat. She decided to rely more 
on the role of the Muslimat due to the fact that she lacked support from the party. She also 
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established a winning team in which its members came from different Islamic organizations 
in the district.
98
 Coming from the Cipasung Islamic boarding school, Neng Madinah 
Ruchyat also employed family and alumni networks. 
Moreover, to support his candidacy in the national legislature in the 2009 election, 
Asep A. Maoshul Affandy emphasized the issue of the implementation of sharia in the 
district in particular and in Indonesia in general. He argued that the implementation of 
sharia did not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Coming 
from the Manonjaya Islamic boarding school family, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy also 
utilized family and alumni networks. Moreover, he established a winning team in which the 
members came from different social organizations and political parties in the district. 
Interestingly, in order to introduce his profile and platforms to the voters in his electoral 
area, Asep A. Maoshul Affandy also used the internet in which he maintained a personal 
blog.
99
  
Having experienced financial limitations, Empep Suryadi utilized the 
implementation of the government’s programs in order to support his candidacy in the 2009 
election. For instance, he introduced his profile to the peasant community through the 
agricultural programs implemented by the government. He also introduced his platforms by 
utilizing some programs implemented by the village legislature (Badan Perwakilan Desa or 
BPD) in his electoral area, such as village development programs.
100
  
The party’s constitution explicitly mentions the rights and obligations of members 
of the party. It also manages the recruitment and dismissal process of members of the 
party.
101
 Empep Suryadi contends that the formal membership system is very important for 
the party as it is useful to assess “the strength of the party”.102 Likewise, Gopur argues that 
the formal membership system is very significant for the party in order to create and 
maintain the political linkage with its members.
103
  
Practically, however, the situation is slightly different as the party has experienced a 
decrease in the formal membership system. Gopur explains that since the New Order 
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period, although there were many restrictions and intimidations, many people were 
enthusiastic to become members of the party. However, the situation shifted just before the 
implementation of the 2004 election along with a growing political pragmatism among 
people.
104
 Moreover, Gopur explains that since the New Order period, the party has 
provided membership cards.
105
 However, as pointed out by Eko Hadi Praja, the party lacks 
information about the exact number of its members.
106
  
The party’s constitution also states that there is no specific condition to become a 
member of the party.
107
 Gopur explains that although all members of the party in the 
district are Muslims, they come from different Islamic organizations, such as the NU, 
Muhammadiyah and PERSIS.
108
 In addition, an outside observer also explains some 
members and supporters of the party also come from the proponents of the Islamic State 
Movement in the 1950’s. Some of the party leaders and legislators are even descendants of 
the leaders and proponents of this movement.
109
 
Officials of the party organization on the ground have a strong relationship with the 
party leaders in the district. Eko Hadi Praja explains that officials of the branch and DPAC 
establish regular communication and coordination forums with the party leaders.
110
 Empep 
Suryadi adds that even officials of these organizations carry out regular communication and 
coordination forums with the party’s legislators.111 Information from direct observation 
confirms such statements. Many officials of the branch and DPAC visit the workplace of 
the central office regularly. They also conduct daily communications with the party’s 
legislators in the legislature.   
Overall, the PPP on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates 
and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting long-
term, on-going and intensive activities. Secondly, in doing so, it combines different 
instruments, i.e., the interpersonal networks, clientelism, the ideology of the party and 
programs of the government. Thirdly, to attract voters, it combines the labor-intensive and 
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capital-intensive activities. Also, it employs the role of the party organizations on the 
ground as well as the role of external organizations. Fourthly, to a limited extent, the formal 
membership system is important for the party. Fifthly, the party attracts members and 
supporters from a wide array of groups. Sixthly, there is a mutual relationship between the 
party organizations on the ground and the party organization in central office. 
 
5. The PKS: Relying Only on the Party Organization 
The vanguard of the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) on 
the ground is manifested by the organizational structures of the party at the village level 
(Dewan Pengurus Ranting or DPRa) and at the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Cabang 
or DPC).
112
 The party also has a supporting organizational structure between these two 
organizational structures, namely the proselytizing areas. Further, each of these 
organizational structures has its own responsibilities, such as to execute the policies of the 
party, to collect membership fees, to receive donations (waqaf), grant (hibah) and 
contributions permitted by the Quran (halal), legal and voluntary, to introduce the party’s 
views and statements and to conduct caderization program.
113
 The party’s constitution also 
clearly mentions that the party relies only on its own organizational structures in order to 
create and maintain the political linkage with its members.
 114
  
It is important to mention that officials of the party organization on the ground must 
meet certain criteria. They must have achieved a certain level of membership, i.e., the 
intermediate member. For officials of the DPC, they have also had experiences in managing 
the DPRa. All of them must be pious people who rely on moral values, truth, justice, and 
are concerned with the benefit and unity of people. Also, they have no personal and group 
interests as well as they have an ability to conduct religious proselytizing in all dimensions 
of life.
115
 In addition, an official of the DPRa in Singasari village, Iwan, explains that most 
officials of the party organizations on the ground in the district have met these 
requirements.
116
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It is also important to note that the party experiences some difficulties in 
establishing the political relationships with major Islamic organizations. More specifically, 
it experiences difficulties in establishing the political relationships with the NU as leaders 
and most members of the NU assume that the party adopts Wahhabism which is totally 
different to the ideology of the NU.
117
 It also faces difficulties in establishing the political 
relationships with the Muhammadiyah as the Muhammadiyah in the district has been 
relatively successful in maintaining its neutrality.
118
 To a limited extent, however, the party 
has been able to establish the political relationships with the PERSIS as some members and 
officials of the PERSIS have became members and officials of the party.
119
  
Since the implementation of the 1999 election the party has succeeded in 
conducting various activities. The most important activity of the party on the ground is the 
tarbiyah (education). Adopted from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organization,
120
 the 
concept refers to activities in studying Islam covering wider subjects, such as theology 
(tauhid), rituals (ibadah), ethics (akhlak), history (tarikh) and politics (siyasah). Permata 
argues that the specific character of the tarbiyah activities is “the overt political 
orientation,” that is, to build an Islamic society in Indonesia.121 According to the party’s 
constitution, the tarbiyah activities is conducted to reach six goals, i.e., to establish Islamic 
tenets among members of the party, to bring about Islamic understanding among society, to 
build Islamic characters among members of the party which are in accordance with the 
Quran and Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, including in their belief (akidah), rituals 
(ibadah), ethics (akhlak), relationship between mankind (muamalah) and other dimensions 
of life, to strengthen Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah Islamiyah) in order to create Islamic 
solidarity, to establish new generations with a better understanding and implementation of 
Islam and to increase the quality of members of the party.
122
  
In practice, the tarbiyah activities is conducted through a number of circles 
(halaqah) referring to a small Islamic gathering in which an Islamic teacher sits surrounded 
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by five to ten students.
123
 Each of the halaqah groups conducts many activities, such as 
studying the Quran, discussing contemporary political issues both at the local and regional 
levels as well as providing social service. However, the most prominent activity of the 
halaqah groups is the proselytizing activity. Moreover, Iwan explains that there are two 
types of proselytizing activities, namely general proselytizing for ordinary people and 
special proselytizing for members of the party.
124
 Through the general proselytizing, the 
party creates the political linkage with its supporters. Meanwhile, through the special 
proselytizing activities, the party maintains the political linkage with its members.
125
 
In carrying out these tarbiyah activities, officials of the party utilize mosques, small 
mosques, Islamic boarding schools and private homes. In this context, it should be 
acknowledged that officials of the party in the district experience some constraints in 
conducting the tarbiyah activities as mosques, small mosques and Islamic boarding schools 
in the district are mostly organized by the NU. Iwan also explains that since the 
implementation of the 1999 officials of the party have experienced some black campaigns 
through which the party has been accused of adopting Wahabbism and of establishing an 
Islamic state in Indonesia.
126
 
According to Iwan, the party encourages its members to be involved in the daily 
activities of the local population. For example, the party encourages its members to 
participate actively in regular Islamic gatherings in the district. The party also encourages 
its members to participate actively in celebrating Islamic festivals.
127
 In addition, the most 
well-known social activity of the party is to provide emergency relief for the victims of 
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, or floods.
128
 Another prominent activity is 
to providing free medical and dental service, including mass and free circumcisions, to 
hosting bazaars and to providing cheap basic goods for poor people.
129
  
To attract voters in the election period, the party relies solely on its ideology and 
platforms. A legislative candidate of the party in the 2009 election, Yuda Cahyadi, explains 
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that in campaign activities, all of the legislative candidates attempted to build an image that 
the party was an anti-corruption party. In their campaign activities, these legislative 
candidates also tried to show that they were concerned with the suffering of Muslims in 
Palestine.
130
 Iwan explains that the party usually increases the frequency of the tarbiyah 
activities in the election period. As the party lacks political relationship with other Islamic 
organizations in the district, the legislative candidates of the party relied solely on the role 
of the party organizations. Iwan also explains that through the party organizations on the 
ground, these legislative candidates distributed stickers, calendars and flags from the 
party.
131
 Information from direct observation also shows that members of the party 
mobilized their families, relatives and friends to vote for these legislative candidates. In this 
sense, the party adopts popular direct selling methods to gain votes.  
The party’s constitution categorizes members of the party into three types, namely 
supporting, core and honorary members.
132
 The supporting members are prepared for at 
least two years. They are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure of the 
party at the district level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah or DPTD). The supporting 
member in turn is divided into the new and junior members.
133
 Meanwhile, the core 
members are prepared for at least five years. There are four types of the core member, i.e., 
intermediate, senior, specialist and top-level members. The intermediate and senior 
members are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure of the party at the 
provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah or DPTW).
134
 Meanwhile, the 
specialist and top-level members are recruited and dismissed by the organizational structure 
of the party at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat or DPTP). Similarly, the 
honorary member are also recruited and dismissed by the DPTP.
135
  
Every member of the party must meet certain requirements and proclaims the 
membership oath.
136
 For example, the new members must pledge loyalty to the Quran and 
Sunna of the Prophet. They also must implement the party’s constitution and keep internal 
information confidential. Similarly, the junior members must pledge loyalty to the Quran 
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and Sunna of the Prophet. They also must implement sharia, maintain the relationship with 
other members and Muslims, have a commitment to implement the party’s constitution and 
keep internal information secure. Meanwhile, the intermediate and senior members have 
higher requirements, such as they must implement a holy struggle (jihad) if the party 
requires it. Moreover, every member must provide a membership fee. Iwan explains that 
some sympathizers of the party in the district also provide financial contributions.
137
 In 
addition, the party’s constitution also explicitly mentions that every member must have a 
membership card and each of them has to follow caderization program.
138
 
Until May 2006 the party in the district had nine hundred and thirty-eight loyal 
cadres consisting of seven hundred and twenty-six newbie members, one hundred and 
eighteen junior members, fifty-nine intermediate members, thirty-two senior members and 
three specialist members. In terms of gender category, there were sixty-nine males and 
twenty-five females in the core members. Meanwhile, with regard to educational 
background, 56.7 percent of members held a high school degree, while 17.8 percent of 
members held a diploma degree and 25.5 percent of members held a university degree. In 
terms of economic background, 85.4 percent of members had a financial income below Rp. 
1 million (66.7 €), 12 percent of members had a financial income between Rp 1-2 million 
(66.7 € - 133.5 €) and 2.6 percent of members had a financial income above Rp. 2 million 
(133 €) per month.139  
Further, the party’s constitution explicitly states that every member is required to 
proclaim the party’s oath which is in accordance with Islamic tenets.140 Iwan argues that 
members of the party can come from different backgrounds “as long as they will participate 
in the tarbiyah activities”.141 Information from direct observation shows that most members 
of the party in the district come from Islamic organizations with modern and Puritanistic 
features, especially from the PERSIS. 
According to the party’s constitution, the organizational relationship within the 
party is based on a hierarchical system.
142
 Iwan explains that officials of the DPRa at the 
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village level provide regular reports to officials of the DPC at the sub-district level. In turn, 
officials of the DPC provide regular reports to the party leaders in the district. Iwan also 
points out that it is possible for officials of the party organization on the ground to conduct 
direct communications and coordination with the party leaders as well as with the party’s 
legislators. The coordination and communication forums between these officials take 
formal and informal meetings.
143
 In general, the party organizations on the ground provide 
resources that are necessary for the existence and success of the party leaders in the district.  
To summarize, the PKS on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party 
creates and maintains the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, 
intensive and reciprocal activities. Secondly, in doing so, it relies on the ideology and 
platforms of the party. Thirdly, in mobilizing its supporters in election period, the party 
employs the labor-intensive activities. It also relies solely on the role of the party 
organizations on the ground. Fourthly, the formal membership system is very important for 
the party. Fifthly, the party attracts members from a particular group. Sixthly, there is a 
mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground and the party 
organization in central office. 
 
6. The PBB: Between the Ideology and Party Elites 
The Star and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB) on the ground is represented by 
the organizational structures of the party at the village level (Dewan Pimpinan Ranting or 
DPRt) and at the sub-district level (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang or DPAC).
144
 Each of 
these organizational structures has its own responsibilities, such as to implement the 
platforms of the party and to implement the decisions made by the party convention at 
given level.
145
 They also have the authority to conduct coordination and communications 
with officials of the party organization on the ground in other areas and to manage the party 
at their own levels.
146
 
The head of the party in central office in the district (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or 
DPC), Momon Abdurrahman, concedes that the party lacks information on the exact 
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numbers of the party organizations on the ground.
147
 However, an official of the DPRt in 
Sukamenah village, Syamsudin, explains that until 2008 the party established the DPAC in 
a few areas.
 
He also adds that the party established the DPRt only in villages and sub-
districts with a significant number of potential voters and with members of the party who 
have a willingness to serve as officials of these organizational structures. Moreover, the 
party established the party organization on the ground in a certain area in which the party’s 
legislators exist.
148
  
The party organizations on the ground have limited facilities. Consequently, as 
explained by Syamsudin, officials of the party organization on the ground lack initiative to 
implement their responsibilities.
149
 In order to create and maintain the political linkage with 
its supporters, the party utilizes Islamic events organized by the local population. Through 
these events, the party leaders introduce the ideology and platforms of the party to the 
audience. Official of the DPRt in Sukaratu village, Iyuk Lukman, explains that in regular 
Islamic gatherings in his village, he often invites Islamic teachers affiliated with the party 
to provide a lecture. By initiating such activities, he argues that the party will be able to 
maintain its loyal supporters.
150
 The party also employs Islamic events conducted by the 
PERSIS. In addition, as a modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia, the PERSIS has 
organizational structures, ranging from the national to the sub-district levels, namely the 
central board at the national level, regional board at the provincial level, branch board at the 
district level or municipality levels and branch representative council board at the sub-
district level. It also has some autonomous bodies existing from the national level to the 
regional level. The vice head of the PERSIS in the district, Dadang Sholihat, explains that 
the PERSIS conducts many religious activities in the district, such as studying the Quran, 
celebrating Islamic festivals, collecting and distributing tithe (zakat) and helping the local 
population to build mosques and small mosques.
151
  
It is also important to mention that the party relies strongly on its ideology and 
platforms when it creates and manages the political linkage with its members or supporters. 
Syamsudin asserts that despite the fact that the local population has become more 
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pragmatic, the party still attempts to introduce the ideology of the party to the local 
population by emphasizing the implementation of sharia in the district. Further, he argues 
that as the local population is familiar with Islamic tenets, it is not difficult to implement 
sharia in the district. Syamsudin also argues that the implementation of sharia in the 
district is not contradictive to the national constitution and provisions.
152
 Similarly, Iyuk 
Lukman explains that he underlines the implementation of sharia in the district in 
implementing his responsibilities as an official of the DPAC. He also argues that among the 
other Islamic parties, the PBB is the only party that proposes the ideology and platforms of 
the Masyumi Party.
153
  
To a lesser extent, the party also utilizes the personal networks of its leaders and 
officials in creating and maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. 
Syamsudin explains that in introducing the implementation of sharia, he initially focuses 
on his own relatives. He expects that his relatives, in turn, will also introduce the ideology 
and platforms of the party to other relatives.
154
 Iyuk Lukman also applies a similar strategy. 
Coming from a family supporting the Masyumi Party, he utilizes his family networks to 
introduce the ideology and platforms of the party on the local population.
155
  
In the election period, through its legislative candidates, the party employs different 
strategies to attract voters. Firstly, it relies on the issue of the implementation of sharia. 
Saeful Azis, for example, explains that in his campaign activities, he put more emphasis on 
the implementation of sharia. In his campaigns, he explained to his potential supporters 
that although the party proposed the implementation of sharia, it did not necessarily mean 
that the party proposed an Islamic state in Indonesia. He also provided an explanation to his 
potential voters that the party attempted to implement sharia through democratic 
mechanisms so that the party was different from other radical and fundamental Islam 
movements. In addition, Saeful Azis preferred to make direct contact with his potential 
supporters.
156
 
Secondly, the party relies on its charismatic leaders. Dadang Sholihat explains that 
in the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, many Islamic teachers from the 
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PERSIS served as the vote getters. He adds that some of the legislative candidates of the 
party employed the organizational structures of the PERSIS in order to support their 
candidacy.
157
 Some other legislative candidates established their own supporting 
organizations. For example, a legislative candidate in the 2004 election established a group 
known as ajengan bendo consisting of young Islamic teachers in the district which gained 
attention because of its radical action in the district, such as anti-alcohol sweeping and anti-
premarital sex actions.
158
    
To a limited extent, the party also relies on eclectic issues of its legislative 
candidates. Ulih Muslihudin explains that he tried to introduce several agendas which could 
solve “the real social problems of the local population”. For example, he tried to facilitate 
people in his electoral area having access to business capital provided by the government 
and to help children gaining an access to education and health services. He also established 
a social organization, namely the Social Advocacy Line (Garis Advokasi Masyarakat or 
GERAM) in which he conducted discussion forums on various social problems.
159
 
Regarding the formal membership system, the party’s constitution distinguishes 
members of the party into six categories. The ordinary members refer to those with a 
commitment to the ideology and platforms of the party. These members have at least two 
recommendations from other ordinary members. The cadre members denote those who 
have followed caderization program. Meanwhile, the major members refer to those who 
have been active in the party in the last five years and who are recommended by the 
officials of the party at every level. The special members refer to those who have been 
recommended by the DPC and the organization of the party at the provincial level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW). The distinctive members refer to those who have been 
recommended by the party leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or 
DPP), while the honorary members refer to those who serve as leaders of social 
organizations with similar goals as the party.
160
 The party’s constitution also mentions the 
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rights and obligations as well as the recruitment and dismissal process of members of the 
party.
161
 
In practice, however, the party in the district is not able to implement such 
provisions. Syamsudin concedes that officials of the party organization on the ground 
disregard the formal membership system as they experience difficulties in recruiting new 
members. He also explains that although the party provided membership cards shortly 
before the implementation of the 1999 and 2004 elections, it lacks a membership 
database.
162
 Similarly, Iyuk Lukman explains that he lacks information about the number of 
members or supporters of the party in his village. He also concedes that although he serves 
as an official of the party organization on the ground, he does not have membership card.
163
  
The party’s constitution clearly states that there is no specific condition to become a 
member of the party. Syamsudin argues that despite the fact that members of the party in 
the district are Muslims, it is possible for non-Muslims to become a member of the party 
“as long as they agree with the ideology and platforms of the party”.164 Meanwhile, Iyuk 
Lukman explains that in the implementation of the 2009 election, he focused on former 
members of the Masyumi Party as well as on members of the PERSIS in his village.
165
 
Moreover, Dadang Sholihat, who also served as the head of the DPC in the district in 2001-
2006, explains that in the 1999 elections many members of the PERSIS voted for the party. 
However, the condition shifted toward the implementation of the 2004 election, when they 
also supported the other Islamist parties, especially the PKS.
166
 
Syamsudin argues that ideally officials of the party organization on the ground 
conduct regular communications and coordination with the party leaders in the district so 
that they have information about the situation in the party in general. However, in reality, 
officials of the party organization on the ground lack coordination and communication with 
the party leaders. He also asserts that coordination and communications between these 
officials and the party leaders just exist in the election period.
167
 Iyuk Lukman also 
concedes that since his recruitment in 2008 he has lacked communication and coordination 
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with the party leaders. As a consequence, he has no understanding about his responsibilities 
as an official of the DPRt.
168
 Information from direct observation also shows that the party 
organizations on the ground were treated as an instrument to gain votes for the party leaders 
who proposed their candidacy in the 2009 election.  
Overall, the PBB on the ground has the following features. Firstly, the party creates 
and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by conducting short-
term, non-intensive and one way activities. Secondly, in doing so, it relies heavily on the 
ideology and platforms of the party and, to a lesser extent, on the interpersonal networks of 
its leaders and officials. Thirdly, to attract its supporters, the party employs the labor-
intensive activities and the role of the party organizations on the ground as well as the role 
of external organizations. Fourthly, the party disregards the formal membership system. 
Fifthly, it attempts to attract members from a particular group, more specifically, members 
of the PERSIS and former members of the Masyumi Party. Sixthly, the party organizations 
on the ground are subordinate to the party organization in central office. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter aims to explore the organizational features of the Islamic parties on the ground 
in the Tasikmalaya district. From the illustrations above, we can see that each of these 
parties has its own prominent features regarding the political linkage between these parties 
and their members or supporters. More specifically, the most salient feature of the PAN on 
the ground is the fact that the legislative candidates of this party begin to have a dominant 
role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between this party and its members or 
supporters. Meanwhile, the most prominent feature of the PKB on the ground is the 
dominant role of the NU, including its autonomous bodies, in creating the political linkage 
between this party and its members or supporters. In the PBR, the patronage mechanism 
serves as an important instrument in the relationship between the party leaders and their 
supporters. Moreover, the most salient characteristic of the PPP on the ground is the fact 
that this party attempts to maximize the different resources when this party creates and 
maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters. Different to the other 
Islamic parties, however, the most prominent dimension of the PKS on the ground is the 
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fact that the party relies solely on the role of its internal organizations to create and 
maintain the political linkage with its members. Meanwhile, the most interesting feature of 
the PBB is the dominant role of the ideology of the party on one hand and a growing 
dominant role of the party leaders on the other hand, in creating and maintaining the 
political linkage between this party and its members or supporters. A summary of the 
organizational features of these parties on the ground in the district is presented in the 
following table. 
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Table 5.1  
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties on the Ground 
 
Party/ 
Indicators 
Effort to create and maintain 
the political linkage with 
members/supporters 
Instrument to create and 
maintain the political linkage 
with the members/supporters 
Strategy to attract voters  Formal 
membership 
Background of 
members/ 
supporters 
Relationship with 
the party in central 
office 
 
PAN 
By conducting short-term, 
intensive and one way 
activities 
By relying on eclectic 
platforms 
By employing labor-intensive 
activities and relying on the 
party organization 
Important A wide array of 
groups in society 
Mutual 
 
PKB 
By conducting long-term, on-
going and intensive activities 
By employing clientelism and 
the interpersonal networks of 
the party elites as well as the 
ideology of the party 
By employing labor-intensive 
activities and relying on 
external organization 
Not 
important 
A particular 
group in society 
Subordinate 
 
PBR 
Short-term, non-intensive and 
one way activities 
By employing clientelism and 
the interpersonal networks of 
the party elites 
By employing labor-intensive 
activities and by relying on the 
party organization as well as 
external organization 
Not 
important 
A wide array of 
groups in society 
Independent 
 
 
PPP 
Long-term, on-going and 
intensive activities 
By combining clientelism, the 
interpersonal networks of the 
party elites, the ideology of 
the party and platforms of the 
government  
By combining labor-intensive 
activities and capital-intensive 
activities as well as the party 
organization and external 
organizations 
Important A wide array of 
groups in society 
Mutual 
 
PKS 
Long-term, intensive and 
reciprocal activities 
By employing the ideology 
and platforms of the party 
By employing labor-intensive 
activities and relying on the 
party organization  
important A particular 
group in society 
Mutual 
 
PBB 
Short-term, non-intensive and 
one way activities 
By employing the ideology of 
the party and interpersonal 
networks of the party elites 
By employing labor-intensive 
activities and by combining 
the party organization and 
external organizations  
Not 
important 
A particular 
group in society 
Subordinate 
Source: Assessment by the Author.  
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As shown in Table 5.1, the PKB, PPP and PKS conduct long-term, on-going and 
intensive activities in and beyond election periods in order to create and maintain the 
political linkage with their members or supporters. As a result, these parties relatively have 
a strong political engagement with their members or supporters. On the other hand, the 
PAN, PBR and PBB tend to conduct short-term, non-intensive and one way activities. In 
this sense, these parties conduct their activities just in the election period so that the 
political linkage between these parties and their members or supporters is weak. In 
addition, except the PPP and PKS, all of the Islamic parties disregard the existence and role 
of their organizations on the ground in creating and maintaining the political linkage with 
their members or supporters. 
As the main instrument of creating and maintaining the political linkage with their 
members or supporters, most Islamic parties utilize clientelism as well as the interpersonal 
networks of the party elites. More specifically, the PBR rely strongly on these instruments. 
In the case of the PKB, this party utilizes the interpersonal networks of the party elites with 
the NU so that despite the fact that the party lacks social activity, it is still able to create and 
maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters by utilizing the activities of 
the NU. The PKB also employs its ideological foundation which is in accordance with the 
ideology of the NU. Similarly, the PBB also combines the interpersonal networks of the 
party elites with the ideology of the party. In the case of the PPP, this party also combines 
such methods with other instruments, i.e., the ideology of the party together with the 
program of the government as the district head come from this party. Meanwhile, the PAN 
creates and maintains the political linkage with its members and supporters by relying on 
the eclectic platforms of its legislative candidates. Different to the other Islamic parties, 
however, the PKS relies solely on the role of its ideology and platforms when it creates and 
maintains the political linkage with its members. 
To mobilize voters, the legislative candidates of all of the Islamic parties tend to 
employ labor-intensive activities. Nevertheless, as their party has many resources, the 
legislative candidates of the PPP also conduct capital-intensive activities in their 
campaigns. Moreover, the legislative candidates of all of the Islamic parties employ the 
party organizations on the ground to support their candidacy to a different degree. More 
specifically, the PKS relies heavily on the role of its ideology and platforms as well as on 
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the party organization. By contrast, the legislative candidates of the PKB disregard the role 
of the party organization as they rely on the role of the NU. The legislative candidates of 
the other Islamic parties combine the role of the party organization with the role of other 
social organizations, including the role of the government in the case of the PPP.   
From the discussion above, we can also see that all of the Islamic parties attempted 
to develop the formal membership system prior to the implementation of the 1999 election. 
In addition, in this election, the local population was very enthusiastic to become members 
of these parties. Nevertheless, as there is a growing political pragmatism among the local 
population, most of the Islamic parties have disregarded the formal membership since the 
1999 election. As a result, most of them also lack membership database and they are not 
able to generate membership fees. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, the 
formal membership is very important for the PKS as it develops the membership system in 
which members of the party must fulfill several requirements. To a lesser degree, however, 
the PAN also conducts a similar effort, such as providing membership identity cards with 
health insurance.  
Regarding the background of the members and supporters, the PAN, PPP and PBR 
attempt to attract voters from a wide array of groups. In this context, it is important to note 
that although the PAN is assumed by many people as the Muhammadiyah’s party, in fact, 
this party also gains support from members of other Islamic organization, including the NU 
and some Shia groups. By contrast, the PKB, PKS and PBB focus on a particular group of 
society. More specifically, the PKB focuses on members of the NU, even though the 
party’s constitution states that the party is an open party. The PKS focuses on those who 
have willingness to take part in the tarbiyah activities, especially the youth, while the PBB 
focuses on members of the PERSIS as well as former members of the Masyumi Party. 
Lastly, the PAN, PPP and PKS also try to establish an internal mechanism in which 
there is a mutual relationship between the organizational structures of the party on the 
ground and the organizational structure of the party in central office. More specifically, the 
PKS develops a strong organizational relationship in which the party organizations on the 
ground play a pivotal role in supporting the party leaders. To a lesser degree, the PAN and 
PPP also make a similar effort. However, the PKB and PBB establish an internal 
mechanism in which the organizational structures of the party on the ground are 
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subordinate to the organizational structure of the party in central office. Meanwhile, in the 
case of the PBB, the organizational structures of the party on the ground are independent 
from the organizational structure of the party in central office.  
From the elaboration above, we can see that the general feature of these parties on 
the ground is complex. If we compare these findings to the theoretical framework as 
elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of these parties contains some elements of the 
elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party and even the cartel party. In 
this sense, except the PKS, each of these parties has hybrid features. Consequently, as 
shown in Table 5.2, it is not easy to categorize these parties into a single party model. As 
some elements are more prominent than the others, however, some of them can be 
categorized into a certain party model. 
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Table 5.2 
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties on the Ground  
 
Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAN 
  
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and the party organization to 
attract voters 
- The party respects the formal 
membership system 
- The party on the ground provides 
resources that are necessary for the 
existence and success of the party in 
central office. While the party in 
central office is seen as the voice or 
guardian of the party on the ground 
 
 
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its supporters by 
conducting short-term, occasional and 
one way activities 
- The party relies on its pragmatic 
platforms in creating and maintaining 
the political linkage with its supporters 
- The party focuses on supporters from a 
wide array of groups in society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKB 
 
 
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its supporters by 
conducting long-term, on-going, 
intensive and reciprocal activities 
- The party relies on clientelism and the 
interpersonal networks of the party 
elites in creating and maintaining the 
political linkage with its supporters 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and external organizations to 
attract voters 
- The party disregards the formal 
membership system 
- The party focuses on supporters from a 
particular group in society 
 
 
 
 
- The party relies on its ideology and 
platforms in creating and maintaining 
the political linkage with its members 
 
 
- The party on the ground is subordinate 
to the party in central office 
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Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PBR 
 
- The party relies on clientelism and the 
interpersonal networks of the party 
elites in creating and maintaining the 
political linkage with its supporters 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and external organizations to 
attract voters 
- The party disregards the formal 
membership system 
- The party on the ground is independent 
from the party in central office 
 
  
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its supporters by 
conducting short-term, occasional and 
one way activities 
- The party focuses on supporters from a 
wide array of groups in society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPP 
 
 
- The party relies on clientelism and the 
interpersonal networks of the party 
elites in creating and maintaining the 
political linkage with its supporters 
 
 
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its members by 
conducting long-term, on-going, 
intensive and reciprocal activities 
- The party relies on its ideology and 
platforms in creating and maintaining 
the political linkage with its members 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and the party organization to 
attract voters 
- The party respects the formal 
membership system 
- The party on the ground provides 
resources that are necessary for the 
existence and success of the party in 
central office. While the party in 
central office is seen as the voice or 
guardian of the party on the ground 
 
 
 
 
 
- The party employs capital-intensive 
activities and external organizations to 
attract voters 
- The party focuses on supporters from a 
wide array of groups in society 
 
 
- The party employs 
capital-intensive 
activities and the 
state agencies to 
attract voters 
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Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKS 
  
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its members by 
conducting long-term, on-going, 
intensive and reciprocal activities  
- The party relies on its ideology and 
platforms in creating and maintaining 
the political linkage with its members 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and the party organization to 
attract voters 
- The party respects the formal 
membership system 
- The party focuses on members from a 
particular group or class in society  
- The party on the ground provides 
resources that are necessary for the 
existence and success of the party in 
central office. While the party in 
central office is seen as the voice or 
guardian of the party on the ground 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PBB 
 
- The party relies on clientelism and the 
interpersonal networks of the party 
elites in creating and maintaining the 
political linkage with its supporters 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and external organizations to 
attract voters 
- The party disregards the formal 
membership system 
 
 
- The party relies on its ideology and 
platforms in creating and maintaining 
the political linkage with its members 
- The party employs labor-intensive 
activities and the party organization to 
attract voters 
- The party focuses on members from a 
particular group or class in society 
 
- The party creates and maintains the 
political linkage with its supporters by 
conducting short-term, occasional and 
one way activities 
- The party on the ground is subordinate 
to the party in central office 
 
Source: Assessment by the Author. 
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 The PAN on the ground contains hybrid features of the mass-based party and 
electoralist party models. In this party, the elements of the mass-based party model are as 
dominant as the elements of the mass-based party model. Taken as a whole, however, the 
party tends to adopt the electoralist party model as its legislative candidates play a more 
dominant role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its 
members or supporters. The way the PAN creates and maintains the political linkage with its 
members and supporters indicates that this party has experienced a transformation from the 
mass-based party model to the electoralist party model. 
Meanwhile, the PKB on the ground has hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-
based party and electoralist party models. Similarly, the PBR on the ground also contains 
hybrid features of the elite-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of 
the elite-based party model are more dominant in these parties. These parties rely on 
clientelism and the interpersonal networks of their leaders and officials when they create and 
maintain the political linkage with their supporters. They also employ labor-intensive activities 
and disregard the role of the party organizations in mobilizing supporters in the election 
period. Moreover, they disregard the formal membership system. In addition, in the case of the 
PKB, by utilizing the daily activities of the NU, it is able to create and maintain the political 
linkage with its supporters. Moreover, the party also focuses on a particular group in society as 
its loyal supporters. In the case of the PBR, the party conducts short-term, occasional and one 
way activities to create and maintain the political linkage with its members. It also attracts its 
supporters from a wide array of groups in society.  
The PPP on the ground has hybrid features of the mass-based party, electoralist party 
and cartel party models. By and large, however, the elements of the mass-based party model 
are very strong in this party. The party creates and maintains the political linkage with its 
members or supporters by conducting long-term, intensive and reciprocal activities. In doing 
so, apart from the other instruments, it relies on its ideological foundation. In the election 
period, it employs labor-intensive activities as well as tending to rely on the party organization 
to attract supporters. Moreover, its legislative candidates also rely on the party organization 
when they mobilize voters. To a limited extent, the formal membership system is important for 
this party. There is also a mutual relationship between the party organizations on the ground 
164 
 
and the party leaders in central office in which the former provides organizational resources 
for the latter, while the latter serves as the voice or guardian of the former. 
Interestingly, different to the other Islamic parties which contain hybrid features, the 
PKS on the ground adopts the mass-based party model purely. The party creates and maintains 
the political linkage with its members by conducting long-term, intensive and reciprocal 
activities. In doing so, the party relies on its ideology and platforms. In election period, it 
employs labor-intensive activities to mobilize its members. Its legislative candidates also rely 
strongly on the party organization to support their candidacy as the party experiences some 
difficulties in establishing the political relationships with major Islamic organizations. For the 
party, the formal membership system is also very important so the party has developed the 
membership system. Moreover, there is also a mutual relationship between the party 
organizations on the ground and the party leaders in central office in which the party 
organizations on the ground provides organizational resources for the party leaders in central 
office, while the party leaders in central office serve as the voice or guardian of the party 
organizations on the ground. 
Lastly, the PBB on the ground contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, mass-
based party and electoralist party models. In this party, the elements of the elite-based party 
model are as dominant as the elements of the mass-based party model. Overall, it is likely that 
the party tends to adopt the elite-based party model as the party elites play a more dominant 
role in creating and maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or 
supporters. Different to the PAN that experiences a transformation process from the mass-
based party model to the electoralist party model, the way the PBR creates and maintains the 
political relationships with its supporters indicates that the party has experienced a 
transformation from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF  
THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN CENTRAL OFFICE 
 
In this chapter we continue the analytical process by examining the organizational features 
of the Islamic parties in central office.
1
 In doing so, we apply the five criteria as proposed 
in Chapter 2, i.e., the recruitment process of party leader, the mechanisms employed by 
these parties when they manage their leadership, the party finances, the activities of the 
organizational structure of these parties in central office in order to create and maintain the 
political linkage with their members or supporters and the relationships between the 
organizational structure of these parties in central office and the organizational structure of 
these parties in public office, more specifically in legislature. 
 
1. The PAN: Trying To Build A Modern Organization 
The organizational structure of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or 
PAN) in the central office at the district level is represented by the DPD (Dewan Pimpinan 
Daerah). The party’s constitution does not specifically mention the authority of the central 
office. However, the party convention in the district (Musyawarah Daerah or Musda) in 
2005 decided that the party leaders in the central office have the following functions, i.e., to 
manage the activities of the party in the district, to implement the decisions and policies 
made by members of the party through the party convention, to provide regular reports to 
members of the party in the party convention, to establish a constructive relationship with 
the government and with other social organizations in the district and to introduce 
platforms of the party to the government, other social organizations and the local 
population.
2
 
The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership model 
consisting of the executive council and advisory board (Majelis Pertimbangan Partai or 
MPP).
3
 According to the party’s constitution, the party leaders are elected by members of 
                                                          
1
 Organizational structure of the party in central office in general refers to party leadership at the national 
level. As this study focuses on the Islamic parties at the local level, more specifically at the district level, 
therefore, the organization of the party in central office in this study refers to the organization of the Islamic 
parties at the district level. 
2
 Mekanisme dan Prosedur Organisasi PAN Kabupaten Tasikmalaya 2005-2010. 
3
 Article 10 and 16 Paragraph 2 of the party’s statue (2005). 
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the party for a five-year period at the party convention. In addition, members of the party in 
the party convention are represented by officials of the party organization at the provincial 
level (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah or the DPW), the party leaders in the district from the 
previous period, officials of the party organizations on the ground (Dewan Pimpinan 
Ranting or DPRt at the village level and Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC at the sub-
district level) as well as leaders of the party’s autonomous bodies.4 
A former secretary of the executive council in the district, Iip Syamsul Arif, 
explains that the party leadership in the period of 1998-2000 was recruited just by several 
members of the party as the party was in its initial process of establishment so it was not 
able to conduct a party convention. It was not until 2000 that party leaders were elected by 
members of the party in the party convention. Iip Syamsul Arif, who also serves as the head 
of the Muhammadiyah in the district, argues that although some prominent leaders of the 
Muhammadiyah were actively involved in the establishment of the party, their role in the 
recruitment process was far from dominant.
5
  
The head of the executive council in the district, Ade Komaruddin, explains that he 
was elected at the 2005 party convention which was carried out under democratic 
mechanisms. He also adds that during the recruitment process he did not conduct campaign 
activities to support his candidacy. Moreover, as all of the candidates were unenthusiastic 
to become the party leader, there was no strong competition among these candidates in the 
recruitment process. In this sense, he argues that “the recruitment process took place 
smoothly and did not involve money politics”.6  
Information from direct observation suggests that members of the party decided to 
choose Ade Komaruddin as the party leader in the district for several reasons. Firstly, he is 
the most prominent academic at Siliwangi University, the biggest university in the district. 
Holding a doctoral degree, he is also the member of the party with the highest academic 
degree in the district. Administrative staff of the executive council, Yono Haryono, 
explains that members of the party are very proud of having a leader with such an 
intellectual capacity.
7
 They also have high expectations that Ade Komaruddin will be able 
                                                          
4
 Article 14 and 24 Paragraph 3 of the party’s rule (2005). 
5
 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
6
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
7
 Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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to manage the party in the district appropriately. From these illustrations, we can see that 
members of the party considered organizational skill and intellectual capability in selecting 
Ade Komaruddin as the party leader in the district. 
The deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat or DPP), Viva Yoga Mauladi, asserts that the party organization at the 
national level did not intervene in the recruitment process. He also explains that the party 
leaders at the national level intervene the recruitment process only in particular 
circumstances, such as when the candidates of party leader have been involved in criminal 
acts. Further, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that along with the implementation of the 
decentralized system and regional autonomy in 2001concerning the relationship between 
the central and regional government, the party leadership at the national level has allowed 
members of the party to recruit their own leaders at the regional level.
8
  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the party cannot be separated from its prominent leader, 
Amien Rais, who served as the party leader at the national level in 1999-2004. Viva Yoga 
Mauladi concedes that during this period, the party strongly relied on the charismatic figure 
of Amien Rais. Consequently, the party lacked a significant effort to develop its internal 
organizational structures. It was not until 2005 when Soetrisno Bachir became as the party 
leader that the party started to develop its internal organizations from the national to 
regional levels, such as providing organizational guidance for managing the party 
organizations at all levels and providing mechanisms for the recruitment process of 
members.
9
 In addition, Sutrisno Bachir was “more of a political entrepreneur than an 
ideologically motivated leader”.10 
A similar situation also took place in the district, when in 2005 Ade Komaruddin 
served as the party leader and he started to develop organizational structures of the party. 
Yono Haryono explains that since 2005 the party leaders in the district have made some 
significant efforts to develop internal organizational structures of the party. For instance, 
they set up an administrative system which is based on modern management principles. 
They also developed a membership database and provided some organizational guidance 
                                                          
8
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
9
 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2009), p. 340. 
10
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
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for the party organizations on the ground. Yono Haryono adds that they have encouraged 
members of the party to play a more significant role in the decision-making process in the 
central office.
11
 In addition, Ade Komarrudin asserts that since 2005 he has attempted to 
manage the party based on professional principles, such as by developing effective and 
efficient procedures.
12
 
Regarding the party finances, the party’s constitution clearly mentions that it is 
possible for the central office at the district level to generate its financial income from 
different sources, i.e., membership fees, donations, charities and grants contributed by 
members and supporters of the party, as well as other financial sources allowed by Islam 
(halal) and government provisions.
13
 The party’s constitution also states that the central 
office at the district level must manage the party finances with transparency and 
accountability.
14
  
In practice, as explained by Ade Komaruddin, the party in the district has several 
financial sources. Firstly, the party receives financial contributions from its legislators in 
the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in which these legislators must give 20 percent of their 
take-home salary to the party. Secondly, it receives financial contributions from its 
legislators in the West Java Province Legislature. Thirdly, it receives donations from 
sympathizers of the party.
15
 Fourthly, it receives a state subvention.
16
 Ade Komaruddin also 
explains that the party receives financial contributions from the party leaders and from 
officials of the central office as they often carry out some activities in the central office at 
their own expense.
17
 In addition, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains the party organizations at the 
national and provincial levels do not provide regular financial assistance to the party 
organization at the district level.
18
 
                                                          
11
 Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
12
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
13
 Article 24 of the party’s rule (2005). 
14
 Article 25 of the party’s rule (2005). 
15
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
16
 According to Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 1/2006 on Financial Assistance to Political Parties in the 
Tasikmalaya District Legislature, the government annually provides a subvention for parties with seat(s) in 
the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (Rp. 20.000.000 (€ 1333) per seat) since 2006.  
17
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
18
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
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Further, Iip Syamsul Arif explains that the party initially strongly relied on 
donations from sympathizers of the party.
19
 Meanwhile, Ade Komaruddin adds that prior to 
the implementation of the 1999 election the party was able to collect membership fees. 
Along with the political euphoria after the fall of Suharto, at that time, members of the 
party were very enthusiastic to support Amien Rais in particular and the party in general. 
However, prior to the implementation 2004 election the party experienced difficulties in 
collecting membership fees along with a significant decline in trust in political parties 
among the local population.
20
 Recently, instead of giving membership fees, members of the 
party often propose some financial assistance to the party.
21
 Information from direct 
observations shows that since 2006 the party in the district has relied on financial 
contributions from its legislators, the state subvention as well as financial contributions 
from the party leaders. 
Table 6.1  
Budget of the PAN in 1998-2005 
 
Year Income Expenditure 
August 1998 - September 2000 Rp. 278180000 (€ 18545.33) Rp. 277416000 (€ 18494.4) 
March 2002 - October 2005 Rp. 513968996 (€ 34264.6) Rp. 511462182 (€ 34097.48) 
Source: The PAN’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005. 
 
Further, there are four main allocations of organizational expenditure, namely the 
overheads (including renting the workplace of the central office and other overhead costs), 
campaign activities, routine activities and the party convention.
22
 Deden Marno, who also 
serves as a deputy secretary of the executive council, explains that the implementation of 
party convention and routine activities, including the establishment of the party 
organizations on the ground, become the biggest allocation beyond election period. On the 
other hand, the implementation of campaign activities, such as providing the party flags, 
becomes the biggest allocation in election period.
23
  
Having experienced budget constraints, the central office of the party in the district 
is not able to conduct activities in order to create and maintain the political linkage with 
members of the party. To be more specifically, the party leadership in the period of 1998-
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 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
20
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
21
 Interview with Yono Haryono, December 3, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
22
 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
23
 Interview with Deden Marno, December 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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2000 focused on the dissemination of the ideology and platforms of the party among the 
local population. They also put an emphasis on the internal consolidation of the party.
24
 
Another example, the party leadership in the period of 2000-2005 focused on internal 
agendas. As stated in the party’s report in 2005, in this period the party did not conduct 
social activities and communication with the local population.
25
 A similar situation was 
also experienced by the party leadership in the period of 2005-2010. As conceded by Ade 
Komaruddin, instead of external agendas, the party leadership focused on internal agendas, 
such as establishing the party organizations on the ground and conducting caderization 
program.
26
 Information from direct observation however shows that since 2006 the party 
leaders have provided an ambulance car for the local population. In this sense, to a limited 
extent, the party leaders in the district have attempted to provide social service for members 
and supporters of the party. 
The party’s constitution also clearly mentions that the party’s legislators must 
follow the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making policies.
27
 
Ade Komaruddin explains that the party’s legislators ideally serve as the representatives of 
the party in defending the ideology and platforms of the party in the regional legislature. In 
this sense, they must implement the policies made by the party leaders. Ade Komaruddin 
also explains that the party’s legislators also ideally must provide regular reports to the 
central office.
28
 Similarly, Viva Yoga Mauladi asserts that the legislators of the party are 
sub-ordinates to the central office so that they must implement the decisions and 
instructions given by the party leaders.
29
  
In actual fact, as explained by Iip Syamsul Arif who was also a party’s legislator in 
the periods of 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, the party’s legislators in the district attempted to 
implement decisions made by the party leaders when they were involved in making public 
policies. He also explains that there were internal forums in which the party’s legislators 
provided regular reports to the party leaders.
30
 Information from direct observation also 
indicates that the party’s legislators establish daily coordination and communication with 
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 The PAN’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2000. 
25
 The PAN’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2005. 
26
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
27
 Article 60 Paragraph 4 of the party’s statue (2005). 
28
 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, November 13, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
29
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
30
 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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the party leader and officials of the central office. In this sense, in line with the party’s 
constitution, they serve as the agent of the party in defending and implementing the 
ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.  
In summary, the PAN in the central office has the following features. Firstly, 
members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the 
party is managed by technocratic principles. Thirdly, regarding the party finance, the party 
relies on a state subvention as well as on financial contributions from the party elites. 
Fourthly, the party organization in central office attempts to conduct social activities in 
election period and beyond. Fifthly, there is a mutual relationship between the party 
organization in central office and the party organization in public office in which the latter 
serves as the agent of the former in defending policies of the party in public policy-making.  
 
2. The PKB: Depending on the Party Elites and NU Leaders 
The central office of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB) 
at the district level is organizationally manifested by the DPC (Dewan Pengurus Cabang). 
According to the party’s constitution, the DPC has several functions, namely to propose 
policies of the party at the district level, to recruit and dismiss officials of the party 
organization on the ground (Dewan Pengurus Ranting or DPRt at the village level and 
Dewan Pengurus Anak Ranting or DPARt at the sub-village level) and to provide 
recommendations to the party organization at the provincial level (Dewan Pengurus 
Wilayah or DPW) regarding the recruitment process of officials of the party organizations 
at the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Anak Cabang or DPAC).
31
 Moreover, the DPC 
also has some responsibilities, such as to implement the decisions and policies of the party 
at the district level, to provide regular reports to the party organization at the provincial 
level and to provide regular reports to members of the party in the party convention at the 
district level (Musyawarah Cabang or Muscab).  
 The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership format 
consisting of the executive council (Dewan Tanfidz) and advisory board (Majelis Syuro).
32
 
The party’s constitution mentions that these leaders are elected by the party leaders from 
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 Article 14 Paragraph 2-3 of the party’s rule (2005). 
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the previous period, officials of the party organization at the sub-district level and the 
party’s legislators at the district level for a five-year period at the party convention.33 
Through these representatives, formally, members of the party play a significant role in 
recruiting the party leaders.  
As a matter of fact, the recruitment process of the party leaders in the district is 
dominated by the party elites at the national level (Dewan Pengurus Pusat or DPP) and 
leaders of the Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) in the district. The 
head of Majelis Syuro in the district, Endang Hidayat, explains that the party leadership in 
the period of 1999-2002 was appointed by the party leaders at the national level. Endang 
Hidayat, who formerly served as the head of the NU in the district, also asserts that leaders 
of the NU in the district played a significant role in the recruitment process.
34
 A similar 
mechanism was also applied to the party leadership in the period of 2006-2011 as the party 
elites at the national level experienced an internal conflict involving Abdurrahman Wahid 
group on one hand and Muhaimin Iskandar group on the other hand. As an impact of this 
internal conflict, in 2007 the party leadership at the national level dissolved the party 
leadership in the period of 1999-2002 in the district that was elected through the party 
convention. To replace this leadership, the party elites at the national level appointed the 
new party leadership in the period of 2008-2011.  
The head of Dewan Tanfidz in the district, Acep Adang Ruchyat, explains that he 
was appointed by the party elites at the national level due to the reason that he was 
relatively neutral in responding to the internal conflict.
35
 Information from direct 
observation also shows that Acep Adang Ruchyat was elected by the party elites at the 
national level as he serves as the manager of the Cipasung Islamic boarding school. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the role of the school is very important for the party in creating and 
in maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters in the district in 
particular and in the West Java province in general. Since its establishment in 1998, except 
the party leadership in the period of 2002-2006, therefore, the party leadership in the 
district was appointed directly by the party elites at the national level as well as by the NU 
leaders in the district. 
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 Article 54-57 of the party’s rule (2005). 
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 Interview with Endang Hidayat, November 10, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Further, as the party leaders in the district are structurally and culturally affiliated 
with the NU, they also employ the managerial principles employed by the NU leaders when 
they manage the party.
36
 For instance, the party adopts a collegial leadership model 
consisting of Dewan Tanfidz and Majelis Syuro. Endang Hidayat concedes that the idea to 
have such the collegial leadership mechanism is borrowed from the NU in which there is 
also the collegial leadership mechanism consisting of the executive council (Tanfidziyah) 
and advisory board (Syuria). Moreover, similar to Tanfidziyah and Syuria in the NU, 
officials of Dewan Tanfidz mostly come from young generations, while officials of Majelis 
Syuro mainly come from senior generations.
37
 Acep Adang Ruchyat concedes that he 
employs the managerial principles applied by Islamic teachers and leaders of the NU when 
he manages the party in the district. For instance, he relies on the role of Majelis Syuro 
when he makes a decision for the party. He also considers a seniority principle in recruiting 
officials of the central office.
38
 
Administrative staff of the executive council, Ujang, explains that in doing their 
functions, the party leaders prefer to apply “informal mechanisms”. For example, the head 
of Dewan Tanfidz prefers to conduct an informal meeting with officials of the central office 
in his residence. It is not surprising if the party leaders infrequently visit the workplace of 
the central office. Ujang also explains that the party leaders and officials of the central 
office act as a big family since most of them have kinship with each other. In this sense, 
interpersonal networks and family relationships among the party leaders and officials of the 
central office serve as the most important mechanisms inside the central office.
39
 
Further, the party leader at the national level, Muhaimin Iskandar, concedes that 
there are two prominent characteristics applied by the party leadership at the national level 
when they manage the party. Firstly, old generations and charismatic figures have a 
dominant role in the decision-making process in the party so they disregard the party’s 
constitution. Secondly, traditional principles, such as feudalism and seniority, as well as the 
patron-client relationship become the most prominent mechanism. As a consequence, after 
more than a decade after its establishment, “the party leadership at the national level is not 
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able to develop a modern political party which is based on the principle of participation, 
accountability, transparency, equality, efficiency and effectiveness”.40 In addition, 
information from direct observation shows that although the party leadership at the national 
level has published several books on party management, these books had not been 
distributed appropriately to the party organizations at the regional level so party leaders at 
the regional level lack guidance to manage their organization.
41
 
 Concerning the party finances, the party’s constitution mentions that the party at the 
district level can generate financial incomes from membership fees, other financial sources 
permitted by government provisions, donations which are allowed by Islam (halal) and 
property right transfer (waqaf).
42
 Practically, as explained by Acep Adang Ruchyat, the 
party in the district has five primary financial sources from financial contributions from its 
legislators in which they must provide 30 percent of their take-home salary to the party, 
financial contributions from the district vice head as the district vice head comes from the 
party, donations from sympathizers of the party, financial contributions from the party 
leaders and officials of the central office as well as the state subvention.
43
 In addition, 
although the party organizations at the national and provincial levels do not provide regular 
financial assistance to the party organization at the district level, they provide “incidental 
assistances,” such as when they conduct their platforms at the regional level.44 Information 
from direct observation also shows that since 2006 the party in the district has depended on 
the state subvention as well as on the financial contributions from the party leaders as its 
primary financial sources.  
Endang Hidayat explains that prior to the implementation of the 1999 election the 
party in the district was able to collect membership fees. Along with the political euphoria 
among the local population, at that time, the party even received non-financial 
contributions from members and supporters of the party. Since a decline in trust in political 
parties among the local population prior to the implementation of the 2004 election, 
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however, the party has not been able to collect membership fees. To a limited extent, the 
party still receives non-financial contributions from its members and supporters. For 
instance, some members and sympathizers of the party provide food and social services 
when the party conducts the party convention and caderization program.
45
 
Table 6.2 
Budget of the PKB in 2002-2006 
 
Year Income Expenditure 
2002 Rp. 59406000 (€ 3627) Rp. 53515500 (€ 3567.7) 
2003 Rp. 43820500 (€ 2921.37) Rp. 43992500 (€ 2932.83) 
2004 Rp. 45750000 (€ 3050) Rp. 46005000 (€ 3067) 
2005 Rp. 49500000 (€ 3300) Rp. 53768500 (€ 3584.57) 
2006 Rp. 148000000 (€ 9866.66) Rp. 124315000 (€ 8287.67) 
 Source: The PKB’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006.  
  
Meanwhile, there are nine major items of expenditure, namely the office 
maintenance, routine activities, transportation, meetings & consolidations, subsidy & 
assistance, public relations, infrastructure developments, infrastructure maintenance and the 
budget deficits from the previous years. According to Acep Adang Ruchyat, the routine 
activities and development of the party structure make up the biggest expenditure beyond 
election period, while the regular meetings, consolidations and campaign activities 
contribute as the biggest expenditure in election period. It should also be acknowledged 
that to a limited extent, the party annually provides financial aid to the NU in the district 
“in order to maintain the political relationships between the party and the NU”.46 
Endang Hidayat explains that as the party has experienced budget constraints, the 
party leaders adopt a principle of “activities follow money” instead of “money follows 
activities” in conducting activities in the district. Consequently, the party lacks effort to 
conduct external activities so it focuses only on internal agendas.
47
 For instance, the party 
leadership in the period of 2002-2006 put an emphasis on five internal agendas, including 
establishing the party organizations on the ground, developing internal organizational 
structure of the central office, conducting regular meetings & the party convention and 
carrying out caderization program.
48
 Acep Adang Ruchyat explains that the party 
leadership in the period of 2007-2011 also focused on consolidation agendas as the party 
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experienced internal conflicts.
49
 Moreover, Hidayat concedes that in order to create and 
maintain the political linkage with its members and supporters, the party employs activities 
of the NU and its autonomous bodies.
50
 Similarly, Acep Adang Ruchyat points out that 
“since the PKB is the NU and vice versa, activities of the party are integrated in the daily 
activities of the NU”.51 In this sense, although the party was not able to conduct social 
activities, it is still able to create and maintain the political linkage with its members and 
supporters by utilizing social activities carried out by the NU. 
Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in 
central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party’s 
constitution clearly mentions that the party’s legislators serve as the agent of the party in 
implementing the ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.
52
 The 
party’s constitution also states that the party’s legislators must maintain their responsibility 
to the party leaders by providing regular reports.
53
  
In practice, Acep Adang Ruchyat claims that the party leaders conduct coordination 
and communication with the party’s legislators, especially when these legislators are 
involved in a crucial policy. In this sense, there is no single public policy in the district that 
is contradictive to the ideology and platforms of the party.
54
 It is also important to note that 
some officials of the central office serve as the party’s legislators at the same time. Some of 
them also have a kinship relationship with these legislators. Further, an official of the 
DPAC in Singaparna sub-district, Cecep Abdul Qoyum criticizes this situation. He argues 
that a dual status has often led to a conflict of interests among officials of the central office 
and the party’s legislators. He also argues that it is very difficult for the party leaders to 
supervise the party’s legislators as “some of them must supervise themselves.55 Information 
from direct observation also shows that the central office becomes a stepping stone for the 
party leaders and its officials to obtain political position as party’s legislator. 
To sum up, the PKB in the central office has the following features. Firstly, the 
party elites at the national level and the NU leaders in the district play a dominant role in 
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recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is managed by patronage and interpersonal 
network mechanisms. Thirdly, in terms of the party finance, the party depends on a state 
subvention as well as the financial contributions of the party elites. Fourthly, experiencing 
budget constraints, the party organization in central office conducts activities just in 
election period. Moreover, the party utilizes activities of the NU in creating and 
maintaining the political linkage with its members or supporters. Fifthly, the party 
organization in central office is subordinate to the party organization in public office. 
 
3. The PBR: Depending on the Party Elites 
The organizational structure of the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or PBR) 
in the central office at the district level is represented by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan 
Cabang). According to the party’s constitution, the DPC has some responsibilities, i.e., to 
implement the party’s constitution at the district level, to implement the policies made by 
the party leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or DPP) and the party 
organization at the provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW), to implement the 
policies made by members of the party in the party convention at the district level 
(Musyawarah Cabang or Muscab), to provide organizational guidelines for the party 
organization at the sub-district level (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang or DPAC), to provide 
regular reports to the party convention and to the party organization at the provincial level, 
to facilitate the establishment of autonomous organizations of the party and to organize 
membership.
56
 
The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system 
consisting of the executive council and expert board. The party’s constitution mentions that 
the party leaders are elected by members of the party at the party convention for a five-year 
period.
57
 However, it does not explicitly state about the participants of the party 
convention. The head of the executive council in the district, Dede Saiful Anwar, explains 
that the participants of the party convention are the party leaders from the previous period, 
officials of the party organizations at the sub-district level and leaders of autonomous 
bodies of the party, such as the Indonesian’s Youth Reform (Pemuda Reformasi Indonesia 
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or PRI), Women’s Voice of Reform Star Party (Suara Perempuan Partai Bintang 
Reformasi or SPPBR) and Islamic Scholars of Reform Star Party (Ulama Partai Bintang 
Reformasi or UPBR).
58
 
The deputy of the executive council in the district, Syarif Hidayat, explains that the 
party leadership in the period of 2004-2006 was appointed by the party elites at the national 
level. It was not until 2006 that the party in the district succeeded in conducting the party 
convention to recruit the party leadership in the period of 2006-2011. Syarif Hidayat also 
explains that all participants had equal rights to vote as it adopted a principle of “one 
participant, one vote”. In the recruitment process, moreover, a candidate must reach at least 
50 percent of the votes to serve as party leader.
59
 In addition, an official of the party 
organization in West Java province, Nandang Harun, explains that the recruitment process 
was fully under the authority of the party organization at the district level. In this sense, 
there was no intervention from the party organization at the provincial level.
60
 Similarly, 
according to the deputy general secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Yusuf 
Lakaseng, the party leadership at the national level did not intervene in the recruitment 
process.
61
  
In managing the party in the district, the party leaders and officials of the central 
office rely heavily on elitism. Dede Saiful Anwar concedes that his role in the party is very 
dominant although he has provided discretion to other officials of the central office. He 
argues that such a situation occurs due to the fact that most officials in the party lack 
organizational skill and personal initiative to manage the central office. For instance, if he 
is not able to attend a regular meeting, officials of the central office usually reschedule the 
meeting. Another example is that, if he is not able to attend an inauguration ceremony of 
the establishment of the party organizations on the ground, the inauguration ceremony will 
be postponed.
62
 Syarif Hidayat confirms these statements. He explains that the role of Dede 
Saiful Anwar is very dominant in the decision-making process within the party because 
“Dede Saiful Anwar has a personal charisma as a leader of the party and as a prominent 
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Islamic teacher in the district”.63 Information from direct observation also suggests that 
Dede Saiful Anwar lacks communication and coordination with other officials of the 
central office.   
To a lesser degree, the party leader and officials of the central office also utilize 
Islamic tenets when they manage the party in the district. Dede Saiful Anwar, who studied 
Islam in Mecca for two years, asserts that in organizing the party in the district, he relies on 
Islamic tenets. By doing so, he argues that he has attempted to conduct “Islamic worship” 
in the party. By quoting the Prophet Muhammad’s words, he also contends that “a 
goodness which is not well-organized will be defeated by a well-organized badness”. In 
this sense, he believes that the party must be managed properly in order to pursue its goals. 
Moreover, he asserts that all officials of the party organizations at every level must serve as 
“a grace for the whole world” (rahmatan lil alamin).64  
Further, Dede Saiful Anwar claims that prior to the implementation of the 2009 
election, the party shifted its main strategy from relying strongly on the role of party 
leaders to relying solely on the role of the party organizations. In this context, he tried to 
establish the party organizations on the ground in many areas.
65
 In addition, Yusuf 
Lakaseng also claims that, different to the party leadership at the national level from the 
previous period that relied strongly on the role of charismatic leaders, the party leadership 
at the national level in the period of 2005-2010 attempted to employ modern management 
principles, such as employing rational calculations and building the party discipline.
66
 
Information from direct observation, however, shows that the party leaders both at the 
national level and at the district level lack significant effort to manage the party 
organizations based on the modern mechanism so that the party still depends on the role of 
its charismatic leaders. 
The party’s constitution clearly mentions that the party at the district level can 
generate its financial incomes from five sources, namely membership fees, donations from 
supporters of the party which is allowed by Islam (halal), transfers of property (waqaf) and 
financial contributions from the party’s legislators as well as financial contributions from 
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members or supporters of the party with positions in the executive branch of government.
67
 
In fact, Dede Saiful Anwar explains that the party in the district relies on four financial 
sources, i.e., donations from supporters of the party, financial contributions from the party’s 
legislators, financial contributions from the party leader and officials of the central office, 
financial contributions from the legislative candidates and the state subvention.
68
 In 
addition, Nandang Harun explains that the party organization at the provincial level provide 
no regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district level.
69
 Similarly, 
Yusuf Lakaseng adds that the party organization at the national level does not provide 
regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district level.
70
 In addition, 
information from direct observation shows that the party leader and officials of the central 
office in the district lack transparency and accountability when they manage the party 
finance. 
Syarif Hidayat explains that the establishment of the party organizations on the 
ground makes up the biggest allocation in election period, while the implementation of the 
party convention contributes as the biggest allocation beyond election period.
71
 He also 
adds that as the party experiences budget constraints, it lacks an effort to conduct activities 
beyond election period. Instead, the party focuses on activities in election period, such as 
providing financial aid when the local population celebrates religious events.
72
 Moreover, 
Dede Saiful Anwar explains that just before the implementation of the 2009 he conducted 
many social activities at his own expense, such as providing free medical treatment and 
mass circumcision for people in his electoral area.
73
 These illustrations suggest that the 
party in the district depends on the personal role of Dede Saiful Anwar in conducting its 
activities. 
Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in 
central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party’s 
constitution clearly mentions that party’s legislators are subordinate to party leaders. The 
party’s constitution also explicitly states that these legislators serve as an instrument of the 
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party in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies.
74
 In this 
sense, they must conduct coordination and communication with party leaders before they 
make actual and strategic decisions in the legislature.
75
 The party’s constitution also clearly 
states that in carrying out their roles in making public policies, party’s legislators must 
provide regular reports to party leaders at least once every six months.
76
 
As the only party’s legislator in the district in the period of 2004-2009, Dede Saiful 
Anwar claims that there were some regular forums through which he provided regular 
reports to the central office.
77
 Such a statement was challenged by a student of Siliwangi 
University, Roni Romansya, who argues that Dede Saiful Anwar had an absolute power to 
determine both decisions of the party in the district and decisions of the party in the 
legislature as he has a dual status as the party leader and as the only party’s legislator at the 
same time.
78
 Information from direct observation also shows that Dede Saiful Anwar 
prioritized his position as the party’s legislator rather than his position as the party leader in 
the district.  
In short, the PBR in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members 
of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is 
managed by elitism principle. To a limited extent, they also rely on the ideology and 
platforms of the party. Thirdly, in term of the party finance, the party depends on financial 
contributions of the party elites as its financial resource. Fourthly, the organizational 
structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period. In 
conducting activities, the party also depends on the role of its leader. Fifthly, the 
organizational structure of the party in central office is subordinate to the party in public 
office.  
 
4. The PPP: Towards Oligarchy 
The organizational structure of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or PPP) in the central office at the district level is manifested by the DPC 
(Dewan Pimpinan Cabang). According to the party’s constitution, the party organization at 
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the district level has these following responsibilities, i.e., to implement the ideology and 
platforms of the party at the district level, to recruit officials for the central office at the 
district level, to establish and coordinate the division and body as its supporting 
organizations, to carry out the candidacy of its legislators at the district level, to provide 
recommendations to members of the party with positions in the executive branch of 
government at the district level, to establish the party organization in the district legislature 
(fraction), to provide guidance to the party’s legislators at the district level, to disaffirm or 
revise the decisions made by the party’s legislators at the district level, to organize the party 
convention at the district level (Musyawarah Cabang or Muscab) and to establish the party 
organizations at the sub-district level (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang or DPAC).
79
   
 The party organization at the district level consists of a collegial leadership model 
consisting of the executive council, advisory board and expert board. These leaders are 
recruited by the party leaders and officials from the central office in the previous period, 
officials of the party organizations at the sub-district level, representatives of the party 
leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or DPP), the party’s legislators at 
the district level and members of the party with position in the executive branch of 
government at the district level for a five-year period at the party convention.
80
  
A former head of the executive council in the district, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, 
explains that during the New Order period, members of the party played a significant role 
in the recruitment process of party leaders despite the fact that the party experienced 
various political repressions from the government.
81
 Moreover, the head of the executive 
council in the district, Ruhimat, explains that in the New Order period, the recruitment 
process of party leaders was mainly based on the ideology of the party. As the party 
consisted of four Islamic parties (the NU Party, PSII, Perti and Parmusi), the candidates of 
party leaders came from the prominent cadres of these parties.
82
 
Further, Tatang Farhanul Hakim explains that since the fall of Suharto in 1998, 
members of the party have played a more significant role in recruiting party leaders. He 
also asserts that different to the recruitment process of party leaders inside the other Islamic 
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parties, the recruitment process of party leaders inside the PPP is very competitive as it 
often involves money politics.
83
 In addition, the vice head of the party leadership at the 
national level, Choizin Chumaidi, explains that since the New Order period the party 
leadership at the national level has provided a political discretion for members of the party 
at the regional level to manage their own organizations, including in recruiting their 
leaders. Along with the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy 
in 2001, the role of the party organization at the national level recently is limited to 
providing guidance for the recruitment process of party leaders at the regional level.
84
 
In managing the party in the district, the party leaders employ several mechanisms. 
The party leadership in the period of 1999-2006, for instance, relied strongly on the role of 
the party elites, more specifically the role of Tatang Farhanul Hakim who also served as the 
district head at the same time. In addition, Tatang Farhanul Hakim concedes that when he 
was in charge as the party leader in the district, he provided financial incentives for officials 
in the central office. He also provided some facilities for officials of the party organizations 
on the ground in some areas, such as computers. Consequently, officials of the party 
organizations at all levels supported his leadership and had political loyalties to the party.
85
 
The treasurer of the executive council in the district, Neng Madinah Ruchyat, 
explains that in the party leadership in period of 2006-2011, the party leaders and officials 
of the central office tended to apply elitism as the decision-making process inside the 
central office was dominated by a few person of the party leaders and officials of the 
central office. She also explains that although the party encourages the participation of 
women in organizing the party, she still experiences many obstacles in participating in the 
decision-making process.
86
 Information from direct observation shows that the head of the 
executive council, several deputies and the secretary of the central office become the key 
actors in the decision-making process within the central office. 
The party leaders also rely on the ideology of the party when they manage the party 
organizations in the district. Tatang Farhanul Hakim asserts that he relied on Islamic tenets 
when he managed not only the central office, but also the party organizations at all levels. 
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In addition, he argues that the PPP is the only Islamist party in Indonesia as its leaders, 
officials, members and supporters are Muslims.
87
 Similarly, Ruhimat states that Islamic 
tenets serve as the most important principle when he manages the party organizations. He 
adds that as the party always urges people to do good things and to leave bad things (amar 
maaruf nahi munkar). Ruhimat also encourages officials of the party organizations at every 
level to serve as Islamic leaders in their regions.
88
  
 Regarding the party finances, the party’s constitution mentions that the party at the 
district level can generate its financial incomes from membership fees, financial 
contributions from its legislators as well as from its members with positions in the 
executive branch of government, the state subvention and other financial sources allowed 
by Islam (halal).
89
 The party’s constitution also clearly states that the party finances must 
be managed in transparent and accountable manner.
90
 
Ruhimat explains that the party in the district generates its financial income from 
different sources, i.e., financial contributions from the party’s legislators in which they 
must provide around 17 percent of their take-home salary to the party, financial 
contributions from the district head as the district head comes from the party, donations 
from sympathizers of the party, the state subvention, and financial contributions from the 
party leaders and officials of the central office. Ruhimat also explains that after the 
implementation of the 2004 election the party has experienced difficulties in collecting 
membership fees.
91
 In addition, Choizin Chumaidi explains that the party leadership at the 
national and the party organization at the provincial level (Dewan Pengurus Wilayah or 
DPW) do not provide a regular financial assistance for the party organization at the district 
level.
92
  
Further, Ruhimat explains that there are several important allocations of 
expenditure, such as the overhead costs, including renting the workplace of the central 
office and phone and water charges. Another example is social activity through which the 
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party provides financial assistance to its members or supporters who are ill or poor.
93
 
Information from direct observation, however, shows that since 2006 the party has 
depended on the state subvention as well as on the financial contributions of the party 
elites, including financial contributions from the party’s legislators.  
As it has many financial sources, the party in the district is able to carry out 
activities in election period and beyond. Ruhimat asserts that different to the other Islamic 
parties, the party is the only Islamic party in the district which has conducted various social 
activities. He also explains that as the party leader, he encourages officials of the party 
organizations at every level to provide social service to the local population.
94
 Similarly, 
Tatang Farhanul Hakim explains that many activities of the party have been integrated into 
activities of the government and daily activities of the local population.
95
 Information from 
direct observation also shows that, to a certain extent, the party employs the activities of the 
NU, especially in conducting Islamic events. 
With regard to the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in 
central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party’s 
constitution clearly mentions that the party’s legislators serve as the main instrument of the 
party in implementing the ideology and platforms of the party in making public policies.
96
 
It also states that these legislators must implement the decisions and policies made by the 
party and they are also under supervision of the party leaders
97
 so they must provide regular 
reports to the party leaders.
98
 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the party organization at the 
district level also has the authority to withdraw or revise the decisions made by these 
legislators. In this sense, formally, the party’s legislators act as the agent through which 
they could be held accountable by members of the party.  
In reality, there are regular forums through which the party leaders conduct 
communication and coordination with the party’s legislators. Ruhimat asserts that the party 
leaders provide a political discretion to the party’s legislators “as long as their actions in 
making public policies are in accordance with the ideology and platforms of the party”. 
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Ruhimat, who also serves as a party’s legislator in the period of 1999-2014, claims that his 
dual status is important in order to develop a strong relationship between the party and its 
legislators.
99
 The deputy secretary of the executive council in the district, Gopur, provides 
similar information. He explains that the party’s legislators provide regular reports to the 
party leaders and officials of the central office in the district. As a result, there is no friction 
between the party leaders and officials of the central office on one side and the party’s 
legislators on the side.
100
  
However, Ruhimat concedes that the party leaders and officials of the central office 
are not able to conduct organizational supervision to the party’s legislators properly as the 
party leaders and many officials of the central office serve as the party’s legislators at the 
same time.
101
 Information from direct observation also shows that the central office 
becomes a stepping stone for the party leaders and its officials in order gain positions in the 
regional legislature. It is also important to note that officials of the central office, who are at 
the same time serving as the legislators of the party, tend to prioritize their status as the 
legislators of the party rather than as officials of the central office. In this sense, it is not 
easy to distinguish between the party leaders, officials of the central office and the party’s 
legislators. 
Overall, the PPP in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members of 
the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is 
managed by a combination of patronage and elitism principles as well as ideological 
considerations. Thirdly, in regard to the party finance, the party depends on a state 
subvention and the financial contribution of the party elites. Fourthly, the organizational 
structure of the party in central office conducts various social activities in and beyond 
election periods in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members or 
supporters. Fifthly, the party organization in central office is subordinate to the party 
organization in public office. 
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5. The PKS: Combining Islamic Tenets and Modern Principles 
The central office of the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) at 
the district level is organizationally manifested by the DPTD (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat 
Daerah) which has four primary functions, i.e., structural, conceptual, managerial and 
operational functions. The structural function aims to develop the party organization at the 
district level, such as establishing the party organizations at the sub-district level (Dewan 
Pengurus Cabang or DPC) and proposing the legislative candidates as well as the 
candidates for district head.
102
 The conceptual function intends to propose public policies at 
the district level.
103
 The managerial function denotes activity to manage the party 
organization at the district level, such as controlling and supervising the party organizations 
at the village level (Dewan Pengurus Ranting or DPRa) and conducting caderization 
activities.
104
 Meanwhile, the operational function refers to administrative functions, such as 
publishing and introducing the party’s political stances in public policies to the local 
population.
105
 
The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system 
consisting of the executive council (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah or DPD), advisory board and 
sharia board. Structurally, the position of the advisory and sharia boards is higher than the 
position of the executive council. The advisory board deals with many functions, such as 
implementing policies made by the party at the provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat 
Wilayah or DPTW), providing advice, recommendations, consultation and supervision to 
the executive council in order to manage the party at the district level, formulating annual 
programs and budgets of the party and providing improvements for the policies made by 
the party.
106
 Meanwhile, the sharia board has other functions, i.e., to implement elements 
of sharia inside the party, to provide Islamic foundations for the party’s decisions and to 
supervise Islamic attitudes among the party leaders and officials of the party at all levels.
107
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According to the party’s constitution, the party leaders are elected at the party 
convention at the district level (Musyawarah Daerah or Musda) for a three-year period.
108
 
However, the party’s constitution does not mention anything about the participants of the 
party convention. The head of the executive council in the district, Yuda Cahyadi, explains 
that the participants of the party convention at the district level are the core members and 
party leaders as well as officials of the central office from the previous period.  
Moreover, Yuda Cahyadi explains that the recruitment process of the head of DPTD 
takes several procedures. Firstly, there is a preliminary forum called the internal selection 
(Pemilihan Raya or Pemira) in which every group of the core members (halaqah) proposes 
its candidates. It is important to note that the candidates of the head of DPTD must be 
proposed by the core members. They are not allowed to propose their own candidacies. 
Secondly, the proposals in turn are examined by a selection committee. Included in the 
examination process are the level of membership, backgrounds and attitudes of the 
candidates. Thirdly, after providing approval for the candidates, the selection committee 
then returns the proposals to the groups. Fifthly, all groups then propose two or three 
definite candidates to compete in the party convention. Yuda Cahyadi also underlines that 
the candidates are prohibited to conduct campaigns during the recruitment process.
109
 In 
addition, an official of the party leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat 
Pusat or DPTP), Ade Suherman, explains that, formally, the party leadership at the national 
level has authorities to supervise the recruitment process. In practice, however, it provides a 
political discretion for members of the party at the district level to recruit their own 
leaders.
110
 
The party’s constitution also explicitly states that the head of the central office at 
the district level must meet six requirements. Firstly, he must have reached the senior level 
of membership for at least two years. Secondly, he must have served as an official of the 
central office from previous years. Thirdly, he must have strong Islamic characteristics. 
Fourthly, he has an understanding of proselytizing activities, of the implementation of 
sharia as well as of the socio-political conditions of the district. Fifthly, he is concerned 
                                                          
108
 Article 18 Paragraph 5-6 of the party’s rule (2006). 
109
 Interview with Yuda Cahyadi, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
110
 Interview with Ade Suherman, January 28, 2009 (Jakarta). 
189 
 
with the party management. Sixthly, he also has organizational skills.
111
 Yuda Cahyadi 
explains that since its establishment in 2003, the heads of the central office in the district 
have fulfilled these requirements.
112
 It is also important to mention that the requirements to 
serve as the head of the advisory and the head of sharia board are higher than the 
requirements to serve as the head of the central office.
113
 
Yuda Cahyadi asserts that in managing the party in the district, the party leaders 
rely heavily on Islamic tenets so that “they do not manage the party with pragmatic 
principles”. He adds that all officials of the party share a similar understanding in managing 
the party, i.e., “the party is not only a pure political party, but it is also a proselytizing 
party”.114 Information from direct observation also shows that the role of the sharia board 
is very important in maintaining the implementation of Islamic tenets inside the party. 
Meanwhile, the role of the advisory board is vital in providing input and feedback to the 
party so the decisions and policies of the party are always in line with Islamic tenets.   
In managing the party in the district, the party leaders also employ modern 
management principles. Yuda Cahyadi asserts that in doing their functions, all officials of 
the party attempt to act in line with the party’s constitution.115 Moreover, Ade Suherman 
explains that the party leadership at the national level has provided administrative 
guidelines for party organizations at the regional level so that party leaders at the regional 
level will be able to manage the party in accordance with the ideology and goals of the 
party.
116
 Information from direct observation shows that the party in the district develops an 
administration system not only for the central office, but also for the party organizations on 
the ground, including the organizational relationship among these two organizational 
structures. 
Regarding the party finances, the party’s constitution states that the financial 
sources of the party organization at the district level come from three sources. Firstly, the 
party at the district level collects membership fees. Secondly, it receives tithes (zakat) & 
charities (sadaqah), grants (hibah), donations (waqaf), testaments and other financial 
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contributions from members and supporters of the party. Thirdly, it receives the state 
subvention.
117
   
Yuda Cahyadi explains that the financial sources of the party in the district come 
from membership fees which can be divided further into three types, namely obligatory 
monthly fee, halaqah fee and general fee for Islam. The party also receives the financial 
contributions from the party’s legislators in which they must provide 30 percent of their 
take-home salary to the party, donations from sympathizers of the party from Indonesian as 
well as from foreign countries and institutions, and the state subvention. Yuda Cahyadi also 
asserts that as they have a common understanding in managing the party, the party leaders 
as well as officials of the party organizations at every level are very enthusiastic to finance 
activities of the party at their own expense.
118
 In addition, Ade Suherman explains that the 
party leadership at the national level and the party organization at the provincial level also 
provide regular financial assistance to the party organization at the regional level.
119
 The 
document of the party’s report shows that the party in the district relied strongly on the 
financial assistances provided by the party leadership at the national level and the party 
organization at the provincial level as well as the state subvention. 
Table 6.3 
Budget of the PKS in 2003-2006 
 
Item Income Item Expenditure 
Surplus from the previous 
year 
Rp. 29280070 (€ 1952) Overhead Rp. 39488200 (€ 2632.55) 
Contributions from the 
party’s legislators 
Rp. 91627800 (€ 6108.52) Publication and 
Public Relation 
Rp. 1279000 (€ 85.27) 
Membership fees Rp. 20806900 (€ 1387.13) Transportation Rp. 30228400 (€ 2015.23) 
Donations Rp. 70569600 (€ 4704.64) Social activities Rp. 410189000 (€ 27345.94) 
Financial assistances of 
DPTP and DPTW 
Rp. 193551050 (€ 12903.4)   
The state subvention  Rp. 88330000 (€ 5888.66)   
Total Rp. 5192495885 (€ 346166.39) Total Rp. 491184600 (€ 32745.64) 
Source: The PKS’s Report in the Tasikmalaya District in 2006. 
  
Moreover, there are four major items of expenditure, namely the overheads, 
including renting the workplace of the central office, publications and public relations, 
transportation and social activities, such as the tarbiyah and proselytizing activities. Yuda 
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Cahyadi also concedes that the party in the district still has financial obligations to some 
members and supporters of the party although he does not mention the exact amount of 
these financial obligations.
120
 In addition, information from direct observation shows that 
the party leaders manage the party finances by promoting transparency and accountability.  
Since its establishment, the party in the district has conducted various activities in 
and beyond election periods. For instance, the party leadership in the period of 2003-2006 
prioritized nine activities, i.e., to build the party organizations, to establish a caderization 
system, to do proselytizing as well as to urge urges people to do good things and to leave 
bad things (amar maaruf nahi munkar) among the local population, to improve Islamic 
awareness among the local population, to build Islamic public opinions, to develop political 
and legal awareness, to implement communication, social relations, collaboration, 
reconciliation and to provide a significant contribution to the development process among 
the local population.
121
   
The party leadership in the period of 2006-2009 had similar agendas. Yuda Cahyadi 
explains that the most important activity of the party in this period was the tarbiyah 
activities, such as providing free medical treatment, conducting economical empowerment 
for the women, providing agriculture and animal husbandry counseling, carrying out 
religious activities, celebrating Islamic festivals, conducting sport competitions and 
providing assistance for victims of natural disasters.
122
 In addition, Ade Suherman explains 
that the party leadership at the national level has encourages the party organizations at the 
regional level to conduct social activities in and beyond election periods based on the 
consideration that the party is a proselytizing party. In this sense, the party leaders, officials 
of the party organizations at all levels and members of the party have a common 
consciousness that being involved in activities of the party is part of Islamic worship.
123
 
Regarding the relationship between the organizational structure of the party in 
central office and the organizational structure of the party in public office, the party’s 
constitution clearly mentions that the party’s legislators are the executors of the ideology 
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and platforms of the party in making public policies.
124
 Moreover, it also states that the 
party organization at the district level has authorities to manage the organizational structure 
of the party in the regional legislature (fraction), including replacing the party’s legislators 
after receiving approval from the party leadership at national level and party leaders at the 
provincial level.
125
 It is also important to note that the party’s constitution disallows the 
party leaders and officials of the central office to serve as a party’s legislator at the same 
time.
126
 Ade Suherman argues that such provision is very important in preventing conflict 
of interests within the party.
127
  
Yuda Cahyadi explains that although the party’s legislators serve as the instruments 
of the party leaders, it does not simply mean that the party leaders make a strong 
intervention to the organizational structure of the party in the regional legislature. Instead, 
“there is a synergy between the party’s legislators and party leaders as well as officials of 
the central office”. Moreover, he states that there are regular forums through which the 
party’s legislators establish communication and coordination with the party leaders and 
officials of the central office. In these forums, the party’s legislators provide regular reports 
on their performance in the legislature, while the party leaders provide input and feedback 
for these legislators.
128
 It is also important to mention that the party’s legislators are 
supervised by the advisory board and the sharia board of the central office. In this context, 
these boards have an important role in making sure that the performance of the party’s 
legislators is in accordance with the ideology of the party. 
To summarize, the PKS in the central office has the following features. Firstly, 
members of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the 
party organization is managed by a combination of Islamic tenets and modern management 
principles. Thirdly, the party depends on the financial contribution from the party elites and 
a state subvention. Fourthly, the organizational structure of the party in central office 
conducts various social activities in election period and beyond in order to create and 
maintain the political linkage with members or supporters. Fifthly, the organizational 
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structure of the party in central office is the agent by which the party in public office could 
be held accountable by members of the party. 
 
6. The PBB: Domination of the Party Elites 
The organizational structure of the Star and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB) 
in the central office at the district level is realized by the DPC (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang). 
According to the party’s constitution, the party organization at the district level has two 
major responsibilities. Firstly, it implements the policies and decision made by members of 
the party in the party convention at the district level (Musyawarah Cabang or Muscab). 
Secondly, it provides organizational reports on the development of the party organization at 
the district level to the party organization at the provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah 
or DPW) at least once every six months.
129
  
 The party organization at the district level adopts a collegial leadership system 
consisting of the executive council, advisory board and conduct board. According to the 
party’s constitution, these party leaders are elected by members of the party at the party 
convention at the district level for a five-year period.
130
 The party’s constitution also states 
that the recruitment process is followed by the party leaders from the previous period, 
representatives of the party organization at the sub-district level (Dewan Pimpinan Anak 
Cabang or DPAC), party’s legislators at the district level, leaders of autonomous bodies of 
the party and outside observers coming from sympathizers of the party.
131
 It is also 
important to mention that the head of the executive council must meet eight requirements, 
i.e., he is Muslim, he practices Islam, he is able to be a role model for people, he is able to 
be a leader (Imam) in the five daily prayers, he is able to read the Quran and he has Islamic 
characteristics, such as being truthful (siddiq), trusted (amanah) and smart (fathonah). He 
also must pledge loyalty to the Quran as well as to the party’s constitution.132  
The former head of the executive council in the district, Dadang Sholihat, explains 
that the party leadership in the period of 1998-2000 in the district was appointed by the 
party leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or DPP). It was not until 
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2001 that the party leadership in the district was elected by members at the party 
convention. Moreover, Dadang Sholihat who also serves as the head of the PERSIS 
(Persatuan Islam or PERSIS) in the district adds that some prominent leaders of the 
PERSIS had been actively involved in the recruitment process. As a result, the head of the 
executive council in this period came from the PERSIS.
133
 Moreover, the head of the 
executive council in the district, Momon Abdurahman, explains that he was elected at the 
2005 party convention which was conducted by democratic principles. At that time, the 
party leadership at the national level as well as the party organization at the provincial level 
did not intervene in the recruitment process.
134
  
The general secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Sahar L. Hasan, 
explains that despite the fact that the role of the party leadership at the national level was 
very dominant in recruiting party leaders at the regional level in the initial period of the 
party establishment, party leaders at the national level have provided autonomy for 
members of the party at the regional level to select their own leaders since 2000.
135
 The 
party’s document also mentions party leaders at the regional level should have participated 
in the first stage of caderization.
136
 However, Sahar L concedes that as the party lacks effort 
to carry out caderization program, most of party leaders at the regional level have not 
followed the first stage of caderization.
137
 
In managing the party in the district, the party leaders rely on two principles. 
Dadang Sholihat concedes that the party leadership in the district in the period of 1998-
2000 relied on Islamic tenets. As the party leaders came from members of the PERSIS, the 
party leadership in this period applied Islamic modernism and Puritanistic when they 
manage the party organizations at all levels
138
 Meanwhile, Momon Abdurahman explains 
that as the party stands up for the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation 
of sharia, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2005-2010 also emphasized 
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the implementation of sharia.
139
 In addition, the deputy of the executive council in the 
district, Sidiq Anggaperbata, asserts that the implementation of sharia inside the party 
became the first agendas for the party before it conducts other agendas.
140
  
The party leaders also employ elitism. Dadang Sholihat argues that similar to the 
relationship between Imam and his followers in Islam, members of the party must follow 
party leaders.
141
 Momon Abdurahman also explains that during his leadership, all decisions 
of the party in the district were mostly made by senior officials who were mostly Islamic 
teachers in the district.
142
 In addition, Sahar L. Hasan argues that party leaders at the 
regional level experience a dilemma when they manage their organizational structures. On 
one hand, they attempt to organize the party organization by applying modern management 
principles. On the others hand, they realize that the implementation of modern management 
principles does not guarantee the party to gain a significant support in elections. As 
winning elections becomes the main goal of the party, party leaders at the regional level 
tend to rely heavily on traditional principles in managing their organizational structures.
143
  
Regarding the party finances, the party’s constitution states that the party at the 
district level can generate its financial income from the entrance fees, monthly fees and 
charities (infaq), tithes (zakat), grants (hibah), donations (waqaf) and other financial 
sources allowed by Islam (halal), including a state subvention.
144
 It also mentions that a 
state subvention from the government must be distributed proportionally to the party 
organizations at every level.
145
 Moreover, in order to create integrity, transparency and 
professionalism, the party finance must be audited by an independent auditor.
146
  
Table 6.4  
Budget of the PBB in 2002-2004 
 
Year Income Expenditure 
2002 Rp. 22360000 (€ 1490.67) Rp. 20360000  (€ 1357.33) 
2003 Rp. 33615000 (€ 2241) Rp. 33615000 (€ 2241) 
2004 Rp. 102167500 (€ 6811.17) Rp. 102167500 (€ 6811.17) 
Source: The PBB’s Report in 2005.  
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In practice, Momon Abdurahman explains that the party in the district receives 
financial income from five primary sources, i.e., donations from supporters of the party, 
financial contributions from the party’s legislators in the regional legislature through which 
they must provide 50 percent of their main salary to the party, the state subvention, 
financial contributions from the party leaders as well as official of the central office, and 
financial contributions from the legislative candidates. Momon Abdurahman adds that the 
party organizations at the national and provincial levels do not provide a regular financial 
assistance to the party organization at the district level.
147
 In addition, Sidiq Anggaperbata 
explains that since the 2004 election, the party in the district has not been able to collect 
membership fees.
148
 As a result, the party in the district has depended on the financial 
contribution of the party leaders, more specifically Momon Abdurahman.  
Meanwhile, there are three major items of expenditure, namely the overhead costs, 
including renting the workplace of the central office, administration affairs and the 
implementation of the party convention.
149
 The secretary of the executive council in the 
district, Saeful Azis, explains that the party lacks financial capability to conduct many 
social programs as “the financial income of the party is enough just to cover the 
administrative affairs”.150  
As a result, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2001-2004 focused its 
activities on two agendas, namely core and supporting agendas. The former refers to 
internal agendas, such as establishing the party organizations on the ground. Meanwhile, 
the latter denotes external agendas, such as developing a mass and intellectual basis, 
implementing economic empowerment among the local population and developing party 
networks.
151
 Dadang Sholihat also concedes that in this period, the party utilized activities 
of the PERSIS.
152
 Meanwhile, Momon Abdurahman explains that as the party experienced 
budget constraints, the party leadership in the district in the period of 2005-2010 lacked 
ability to conduct social activities so the party focused on its internal agendas, such as 
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establishing party organizations on the ground prior to the implementation of the 2009 
election.
153
  
The party’s constitution explicitly states that the party’s legislators serve as the 
important instrument of the party in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party 
into public policies.
154
 Nevertheless, in actual fact, as explained by Momon Abdurahman, 
the party leaders lack communication and coordination with the party’s legislator. 
Consequently, they are not able to make sure that the party’s legislator proposed the 
ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies.
155
 
Sidiq Anggaperbata provides similar information. He explains that the party leaders are not 
able to conduct supervision functions of the party’s legislator due to the fact that the party’s 
legislator of the party is more senior than the party leaders.
156
 In addition, Sahar L. Hasan 
also concedes that many party’s legislators at the regional level disregard the role of party 
leaders. In this sense, it is not easy for party leaders at the regional level to supervise the 
performance of party’s legislators in making public policies.157   
Overall, the PBB in the central office has the following features. Firstly, members 
of the party play a significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Secondly, the party is 
managed by elitism and, to a lesser extent, by ideological considerations. Thirdly, the party 
depends on the financial contributions of the party elites. Fourthly, the organizational 
structure of the party in central office conducts activities just in election period. Fifthly, the 
party organization in central office is subordinate to the party organization in public office. 
 
7. Conclusion  
This chapter intends to reveal the organizational features of the Islamic parties in central 
office in the Tasikmalaya district. From the elaboration above, we can see that each of these 
parties has its own prominent features in terms of party leadership. More specifically, the 
most salient feature of the PAN is the fact that the party leaders attempt to develop a 
modern political party in the district. Meanwhile, the most prominent feature of the PKB is 
the dominant role of the party leadership at the national level as well as the NU’s leaders in 
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managing the party organization in the district. Similarly, the most interesting feature of the 
PBR is the dominant role of the party leader in managing the party. In the PPP, there has 
been a transformation process from the dominant role of members of the party to the 
dominant role of the party elites in managing the party organization in the district. On the 
other hand, the most prominent dimension of the PKS is the combination of Islamic tenets 
and technocratic principles in the party organization. In contrast, the most salient 
characteristic of PBR is the combination of elitism and ideological considerations. A 
summary of the central office’s features of these parties in the district is presented in the 
following table. 
199 
 
Table 6.5 
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties in Central Office 
 
Party/ 
Indicators 
Recruitment process of 
the party leader 
Management principle  Financial Resource Activity Relationship with the 
party in public office 
PAN Members of the party Technocratic principles Depending on the state subvention 
and the party elites 
In election period and 
beyond 
Mutual 
PKB The party elites and the 
NU leaders  
Patronage, clientelism and 
interpersonal networks  
Depending on the state subvention 
and the party elites  
Only in election period Subordinate 
 
PBR 
Members of the party Combination of elitism and, 
to a lesser extent, ideological 
consideration 
Depending on the party elites Only in election period Subordinate 
PPP Members of the party Combination of elitism and 
ideological considerations  
Depending on the state subvention 
and the party elites 
In election period and 
beyond 
Subordinate 
 
PKS 
Members of the party Combination of ideological 
consideration and 
technocratic principles 
Depending on the party elites and the 
state subvention 
In election period and 
beyond 
Mutual 
PBB Members of the party Combination of elitism and 
ideological consideration 
Depending on the party elites Only in election period Subordinate 
Source: Assessment by the Author. 
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In the initial period of their establishment in the district, the national leadership of the 
Islamic parties played a dominant role in the recruitment process of the party leaders. The 
condition shifted after the implementation of the 1999 election, when members of these parties 
play a more significant role in the recruitment process of the party leaders. More specifically, 
as shown in Table 6.5, the role of members of the party in recruiting the party leaders is very 
essential in the case of the PAN, PPP and PKS. To a lesser degree, a similar condition also 
takes place in the case of the PBR and PBB. Different to the other Islamic parties, however, 
the role of members of the party in the recruitment process of the party leaders is insignificant 
in the case of the PKB. In this party, the role of members of the party is replaced by the 
dominant role of the party leaders at the national level as well as the NU’s leaders in the 
district.  
In managing their organizations, some Islamic parties try to employ technocratic 
principles. Led by the most prominent academic in the district, the leaders of PAN tend to 
manage the party organization by employing technocratic principles. Similarly, the leaders of 
the PKS also apply such principles. By and large, however, the leaders of the PKS employ its 
ideological foundation in developing their party organization. Meanwhile, the leaders of the 
PKS employ patronage mechanisms and clientelism and they utilize their interpersonal 
networks when they manage their party organization. The other leaders of the Islamic parties 
combine elitism and Islamic tenets when they manage their party organizations. In this 
context, some Islamic parties experience the personalization of political power in their 
organizational structures. More specifically, the PBR depends on the role of Dede Saiful 
Anwar as the party leader. To a lesser degree, the PBB also depends on the role of its leaders. 
Meanwhile, the PPP experiences a transformation process from the dominant role of members 
of the party to the dominant role of the party leaders in its organizational structures. 
Regarding the party finance, in the implementation of the 1999 election, all of the 
Islamic parties were able to collect membership fees. Along with a growing political 
pragmatism in the local population and a decline in political trust in political party, just before 
the implementation of the 2004 election, most of them have not been able to generate 
membership fees anymore. Interestingly, to a limited extent, the PKS is the only Islamic party 
which is still able to generate membership fees. As these parties lack membership fees, most 
of them rely on the financial contribution from the party elites as the primary financial 
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resource. In addition, the financial contribution from the party elites takes various forms, such 
as the financial contribution from the party leaders at the national level, the financial 
contribution of members of the party with a position in the regional government (the district 
head and vice head), the financial contribution from the legislators, as well as the financial 
contribution from the legislative candidates. It is also important to note that these parties have 
also tended to depend on the state subvention as the government in the district provides the 
subvention for all parties with seat(s) in the legislature in 2006.  
Having experienced budget constraints, these Islamic parties experience many 
difficulties in conducting their regular activities in order to create and maintain the political 
linkage with their members and supporters. Overall, the PPP, the PKS and, to a lesser degree, 
the PAN, are still able to conduct activities in election period and beyond. As a consequence, 
the central office of these parties in the district serves as a centre in which coordination and 
communication among the party leaders, officials of the central office, members and 
supporters of these parties are established. On the other hand, the PKB, PBR and PBB lack 
effort to conduct social activities beyond election period. In creating and maintaining the 
political linkage with their members or supporters, these parties focus on activities in election 
period.  
Further, some of the Islamic parties have also succeeded in developing their 
organizational relationship between their leaders in the central office and their legislators. 
More specifically, the PAN and PKS develop a mutual relationship between the party leaders 
and their legislators. In this context, on one hand, the organizational structure of these parties 
in the central office serves as the agent in connecting members and their legislators. On the 
other hand, the legislators from these parties serve as the agent in defending the ideology and 
platforms of these parties in making public policies in the regional legislature. On the contrary, 
the PKB, PBR, PPP and PBB develop an internal organizational relationship in which their 
leaders and officials of their central office are as subordinate to their legislators. 
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Table 6.6 
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties in Central Office  
Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
 
PAN 
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- Members of the party recruit the party 
leader 
- The organizational structure of the party in 
central office conducts activities in 
election period and beyond 
- The organizational structure of the party in 
central office is the agent by which the 
organizational structure of the party in 
public office could be held accountable by 
members of the party 
- The party organization is managed 
by technocratic principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKB 
- The party elites serve as or recruit 
party leader 
- The party organization is managed by 
clientelism or interpersonal network 
mechanism 
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office conducts 
activities only in election period 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office is subordinate to 
the organizational structure of the 
party in public office 
 - The party depends on a state 
subvention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PBR 
- The party organization is managed by 
elitism  
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office conducts 
activities only in election period 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office is subordinate to 
the organizational structure of the 
party in public office 
 
- Members of the party recruit the party 
leader 
- The party organization is managed by 
ideological considerations 
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Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
PPP 
- The party organization is managed by 
clientelism or interpersonal network 
mechanism 
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office is subordinate to 
the organizational structure of the 
party in public office 
- Members of the party recruit the party 
leader 
- The party organization is managed by 
ideological considerations 
- The organizational structure of the party in 
central office conducts activities in 
election period and beyond 
 
- The party depends on a state 
subvention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKS 
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- Members of the party recruit the party 
leader 
- The party organization is managed by 
ideological considerations 
- The organizational structure of the party in 
central office conducts activities in 
election period and beyond 
- The organizational structure of the party in 
central office is the agent by which the 
organizational structure of the party in 
public office could be held accountable by 
members of the party 
- The party organization is managed 
by technocratic principles 
- The party depends on a state 
subvention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PBB 
- The party organization is managed by 
elitism  
- The party depends on the financial 
contribution of the party elites 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office conducts 
activities only in election period 
- The organizational structure of the 
party in central office is subordinate to 
the organizational structure of the 
party in public office 
- Members of the party recruit the party 
leader 
- The party organization is managed by 
ideological considerations 
   
Source: Assessment by the Author. 
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From the discussion in above, as shown in Table 6.6, we can see that the general 
features of these Islamic parties in central office are complex. If we compare these 
findings to the theoretical framework as elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of 
these parties contains some elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party and 
the electoralist party models. In this sense, all of these Islamic parties contain hybrid 
features of these party models. In this sense, it is not easy to categorize these parties into 
a single party model. As some elements are more prominent than the others, however, 
some of them can be categorized into a certain party model. 
The PAN in the central office contains hybrid features of the elite-based party, 
mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the mass-based 
model are very dominant in this party. More specifically, members of the party play a 
significant role in recruiting the party leaders. Despite the fact that party experiences 
budget constraints, the party in the district is still able to conduct social activities in and 
beyond election period in order to create and maintain the political linkage with its 
members and supporters. In this party, the organizational structure of the central office 
serves as an agent through which the party’s legislators could be held accountable by 
members of the party.  
Meanwhile, the PKB in the central office resembles the elite-based party 
models, although it depends on a state subvention as one of its primary sources. In the 
party, the role of the party elites is very dominant in the recruitment process of the party 
leaders. The party organization is also managed by elitism, clientelism and the 
interpersonal networks of the party leaders. Moreover, the party also depends on the 
financial contribution of their elites. Meanwhile, by utilizing daily activities of the NU, 
the party conducts social activities only in election periods. In this party, the party 
leaders in the central office are subordinate to the party’s legislators.  
Similarly, the PBR in the central office also contains some elements of the elite-
based party and mass-based party models. Taken as a whole, however, the elements of 
the elite-based party model are very strong in this party. In this party, the role of Dede 
Saiful Anwar is very dominant not only in managing the party organization, but also in 
providing the party finance. As a result, the party in the district is identical to this figure. 
Apart from his position as the party leader, Dede Saiful Anwar also serves as the only 
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party’s legislator. However, he prioritizes his status as the party’s legislator rather than 
as the party leader. In this party, therefore, the party organization in central office is 
subordinate to the party in public office.  
The PPP in the central office also contains hybrid features of the elite-based 
party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements of the elite-
based party model are as strong as the elements of the mass-based party model. Taken 
as a whole, however, it seems that the party tends to adopt the elite-based party model 
as the party leaders have a more dominant role in managing the party organization. The 
way this party organizes in the district indicates that it has experienced a transformation 
from the mass-based party model to the elite-based party model. 
On the other hand, the PKS in the central office contains hybrid features of the 
elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the elements 
of the mass-based party models are very dominant in this party. More specifically, 
members of the party play a pivotal role in recruiting the party leaders. In this party, the 
party organization is managed by ideological considerations. Moreover, to create and 
maintain the political linkage with members and supporters, the party conducts activities 
in election period and beyond. There is also a mutual relationship between the party 
leaders and the party’s legislator.  
Lastly, the PBB in the central office contains some elements of the elite-based 
party and mass-based party models. However, the elements of the elite-based party 
model are more dominant. In this party, the party organization is managed by elitism 
principle. To finance its activities, the party also depends on the financial contribution 
from the party elites. As a result, the party conducts activities just in election period in 
order to create and maintain the political linkage with its members or supporters. In this 
party, the organizational structure of the party on the ground is also subordinate to the 
party in public office. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF  
THE ISLAMIC PARTIES IN PUBLIC OFFICE  
 
This chapter explores the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public office, 
more specifically in the Tasikmalaya District Legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah or DPRD). In doing so, we apply the five criteria as introduced in Chapter 2, 
namely the models of representation, the efforts of legislators of the Islamic parties to 
transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, the supporting 
infrastructures employed by legislators of these parties in making public policies, the 
ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as well as 
the relationships among legislators of these parties as well as between the legislators of 
these parties and legislators of the secular-nationalist parties in making public policies.  
In addition, the analysis in this chapter focuses on two important policies in the 
district, i.e., sharia-based policies and regional budget policy (Anggaran Pendapatan dan 
Belanja Daerah or APBD). As discussed in Chapter 4, the sharia-based policies in the 
district are realized by the Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the 
Tasikmalaya district in 2001-2005 which was later on continued by the Tasikmalaya 
Regulation No. 17/2006 on the Tasikmalaya Medium-Term Development Plan in 2006-
2010 and the Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 3/2001 on Security and Order Based on 
Morality, Religion, Local Ethics and Values. Meanwhile, in the implementation of the 
decentralized system and local autonomy, similar to other regional governments, the 
government in the district has the political authority to manage its domestic affairs, 
including in the budgeting process. 
 
1. The PAN: When the Ideology Is Irrelevant 
As explained in Chapter 4, the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN) 
was able to gain three seats in the district in the 1999 election. The party however failed to 
maintain this achievement in the following election when it gained only two seats. In the 
2009 election the party was able to increase the number of its votes significantly and 
obtaining three seats. Overall, the party in the district was relatively able to maintain its 
level of political support in these three elections.   
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A party’s legislator in the district, Demi Hamzah Rahadian, explains that following 
the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list proportional representation 
system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation system in the 2004 
and 2009 elections by which the voters relied more on personal candidates rather than on 
political parties, the political attitude of party’s legislators in implementing their functions 
has also changed. If the closed-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election 
produced the party’s legislators who acted as “the party servants”, the open-list 
proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections created the party’s 
legislators who tended to act as “the public servants” for their electorates. In other words, 
the new electoral system led to a transformation of the party representation from the party’s 
legislators as “the agent of the party” to the party’s legislators as “the agent of the 
electorates”.1  
Such an argument is denied by the deputy general secretary of the party leadership 
at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or DPP), Viva Yoga Mauladi. Based on his 
understanding of the national provision on political parties and elections as well as the 
party’s constitution, Viva Yoga Mauladi argues that all of party’s legislators at the national 
and regional levels must serve as the agent of the party.
2
 This information suggests that 
there is a different interpretation between the party’s legislators at the regional level and the 
party leadership at the national level regarding the model of representation. 
Moreover, Demi Hamzah Rahadian concedes that in implementing his 
responsibilities as the party’s legislator, he relies on the interests of his electorates in his 
own electoral area (daerah pemilihan or dapil) rather than on the interests of the local 
population at large. He argues that such a practice is in accordance with Law No. 22/2003 
on Structure and Position of National, Provincial and District/Municipal Legislators and 
Regional Representative Council.
3
 Similarly, another party’s legislator in the district, Iip 
Syamsul Arif, argues that the party’s legislators must prioritize the interests of their 
electorates in their own electoral area. However, it does not necessarily mean that they 
disregard the interests of the local population at large.
4
 
                                                          
1
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
2
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
3
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
4
 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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Information from direct observation shows that in their daily activities, the party’s 
legislators prioritize the interests of their electorates rather than the interests of the local 
population in general. In addition, the interests of their electorates are typically manifested 
with proposal letters demanding various infrastructure projects of the government, such as 
projects to build mosques, roads, or put up street lights. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains 
that the electorates attempt to make direct contact with the party’s legislators when they 
propose these projects as they experience what he calls “bureaucratic obstacles”. In this 
sense, the party’s legislators provide political solutions for their electorates in dealing with 
the complexity of bureaucratic procedures.
5
  
Iip Syamsul Arif contends that such this mechanism does not impair the budgeting 
process as the regional budget has provided the financial allocations for these sectors. 
Further, he argues that by facilitating their electorates to access the regional budget, the 
party’s legislators have implemented their main function, i.e., to articulate the interests of 
their electorates.
6
 A cultural observer in the district, Acep Zamzam Noer, provides a 
different point of view. He argues that such a practice in fact reflects the patron-client 
relationship between the party’s legislators and their electorates. On one hand, these 
legislators act as the patron through which they must propose policies which provide 
benefits to their electorates. On the other hand, the electorates act as the clients through 
which they must vote for these legislators in elections.
7
 These illustrations, therefore, 
indicate that the party’s legislators tend to adopt the trustee model of representation. 
Further, although the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation, the 
party’s legislators support the implementation of the sharia-based policies in the district. 
According to the journalist of Radar Priangan, Duddy, the party’s legislators in the period 
of 2005-2009 played a significant role in imposing the Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 
on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya District in 2001-2005. He also explains that this 
policy was also supported by several Islamic boarding schools in the district with a political 
affiliation with the party, such as the Cintawana Islamic boarding school in which its 
leaders are the loyal supporters of the party.
8
 
                                                          
5
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
6
 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, November 20, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
7
 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
8
 Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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The party’s legislators in the period of 2005-2009 did not reject the implementation 
of the Tasikmalaya Regulation No. 17/2006 on the Tasikmalaya Medium-Term 
Development Plan in 2006-2010. Demi Hamzah Rahadian argues that the party’s 
legislators decided to support this policy due to calculative considerations. Firstly, the 
implementation of these policies is a very sensitive issue in the district. As the majority of 
the local population is Muslim, therefore, “it did not make sense for the party’s legislators 
to reject these policies”. Secondly, the implementation of this policy has nothing to do with 
the implementation of an Islamic state in the district as it serves just as “the political 
commodity” for all of political actors in the district so that the implementation of sharia in 
the district is merely a slogan.
9
 In addition, Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that the 
implementation of various sharia-based policies at the regional level has been utilized by 
all of local political actors for the purpose of political marketing and an image building of 
their own parties.
10
 
Information from direct observation confirms such statements. Although the party’s 
legislators support these policies, they lack significant effort to transform the elements of 
sharia into public policies in the district, especially in the regional budget policy. For 
instance, as conceded by Demi Hamzah Rahadian, the regional budget policy in the district 
provides a limited financial allocation for Islamic education sector. “Not surprisingly, 
although the development plan policy in the district contains the elements of sharia, in 
reality, the condition of Islamic schools in the district is still very poor”.11 Similarly, a staff 
of Tasikmalaya Corruption Watch (TCW), Dadi Abdul Hadi, argues that the party’s 
legislators do not make any significant effort to propose the pro-poor budget in the district. 
Consequently, the regional budget is not able to increase the social welfare of the local 
population.
12
 
Further, to support their role in making public policies, these legislators rely heavily 
on the role of the party organizations, more specifically the party organization in central 
office at the district level (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah or DPD) and the party organizations 
on the ground (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC at the sub-district level and Dewan 
                                                          
9
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
10
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
11
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
12
 Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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Pengurus Ranting or DPRt at the village level). Demi Hamzah Rahadian asserts that the 
role of the party organizations is very important, especially in the budgeting process as they 
serve as “the eyes and ears of the party’s legislators”. Meanwhile, the central office serves 
as “the selector” of various demands from the local population.13 In other words, the role of 
the party organizations on the ground is very significant as an instrument of the interest 
articulation, while the role of the central office is very important as an instrument of the 
interest aggregation. 
To a limited extent, the party’s legislators also receive organizational support from 
the party leadership at the national level. Viva Yoga Mauladi explains that the party 
leadership at the national level provides organizational guidelines for all of the party’s 
legislators at the regional level so they understand what they should do in making public 
policies. It also conducts an annual forum in which it provides instructions and technical 
skills for all of the party’s legislators.14 Information from direct observation shows that the 
party organization at the provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW) also 
provides organizational support for the party’s legislators, such as conducting a regional 
forum through which these legislators in the district establish communication and 
coordination with their counterparts in other district and municipalities in West Java 
province. 
It should also be acknowledged that together with the legislators of the PBR, PBB 
and PD, the legislators of the PAN in the period of 2004-2009 established the Amanah 
fraction in the district. Demi Hamzah Rahadian asserts that legislators of the PAN played a 
dominant role in the fraction, including in deciding the final stance of the fraction. Further, 
he explains that such a situation came about due to the fact that legislators of the other 
parties in this fraction had limited competence in the budgeting process in particular and in 
making public policies in general.
15
 Dadi Abdul Hadi confirms such a statement. He asserts 
that in fact “the Amanah fraction was the PAN fraction” as legislators of this party played a 
dominant role.
16
  
                                                          
13
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
14
 Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, January 29, 2009 (Jakarta). 
15
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
16
 Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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Different to the situation in the fraction, the party’s legislators lack ambition for 
hegemony in making public policies in the legislature. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains 
that such a condition occurs due to the fact that the party has a small number of seats. 
However, it does not simply mean that they do not have an aspiration to propose their own 
policies. For instance, although there were only two legislators of the party in the period of 
2004-2009, the role of these legislators was very significant in proposing public policies, 
such as when they urged the executive branch of government to provide identity cards for 
the local population for free in 2007 and when they put an emphasis on the financial 
allocation for the elderly to gain access to health facilities and for poor children to gain 
access to education.
17
 
It is also important to mention that these legislators are well-known as clever and 
well-educated persons by other legislators. Demi Hamzah Rahadian explains that Heri 
Hendriana became one of the leading legislators in the district in the period of 1999-2004, 
especially in the budgeting process.
18
 Similarly, Iip Syamsul Arif played a significant role 
in the budgeting process in the period of 2004-2009.
19
 He was also known as one of the few 
legislators who were concerned with the social welfare of the local population so that he 
gained a lot of respect and appreciation from other legislators.
20
 
Further, Demi Hamzah Rahadian concedes that all of legislators in the district lack 
ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. He also 
adds that the legislature has not been able to implement the overseeing function optimally 
for two reasons. Firstly, most legislators have limited technical skill so that they are far 
behind the bureaucrats in making policies. Secondly, since 2004 the national provisions 
have not optimally supported the implementation of controlling function. As a 
consequence, similar to the status of the regional legislature during the New Order period, 
the Tasikmalaya District Legislature recently serves just as a rubber stamp for public 
policies made by the executive branch of government.
21
 
Demi Hamzah Rahadian also asserts that although each of the parties adopts 
different ideological foundations, all of the legislators have a similar political stance when 
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 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
18
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
19
 Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
20
 Interview with Duddy, November 17, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
21
 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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they are involved in making public policies. In this sense, the ideology and platforms of 
parties are not in line with the political stance of their legislators in making public policies. 
In this sense, it is very difficult to distinguish the political stance of legislators of the 
Muslim-Nationalist with legislators of Islamist and secular-nationalist parties.
22
 Viva Yoga 
Mauladi also explains that similar to the condition at the national level, there is no certain 
pattern regarding collaboration and conflict between the party’s legislators and legislators 
of other parties at the regional level. He also adds that collaboration and conflict in the 
policy-making processes are mostly based on pragmatic reasons rather than on ideological 
considerations. These illustrations suggest that the ideology and platforms of the party are 
irrelevant for the party’s legislators when they are involved in making public policies.23  
In summary, the PAN in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislators tend to act as trustees. Secondly, they disregard the role of the ideology and 
platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies so that they tend to 
defend their own personal interests. Thirdly, they employ the party organizations to support 
their role in policy-making. Fourthly, they have minimal to establish an opposition force to 
the executive branch of government. Fifthly, although they play a dominant role in the 
Amanah fraction, they lack ambition to achieve hegemony in making policies. In this sense, 
they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the policy-making 
processes. 
 
2. The PKB: When the Ideology Is Flexible 
The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB) was able to maintain 
their political achievement in the district by gaining five seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 
elections. It should also be acknowledged that most of the party’s legislators in the period 
of 2009-2014 served as the party’s legislators in the previous period. 
The head of the PKB fraction in the district, Syamsudin, claims that since the 
implementation of the 1999 election all party’s legislators have attempted to articulate the 
interests of the local population at large. For example, they allocated an “endowment fund” 
for poor and elderly people. They also provided sufficient financial allocation to the health 
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 Interview with Demi Hamzah Rahadian, November 18, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
23
 Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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and education sectors. By conducting such efforts, Syamsudin argues that the party’s 
legislators serve not only as the representative for their electorates, but also as the 
representative for the local population at large.
24
 However, Dadi Abdul Hadi denies such a 
claim. He explains that since the implementation of the decentralized system and local 
autonomy in 2001, the party’s legislators have made a limited effort to propose the public 
policies which increase the social welfare of the local population. In the education sector, 
for instance, they do not have empathy to improve the facilities of Islamic schools 
(madrasah) despite the fact that most of them had obtained their education in these schools. 
Based on their performance, Dadi Abdul Hadi argues that, “rather than serving as the 
representative of the local population, the party’s legislators serve as the representative of 
their own interests”.25 
Another party’s legislator in the district, Haris Sanjaya explains that in the 
budgeting process, the party’s legislators rely on political, sociological and historical 
analysis. In this sense, they have relied on national provisions when they play their role in 
making public policies in order to minimize an abuse of power.
26
 However, Acep Zamzam 
Noer criticizes such an opinion. He argues that this explanation is made in order to hide the 
fact that the party’s legislators stand up just for their own personal interests as all of public 
policies made by these legislators have failed to improve the social welfare in the district.
27
  
Information from direct observation shows that the party’s legislators tend to 
prioritize the interests of their electorates rather than the interests of the local population at 
large. It is also important to mention that some of them also serve as officials of the party 
organization in central office in the district (Dewan Pengurus Cabang or DPC). In this 
sense, they have autonomy from the party leaders in the district as well as from their 
electorates when they are involved in policies-making. These illustrations indicate that the 
party’s legislators tend to act as trustees for their electorates. 
Although the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation, the party’s 
legislators do not decline the implementation of the sharia-based policies. Syamsudin 
explains the party’s legislators decided to take this political stance for calculative reasons. 
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 Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
25
 Interview with Dadi Abdul Hadi, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
26
 Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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Firstly, these policies are in accordance with the nature of the local population, i.e., the 
pious Muslims. Secondly, they have nothing to do with the implementation of an Islamic 
state in the district. Thirdly, they are not against the national constitution and national 
provisions. In addition, Syamsudin asserts that in playing their role in making public 
policies, the party’s legislators interpret the ideology of the party in “flexible ways”.28 
Another party’s legislator in the district, Haris Sanjaya, has a similar point of view. 
He argues that the political stance to support the implementation of the sharia-based 
policies in the district is not against the party’s constitution as the implementation of these 
policies does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state in the district. He 
also concedes that this political stance is important for the party in order to gain political 
support from the local population, especially from members of the Renaissance of Islamic 
Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) since they are the loyal supporters of the party. 
Moreover, he explains that it is not possible for the party’s legislators to reject the 
implementation of these policies “as all of legislators in the district also support the 
implementation of these policies”.29  
An academic of Siliwangi University, Subhan, explains that in 2001 most of the 
prominent leaders of the party and NU’s leaders did not support the implementation of 
Tasikmalaya Regulation No 3/2001 on Strategic Planning of the Tasikmalaya District in 
2001-2005. They argued that it was more important to implement sharia in a substantive 
manner rather than to formalize it in a public policy.
30
  Similarly, Acep Zamzam Noer 
explains that the party’s legislators do not actively propose policies with the elements of 
sharia. As sharia becomes an interesting political instrument to gain supporters, however, 
“it is too attractive” to be ignored.31 
To support their role in making public policies, the party’s legislators receive 
organizational supports from the party leadership at the national level (Dewan Pengurus 
Pusat or DPP). The party leader at the national level, Muhaimin Iskandar, explains that the 
national party leaders has provided organizational guidelines for party’s legislators at the 
national and regional levels in order to support their functions in making public policies. 
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 Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Interview with Haris Sanjaya, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Interview with Subhan, November 15, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Interview with Acep Zamzam Noer, November 25, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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They have also established a forum called FOKSAM (Forum Kerjasama or the cooperation 
forum) through which the party leadership at the national level provides instruction and 
technical skills for party’s legislators at all levels.32 Information from direct observation 
shows that although the party leadership at the national level has published several 
guidelines to all of the party’s legislators, these guidelines have not been distributed well to 
the party’s legislators in the district.33 
Further, the party’s legislators have their personal staff. A member of this staff, 
Jejeng, explains that the staff mostly comes from former activists of the Indonesian 
Movement of Islamic Student (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or PMII), a student 
organization affiliated with the NU. Jejeng also explains that they receive their financial 
fees from the personal contributions of the party’s legislators. They do not receive their 
financial fees from the party leadership in the district. The role of this staff is very 
important for the party’s legislators in providing substantive and technical supports in daily 
activities of these legislators, such as in preparing a political stance of the party in a public 
policy.
34
 
The party’s legislators also receive supports from the NU. Syamsudin argues that as 
the NU serves as the main organizational foundation of the party, the party’s legislators 
take into consideration advice and input of the NU’s leaders in the district when they are 
involved in making public policies.
35
 However, Acep Zamzam Noer explains that the 
party’s legislators have a strong relationship just with a few leaders of the NU with a strong 
political ambition. In this sense, he argues that the party’s legislators do not have a strong 
organizational relationship with the NU. As a result, they are not able to increase the social 
welfare of members of the NU in the district.
36
 
In policy-making, the party’s legislators lack ambition for hegemony. This is partly 
due to the fact that they are not the majority in the legislature. Syamsudin concedes that as 
the party gained five seats in the legislature, the PKB fraction in the district is not able to 
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 Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, January 30 2009 (Jakarta). 
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 See, for example, DPP PKB, Menjadi Politisi Negarawan. Modul Pelatihan Orientasi Politik DPC dan 
DPW PKB (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2008). 
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 Interview with Jejeng, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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 Interview with Syamsudin, November 24, 2008 (Tasikmalaya). 
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initiate its own policies.
37
 Moreover, Haris Sanjaya asserts that the party’s legislators 
cannot be “a sectarian actor” when they are involved in making public policies. In this 
sense, “they must consider political opinions as well as political attitudes of legislators of 
other parties”.38 
Syamsudin also explains that there is no “clash of ideologies” among the legislators 
when they are involved in making public policies. Further, he asserts that although the 
party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base, it does not necessarily mean that the party’s 
legislators have a different political stance with the legislators of the Islamist parties.
39
 
Similarly, Haris Sanjaya explains that there is no ideological disparity between the party’s 
legislators and legislators of other parties as all of them follow national provisions when 
they are involved in making public policies.
40
 Meanwhile, Acep Zamzam Noer underlines 
that the party’s legislators are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties 
as all of them have a similar goal, i.e., imposing their own personal interests.
41
 
The party’s legislators also lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the 
executive branch of government. This is due to the fact that the district vice head, Endang 
Hidayat, serves as the head of Majelis Syuro (the advisory board) of the party leadership in 
the district despite the fact that the party did not support the Endang Hidayat’s candidacy as 
the district vice head in 2006. It should also be acknowledged that Endang Hidayat is the 
father-in-law of Syamsudin as the head of the PKB fraction. These illustrations suggest that 
it is not an easy task for these legislators to criticize policies made by the executive branch 
of government.  
Haris Sanjaya also explains that the national provisions on the regional government 
do not facilitate the regional legislature to conduct the overseeing function in ideal 
manners. These provisions explicitly state that the regional legislature is part of the regional 
government. In this sense, different to the relationship between the national legislature and 
the president, the relationship between the regional legislature and the executive branch of 
regional government does not apply the principle of separation of power. As a result, there 
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is no single policy of the executive branch of government which has been disapproved by 
the legislature.
42
 
To sum up, the PKB in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislators act as trustees. Secondly, they disregard the role of the ideology and platforms of 
the party so that they tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in 
policy-making. Thirdly, they employ the role of external organizations and, to a limited 
extent, the party organizations to support their role in making policies. Fourthly, they lack 
desire to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as the district 
vice head come from the party and some of the legislators have a family relationship with 
the district vice head. Fifthly, they lack ambition to establish hegemony in the policy-
making so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties. 
 
3. The PBR: When Elitism Continues 
In the 2004 election, as a new party, the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi or 
PBR) gained one seat in the district. However, the party failed to send its representative to 
the legislature in the 2009 election. In 2004 the party was represented by Dede Saiful 
Anwar who also served as the party leader in the district. In addition, Dede Saiful Anwar 
was one of the leading vote getters for the Functional Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) 
during the New Order period. After the fall of Suharto, he decided to move to the PPP by 
serving as the general secretary of the expert board. Since 2003 he has decided to support 
the PBR.  
Dede Saiful Anwar explains that according to the party’s constitution, in carrying 
out his functions as the only party’s legislator, he must rely on the party’s main goal, i.e., to 
improve the social welfare of the local population. In doing so, he claims that he has 
maintained the political relationships with the local population in general and with his 
electorates in his electoral area in particular. He also claims that he succeeded in 
articulating and realizing aspirations of his electorates in many policies, such as health care 
service for the elderly people and education service for poor children.
43
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Such claims are denied by Acep Zamzam Noer. He asserts that similar to other 
legislators, “Dede Saiful Anwar does not understand about what he should do in making 
public policies to improve the social welfare of the local population”. Acep Zamzam Noer 
also explains that Dede Saiful Anwar does not involve the participation of his electorates in 
making public policies as he is so very dominant in the party organization in the central 
office and in the legislature.
44
 Duddy provides similar information. He explains that since 
the implementation of the decentralized system and regional autonomy in 2001 Dede Saiful 
Anwar has had a limited effort in proposing public policies which improve the social 
welfare of the local population.
45
 
Information from direct observation also shows that Dede Saiful Anwar plays a 
dominant role in deciding the political stance of the party in the legislature. On one hand, 
officials of the party organizations suppose that Dede Saiful Anwar has made significant 
efforts in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies. On the 
other hand, his electorates assume that Dede Saiful Anwar has attempted to defend the 
interests of his electorates in making public policies. Having had a dual status as the party 
leader and as the only party’s legislator at the same time, Dede Saiful Anwar has autonomy 
in playing his role in making public policies. In this sense, he tends to acts as a trustee with 
regard to the model of representation. 
Dede Saiful Anwar has attempted to implement the sharia-based policies in the 
district. He argues that the implementation of these policies is very important in realizing 
“the Islamic structure of the government and the Islamic culture of the local population”. 
Moreover, he asserts that the implementation of these policies reflects the political will of 
the government and local population in the district to realize Islamic tenets into daily 
activities so that Islam is not a merely slogan. He also states that one should not have 
“Islamphobia” when there are various sharia-based regulations as Islam serves as a 
blessing for all mankind (rahmatan lil alamin), including for the minorities.
46
 
Further, Dede Saiful Anwar claims that he made many efforts to realize the 
ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, such as allocating adequate 
financial allocation to the education sector when he was involved in the budgeting 
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process.
47
 However, Dadi Abdul Hadi asserts that Dede Saiful Anwar has limited effort to 
make the pro-poor budget policy, especially in the education sector. Dadi Abdul Hadi also 
adds that Dede Saiful Anwar has limited competence in the budgeting process.
48
 A student 
of Siliwangi University, Roni Romansya provides similar information. He explains that as a 
political campaigner with a long political experience, Dede Saiful Anwar often makes 
personal claims that are far from the truth. Still according to Roni Romansya, there are 
some indications that Dede Saiful Anwar has also been involved in corruption when he 
served as the head of the special committee on the education sector in the legislature in 
2006.
49
 
Dede Saiful Anwar explains that the party leadership at the national level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat or DPP) and the party organization at the provincial level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW) provide neither inputs nor facilities to support his role as the 
only party’s legislator in the district. He does not receive organizational support from the 
party organizations on the ground (Dewan Pimpinan Anak Cabang or DPAC at the sub-
district level, Pimpinan Ranting or PIRANTI at the village level and Pimpinan Anak 
Ranting or PINAKRANTI at the sub-village level).
50
 In addition, the deputy general 
secretary of the party leadership at the national level, Yusuf Lakaseng, concedes that the 
party leadership at the national level provides organizational supports just for party’s 
legislators in the national legislature as it experiences budget constraint.
51
 Information from 
direct observation also indicates that although Dede Saiful prefers to establish his personal 
own networks to support his role in making public policies rather than to rely on Islamic 
organizations. 
As mentioned earlier, together with the legislators of the PAN, PBB and PD, Dede 
Saiful Anwar creates the Amanah fraction. As the fraction is dominated by the legislators 
of the PAN, Dede Saiful Anwar plays an insignificant role in the fraction. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that he has limited competence to implement his responsibilities as 
a legislator. In this context, Dede Saiful Anwar concedes that “as a single fighter of the 
party in the legislature”, it is not easy for him to take a more significant role both in the 
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fraction and in the legislature.
52
 Consequently, although he has a dominant role in the party 
organizations, he lacks ambition for hegemony in the fraction in particular and in the 
legislature in general.  
Dede Saeful Anwar explains that he has attempted to maintain his personal 
relationship with the other legislators in the fraction. He concedes that he has a similar 
understanding with the legislators of the PAN as well as with the legislator of the PBB and 
the PBB as these parties also adopt Islam as their ideological foundation. By contrast, he 
has a different point of view with the legislator of the PD. Moreover, he concedes that he 
shares a similar point of view with legislators of the other Islamist parties, especially with 
the legislators of the PPP and PKS. On the other hand, it is difficult for him to share a 
similar political stance with the legislators of the PKB as well as with the legislators of the 
secular-nationalist parties.  
However, it does not simply mean that he could not establish political 
collaborations with legislators of other parties in making public policies. In this context, he 
argues that “there are no eternal friends, but there is only an eternal interest in politics”.53 In 
addition, Yusuf Lakaseng explains that the pattern of conflict and coalition between the 
party’s legislator and legislators of other parties in making public policies in the district 
does not necessarily follow the pattern of conflict and coalition between party’s legislator 
and legislators of other parties in making public policies at the national level. He also 
asserts that the party leadership at the national level provides autonomy to party’s 
legislators at the regional level to conduct coalition with legislators of other parties in 
making public policies.
54
 
Dede Saiful Anwar also lacks ambition to establish an opposition force to the 
executive branch of government in the district. He asserts that he has tried to maintain his 
personal relationship with the district head. He also states that he shares similar visions 
with the district head despite the fact that he did not support the candidacy of Tatang 
Farhanul Hakim as the district head in 2006.
55
 Likewise, Tatang Farhanul Hakim contends 
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that he has tried to maintain his personal relationship with all legislators in the district, 
including with those who did not support his candidacy as the district head in 2006.
56
 
In short, the PBR in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislator acts as a trustee. Secondly, he disregards the role of the ideology and platforms of 
the party so that he defends his own personal interests when he is involved in policy-
making. Thirdly, he employs his own infrastructure to support his role in making policies. 
Fourthly, he has minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch 
of government. Fifthly, he lacks ambition for hegemony in the Amanah fraction in 
particular and in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature in general. In this sense, he is tolerant 
of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the policy-making processes. 
 
4. The PPP: Playing With the Ideology 
The United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) was able to gain 
eleven seats in the 1999 election in the district. In the 2004 election the party gained twelve 
seats despite the fact that it failed to become the winning party in the district as it was 
replaced by the Golkar Party. However, in the 2009 election it removed the domination of 
the secular-nationalist parties as the winning party by gaining fourteen seats. In general, the 
party succeeded in increasing its electoral achievement in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 
elections. 
The head of the PPP fraction in district, Apip Ifan Permadi, argues that in 
implementing their responsibilities, the party’s legislators attempt to serve as “the 
mouthpiece of the local population”. In this sense, the interests of the party’s legislators in 
making public policies must be in accordance with the interests of their electorates in their 
own electoral areas. Apip Ifan Permadi adds that in implementing their functions, the 
party’s legislators must rely on six Islamic principles as mentioned in the party’s 
constitution, namely worship (ibadah), truth, honesty, justice, equality, solidarity, unity and 
consistency (istiqamah).
57
  
Another party’s legislator in district, Ruhimat, provides a similar explanation. 
According to him, the party leadership in the district (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC) 
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provides greater discretion for the party’s legislators to implement their functions when 
they are involved in policy-making. Nevertheless, it does not simply mean that they are 
uncontrollable as all of them must act in line with the party’s constitution and platforms.58 
Information from direct observation shows that the workplace of the PPP fraction serves as 
a room in which the party’s legislators establish coordination and communication with 
officials of the party organizations on the ground (branch at the village level and Dewan 
Pengurus Anak Cabang or DPAC at the sub-district level) as well as with members and 
supporters of the party.  
Apip Ifan Permadi explains that after the implementation of the 1999 election, 
members and supporters of the party typically articulated their interests through the party 
organizations on the ground which in turn delivered these aspirations to the party leadership 
in central office at the district level. After selecting these aspirations, the party leaders at 
the district level then send these aspirations to the party’s legislators. However, along with 
the modification of the electoral system and a growing political pragmatism among the 
local population, members and supporters of the party prefer to articulate their interests 
directly to the party’s legislators. Therefore, members or supporters of the party tend to 
disregard the role of the party organizations on the ground and the party leadership in the 
central office when they articulate their interests.
59
 In addition, the interests of members 
and supporters of the party are mostly realized by proposal letters, demanding social 
development projects and social financial assistance. 
It is also important to underline that in making public policies, the party’s 
legislators support policies proposed by the executive branch of government due to the fact 
that the district head, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, comes from the party. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, Tatang Farhanul Hakim served as the party leader in the district in the 
period of 1999-2006.
60
 On the other hand, as conceded by Tatang Farhanul Hakim, the 
district head in particular and the bureaucracy in general provide political supports the 
party’s legislators when they are involved in policy-making.61 
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Further, the party’s legislators play a significant role in supporting the 
implementation of the sharia-based policies in the district. Subhan explains that although 
the proposal of these policies came from the executive branch of government in the district, 
more specifically the district head, the party’s legislators were also involved in the initial 
process. In proposing these policies, the party’s legislators were supported by autonomous 
agencies of the party, such as the Youth Movement of the Ka’bah (Gerakan Pemuda 
Ka’bah or GPK).62 They were also supported by several Islamic boarding schools affiliated 
with the party, such as the Miftahul Huda.
63
 
Apip Ifan Permadi argues that the party’s legislators support these policies as they 
are not against the national constitution and provisions. He also underlines that in the 
future, the party’s legislators will continue to impose other sharia-based policies in the 
district as they believe that “the source of all provisions on earth lies on the Quran and 
Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad”.64 Similarly, another party’s legislator, Neng Madinah 
Ruchyat, asserts that the party’s legislators will keep introducing various sharia-based 
policies in the district as the majority of the local population is Muslims.
65
  
Apip Ifan Permadi also claims that the party’s legislators have attempted to 
transform the elements of sharia into many public policies in the district. For instance, they 
provided input and feedback for the district head to propose sharia-based decrees, i.e., the 
District Head Decree No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 on Quran Literacy Obligation for Pupils and 
Bride Muslim Dress in the Tasikmalaya District, the District Head Circulation Letter No. 
451/1271/Sos on Wearing of Muslim Dress for Government Apparatus in the Tasikmalaya 
District and the District Head Circulation Letter No. 556.3/SE/03/Sos/2001 on 
Management of Swimming Pools in the Tasikmalaya District. They also provided financial 
allocation for the celebration of Islamic events and for the improvement of physical Islamic 
infrastructures, such as Islamic boarding schools.
66
  
However, Acep Zamzam Noer denies such claims. He asserts that the idea to 
implement the elements of sharia in the district has nothing to do with the ideology of the 
party as well as with the interests of the local population. Instead, it serves only as “a 
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political maneuver” of these legislators to gain political support. Acep Zamzam Noer adds 
that the party’s legislators do not make any significant effort to transform the elements of 
sharia, especially in the campaigns against corruption.
67
 Similarly, the head of the 
Sukahideung Islamic boarding school, Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab, explains that the issue of 
the implementation of sharia serves merely as “a political commodity” for all political 
actors to gain political support from the fanatic and uneducated people in the district.
68
 
Moreover, Dadi Abdul Hadi explains that since the implementation of the sharia-
based policies in the district in 2001, the party’s legislators do not put emphasis on 
providing financial allocation for the health sector. He argues that it is very ironic that the 
local population still experiences many difficulties in accessing health facilities so that the 
district has been categorized as a district with the highest maternal mortality rate in West 
Java Province, despite the fact that the district imposes various sharia-based policies. Dadi 
Abdul Hadi adds that the party’s legislators focus on their personal advantages in the 
budgeting process. For instance, they established personal collaborations with businessmen 
in order to take economic benefits from the development projects of government. Some of 
them also established their own company in order to attain the government contracts for 
development projects.
69
 
To support their role in policy-making, the party’s legislators rely on several 
organizations. Firstly, they obtain political support from the party organizations. Apip Ifan 
Permadi explains that in playing their role in making public policies, these legislators are 
supported by the party organizations on the ground as well as by some autonomous 
agencies of the party. He also asserts that officials of the party organizations on the ground 
serve as important agents for these legislators to collect aspirations from members and 
supporters of the party.
70
 Moreover, the party’s legislators also receive political support 
from the party leadership in the district
71
 and the party organization at the provincial level 
(Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW)
72
, such as training program of the legal drafting.   
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Secondly, they receive support from the executive branch of government. There is a 
mutual relationship between the party’s legislators and district head. On one hand, as 
explained by Apip Ifan Permadi, the party’s legislators provide political support to the 
district head, such as providing input and recommendation to the district head before he 
takes a decision on a crucial issue.
73
 On the other hand, as explained by Tatang Farhanul 
Hakim, the district head provides supports for these legislators when they are involved in 
policy-making, such as providing preliminary information when they prepare the regional 
budget policy.
74
 
Thirdly, they also receive support from some Islamic organizations in the district, 
especially the NU. They also obtain support from some prominent Islamic teachers and 
Islamic boarding schools in the district. Neng Madinah Ruchyat, for instance, explains that 
in performing her role in making policies, she relies on the roles of an autonomous body of 
the NU, namely the Nahdlatul Ulama Woman Association (Muslimat).
75
 Moreover, Apip 
Ifan Permadi states that in proposing the sharia-based policy in 2001, the party’s legislators 
were supported by an Islamic organization known as the Islamic Boarding School Society 
Forum (Forum Masyarakat Pesantren or FMP).
76
 At that time, they also received support 
from some proponents of the Islamic state movement in the district.
77
 In addition, some of 
the party’s legislators also rely on the role of thugs (preman) who typically serve as “a 
political broker” between these legislators and their electorates in the patron-client 
relationship.
78
 
As the party has a strong relationship with the district head, the party’s legislators 
lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. 
Instead, they always provide their political support for the district head. However, Apip 
Ifan Permadi argues that the party’s legislators in particular have made various efforts in 
order to conduct the supervision function to the bureaucracy in the district in technical 
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matters.
79
 In other words, they conduct the overseeing function just over the street level 
bureaucracy on one hand and they do not conduct the controlling function over the district 
head in the ideal manner on the other hand.  
It should also be acknowledged that although the party has successfully become the 
winning party in the district, the party’s legislators lack desire for hegemony in making 
public policies. Apip Ifan Permadi explains that although the party has a large number of 
seats, it does not simply mean that they play a dominant role in policy-making. This 
situation occurs partly due to the fact that just a few legislators of the party have 
capabilities to implement their functions, especially in the budgeting process.
80
 Subhan also 
explains that although they are the majority in the legislature, the party’s legislators do not 
have the collective consciousness to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into 
public policies.
81
 
Moreover, Apip Ifan Permadi concedes that the political position between the 
party’s legislators and legislator of other parties in fact cannot be distinguished. In some 
cases, the party’s legislators even have different political stance to legislators of the other 
Islamist parties, including the PKS.
82
 Neng Madinah Ruchyat also explains that there is no 
“ideological struggle” among the legislators when they are involved in policy-making. She 
adds that the legislators of the PKS are slightly different to legislators of other parties as 
“they act more hypocritical by denying what they actually do in making public policies”.83  
Such statements are confirmed by officials of the secular-nationalist parties in the 
district. The leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia-Perjuangan or PDI-P) in the district, Ade Suherman, explains that all legislators 
in the district have a similar political stance when they are involved in making public 
policies. He also asserts that “it is very difficult to distinguish between criminals and 
Islamic teachers or leaders (kyai) in the legislature”.84 The leader of the Golkar Party in the 
district, Eman Sulaeman shares a similar opinion. According to him, the political 
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constellation in the legislature is “very fluid” so that it is very difficult to identify patterns 
of coalition and conflict between the legislators of the PPP and legislators of other parties.
85
  
In brief, the PPP in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislators tend to act as political entrepreneurs in making public policies. Secondly, they 
tend to defend their own personal interests when they are involved in making public 
policies. Thirdly, they employ the role of the party organizations, other social 
organizations, more specifically the NU and its autonomous bodies, bureaucracy and even 
thugs to support their role in making public policies. Fourthly, they lack ambition to 
establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government as the district head 
come from the party. Fifthly, they also lack ambition for hegemony in the policy-making 
processes so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties 
despite the fact that they become the winning party in the district. 
 
5. The PKS: Pursuing Minimal Targets 
In the 1999 election, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK) was able to gain one seat in 
the district. Having failed to pass the required 2 percent of the electoral threshold in the 
1999 election, the political actors of the PK established the Justice and Prosperity Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS). By modifying its campaign issue from the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia to the more secular 
platforms, such as the campaigns against corruption and the implementation of good 
governance, the PKS gained four seats in the 2004 election and five seats in the 2009 
election. In general, the PKS was relatively able to maintain its electoral performance in the 
district. 
The head of the PKS fraction in district, Asep Hidayat, asserts that the party’s 
legislators serve as the representative of the party in making public policies. They must act 
in line with the ideology and platforms of the party. He also explains that based on Law No. 
22/2003 on the Structure and Position of Legislatures, the party’s legislators must articulate 
the interests of their electorates in their own electoral areas. Moreover, Asep Hidayat 
explains that in doing their functions, these legislators are supervised by the party leaders in 
the district (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah or DPTD). More specifically, to ensure that 
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they will always act in line with the ideology and platforms of the party, these legislators 
are supervised by the executive council (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah or DPD) and advisory 
board. Moreover, to ensure that they will always act in concordance with Islamic tenets, the 
party’s legislators are supervised by the sharia board.86  
Another party’s legislator, Dadi Supriadi, explains that the party’s legislators must 
have met certain requirements. Firstly, they have achieved a certain level of membership, 
namely the core member. Secondly, they would be able to adhere to God and His 
messenger as well as to do Islamic struggle (jihad) if the party requires it. In this context, 
they must implement Islamic tenets strictly, such as not smoking. Further, Dadi Supriadi 
explains that the party’s legislators must be proposed by the core and honorary members so 
that “they are not allowed to have an ambition to become a party’s legislator, including in 
proposing their candidacy”. When they have been nominated as a legislative candidate, 
however, they cannot reject the nomination.
87
 
Information from direct observation shows that in their daily activities, the party’s 
legislators receive many proposal letters from their electorates demanding development 
projects and financial assistances. It is important to note that different to the articulation 
process in the other Islamic parties in which the proposals are submitted to an individual 
legislator, members and supporters of the party deliver their proposals to the secretary of 
the fraction. Therefore, as stated by Dadi Abdul Hadi, “the PKS fraction attempts to 
institutionalize the articulation process from the individual-based system to the 
organizational-based system”.88 These illustrations show that the party’s legislators tend to 
adopt delegates regarding the model of representation. 
Further, Subhan explains that since 2001 the party’s legislators have imposed the 
implementation of the sharia-based policies in the district. He also explains that these 
legislators believe in the implementation of these policies in order to formalize Islam due to 
the fact that the majority of the local population is Muslim.
89
 However, Asep Hidayat 
argues that the party recently interprets sharia in a broader understanding so that the 
implementation of sharia does not simply refer to the implementation of restrictions 
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(hudud) and harsh Islamic criminal law (qishas). In this context, the implementation of 
sharia covers all dimensions of human life, such as health and education. Consequently, as 
claimed by Asep Hidayat, the party’s legislators attempt to realize the elements of sharia 
into public policies, such as proposing a policy of the female reproductive health and a 
policy of the basic education.
90
 
However, Acep Zamzam Noer criticizes such claims. He argues that the party’s 
legislators do not put emphasis on proposing public policies which are able to increase the 
social welfare of the local population. He also asserts that, similar to legislators of other 
parties, “the party’s legislators just play around with sharia”.91 Similarly, Dadi Abdul Hadi 
argues that there is no single indication which shows that the party’s legislators have 
transformed the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies, especially in the 
regional budget policy.
92
 In addition, information from direct observation also indicates that 
the party’s legislators have limited capability to conduct their functions, especially in the 
budgeting process.  
In responding to such criticisms, Asep Hidayat argues that the party’s legislators 
have conducted maximum efforts in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party 
into public policies. However, as the party gained a limited numbers of seats, they are not 
able to initiate their policies which are in line with the ideology and platforms of the party 
in the ideal form.
93
 Dadi Supriadi has a similar point of view and argues that as “the party is 
still young, its strength and ability in policy-making are still limited”. He also emphasizes 
that although the party’s legislators were so far not able to transform the ideology and 
platforms of the party into the ideal form, it does not simply mean that the struggle of the 
party is over. He adds that “as the party has a long term goal, there will still be other 
chances to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the ideal 
form in the future”.94 
To support their role in making policies, the party’s legislators rely on the role of 
the party organizations. Asep Hidayat asserts that it is likely impossible for the party’s 
legislators to work alone in carrying out their functions. Instead, they must rely on the party 
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leaders in the district (Dewan Pengurus Daerah or DPD) and the party organizations on the 
ground (Dewan Pengurus Cabang or DPC the sub-district level and Dewan Pengurus 
Ranting or DPRa the village level). Asep Hidayat also explains that the role of the party 
organizations on the ground is essential to absorb the aspirations of members and 
supporters of the party.
95
 Dadi Supriadi adds that the party’s legislators also utilize the 
halaqah groups to absorb the interests of members of the party.
96
  
Moreover, the party’s legislators also receive supports from the party organization 
at the provincial level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah or DPTW) and the party 
leadership at the national level (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat or DPTP). An official of 
the party leadership at the national level, Ade Suherman, explains that the party leaders at 
the national level provide an annual forum through which all of party’s legislators establish 
coordination and communication with the party leaders. Moreover, the party organization at 
the provincial level conducts a similar forum so that all of party’s legislators in a certain 
province establish coordination and communication with the party organization at the 
provincial level as well as with their counterparts in other districts or municipalities in a 
given province. Through these forums, therefore, the party leaders provide instructions, 
supervisions and trainings to improve technical skills for all of party’s legislators at the 
regional level.
97
  
Similar to the legislators of the other Islamic parties, the party’s legislators lack 
ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. Asep 
Hidayat states that the relationship between the party’s legislators and district head is 
“smooth”. Further, he argues that the party’s legislators are not able conduct the overseeing 
function properly as national provisions do not optimally support the regional legislature to 
do so. As a consequence, as he argues, the position of the regional legislature seems to be 
subordinate to the executive branch of government.
98
 
It is also important to mention that although the party adopts Islam as its ideological 
foundation, it does not necessarily mean that the party’s legislators insist on implementing 
sharia strictly. Asep Hidayat explains that these legislators adopt four minimal principles 
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when they are involved in policy-making. Firstly, they produce a policy that is not against 
the basic tenets of Islam (akidah). Secondly, they produce a policy that is not forbidden by 
Islam (haram). Thirdly, they produce a policy that does not harm the local population. 
Fourthly, they reject a policy that is clearly against sharia, such as a policy with the 
elements of gambling or sexual acts outside marriage (zina).
99
 Similarly, Dadi Supriadi 
argues that by considering the political constellations in the legislature, “the party’s 
legislators do not transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies 
massively and instantly”.100 
Further, Asep Hidayat explains that the party’s legislators maintain their personal 
relationship with legislators of other parties. However, they will not support legislators of 
other parties if they propose a policy which is clearly against Islamic tenets. Asep Hidayat 
also explains that the party’s legislators do not have any constraint to establish 
collaborations with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties. In this sense, “it is possible 
for the party’s legislators to conduct a technical coalition, but it is not necessarily an 
ideological coalition, with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties.
101
 Moreover, Dadi 
Supriadi asserts that the party’s legislators have a willingness to establish collaborations 
with legislators of other parties as long as “it is not against the Islamic belief (akidah)”.102  
Overall, the PKS in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislator acts as delegates. Secondly, because of many constraints, the party’s legislators 
fail to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the ideal 
manners. Thirdly, to support their role in making policies, they rely solely on the role of the 
party organizations. Fourthly, they have minimal ambition to make an opposition force to 
the executive branch of government. Fifthly, by and large, they lack ambition to establish 
hegemony so that they are tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other parties in 
the policy-making processes. 
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6. The PBB: When the Ideology without Realization  
In the 1999 election, the Star and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB) succeeded 
in gaining two seats in the district. However, the party experienced a significant decrease in 
the 2004 election by gaining one seat. In the 2009 election, the party even failed to send its 
representative in the legislature. Currently, the party is represented by Muhammad Noer. 
Coming from a family that supported the Masyumi Party, Muhammad Noer served as an 
official of the NU Party at the sub-district level in 1960’s. During the New Order period, he 
was not involved in political activities because serving as a public servant. Following his 
father’s advice, finally, he decided to join with the PBB after his retirement in 1998. 
Believing that the PBB is the only descendent of the Masyumi Party, Muhammad 
Noer argues that in implementing his functions as the party’s legislator, he must rely on the 
ideology and platforms of the party. He also asserts that, compared to the role of the party 
leaders in the district (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang or DPC), the role of the party’s legislator 
is more important, especially in transforming the ideology and platforms of the party into 
public policies. Muhammad Noer also underlines that he must prioritize the interests of his 
electorates in his own electoral area rather than the interests of the local population at large 
when he is involved in policy-making.
103
  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the party leaders in the district are subordinate 
to Muhammad Noer. Information from direct observation also shows that as the seniority 
principle serves as one of the most important principles in the party, the party leaders in the 
district tend to be reluctant to supervise Muhammad Noer. On the other hand, members and 
supporters of the party take for granted the ideal role of Muhammad Noer in the legislature. 
In addition, the general secretary of the party leadership at the national level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat or DPP), Sahar L. Hasan, explains that it is not easy for the party leaders at 
the national level to supervise the party’s legislators at the regional level as they argue that 
they serve as the representative of their electorates rather than as the representative of the 
party. This situation occurs as an implication of the modification in the electoral system 
from the close-list system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional system in the 
2004 and 2009 elections.
104
 These illustrations, therefore, suggest that Muhammad Noer 
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has autonomy both from his party as well as from his electorates when he is involved in 
making public policies. In short, he acts as a trustee with regard to the model of 
representation. 
In his daily activities as the only party’s legislator, Muhammad Noer receives many 
proposal letters from members and supporters of the party demanding development projects 
and financial assistances. He explains that instead of sending proposal letters to the party 
organizations, members and supporters of the party prefer to deliver their proposal letters to 
him directly either at his residence or at the legislature.
105
 In this sense, members and 
supporters of the party prefer to articulate their interests to the party’s legislator directly 
rather than to the party organizations. 
Subhan explains that the party’s legislators have strongly supported the 
implementation of the sharia-based policies in the district since 2001.
106
 Muhammad Noer 
also concedes that since 2006 he has supported the implementation of various sharia-based 
policies in the district as the implementation of these policies become the main priority. He 
also explains that, different to the Islamic state movement in the district in the 1950s, the 
party insists on implementing sharia in democratic principles and in constitutional 
approach. Moreover, Muhammad Noer also claims that he has made a lot of efforts in order 
to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public policies in the district.
107
 
Such a claim is denied by Acep Zamzam Noer. He contends that similar to other 
legislators in the district, Muhammad Noer does not have understanding about what he 
should carry out in making public policies. In this sense, similar to the legislators of the 
other Islamic parties, Muhammad Noer just plays around with the issue of the 
establishment of an Islamic state in general and the implementation of sharia in particular. 
Acep Zamzam Noer adds that because of his seniority, Muhammad Noer is not able to play 
a significant role in making policies.
108
 Similarly, Dadi Abdul Hadi explains that 
Muhammad Noer has limited competence in the budgeting process. As a result, “he has 
been played” by legislators of other parties in making public policies.109 Information from 
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direct observation also shows that Muhammad Noer plays an insignificant role in the 
Amanah fraction as it is dominated by the legislators of the PAN. 
Muhammad Noer also claims that in implementing his functions, he conducts 
communication and coordination with the party leaders in the district.
110
 However, this 
statement is denied by the party leader in the district, Momon Abdurahman.
111
 Moreover, 
Muhammad Noer concedes that he does not receive organizational support from the party 
leadership at the national level and the party organization at the provincial level (Dewan 
Pimpinan Wilayah or DPW) when he plays his role in policy-making.
112
 In addition, Sahar 
L. Hasan explains that as the party leaders at the national level have limited financial 
capability, they lack of agenda to support party’s legislators at the regional level.113 
Instead of utilizing the role of the party organizations, Muhammad Noer employs 
the role of an Islamic paramilitary force in the district, namely the Front of Hizbullah.
114
 
Organized by young and radical Islamic teachers, this paramilitary imposes the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in the district. Acep 
Zamzam Noer explains that there is a transactional mechanism between Muhammad Noer 
and this organization. On one hand, Muhammad Noer receives political support from this 
organization when he is involved in making public policies. On the other hand, Muhammad 
Noer provides financial assistance to this organization.
115
 In addition, Muhammad Noer 
also maintains personal relationships with some proponents of the Islamic state movement 
in the district.
116
 
In doing his functions, Muhammad Noer lacks ambition to establish an opposition 
force to the executive branch of government in the district. He explains that he tries to 
maintain his personal relationship with the district head. He also concedes that he does not 
make any significant effort to supervise the executive branch of government as the national 
provision on regional government explicitly states that the regional legislature has an equal 
position to the executive branch of government. Further, he adds that recently the executive 
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branch of government plays a more dominant role in making public policies, especially in 
proposing all of public policies in the district.
117
 
Muhammad Noer also lacks ambition for hegemony in policy-making. In the 
Amanah fraction, Muhammad Noer plays an insignificant role as the fraction is dominated 
by the legislators of the PAN. He also plays an insignificant role in the legislature
 
in 
general. The most important factor in contributing to this situation is the physical condition 
of Muhammad Noer which does not allow him to follow the dynamics of the political 
process in the legislature. In addition, Muhammad Noer is the oldest legislator in district. 
Another factor is the fact that Muhammad Noer has very limited competence in making 
public policies, especially in the budgeting process.
118
  
Further, Muhammad Noer asserts that there is no “clash of ideology” among 
legislators in the legislature when they are involved in making public policies due to the 
fact that all legislators in the district have a similar political stance although their parties 
adopt different ideological foundations.
119
 Similarly, Ade Suherman explains that in the 
period of 1999-2004, the legislators of the PBB had a similar political stance to the 
legislators from the secular-nationalist parties when they were involved in making public 
policies despite the fact that these parties adopted different ideological bases and imposing 
different political platforms.
120
 According to Eman Sulaeman, such a condition continues 
when Mohammad Noer serves as the only legislator of the PBB.
121
 Therefore, it is very 
difficult to identify the pattern of conflict and coalition between Mohammad Noer and 
legislators of other parties in making public policies. 
In general, the PBB in public office has the following features. Firstly, the party’s 
legislator acts as a trustee. Secondly, he disregards the ideology and platforms of the party 
so that he tends to defend his own personal interests when he is involved in policy-making. 
Secondly, instead of the role of the party organizations, he employs the role of an external 
organization, i.e., the Front of Hizbullah to support his role in making policies. Fourthly, he 
has minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of 
government. Fifthly, he lacks ambition to achieve hegemony in the fraction as well as in the 
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legislature. In this sense, although his party serves as the most Islamist party, he is tolerant 
of and collaborative with legislators of other parties, including with legislators of the 
secular-nationalist parties. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to examine the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public 
office, more specifically in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature. From the explanations 
above, we can see each of these Islamic parties has its own prominent features regarding 
their role in making public policies. More specifically, the most salient feature of the PAN 
in public office is the fact that the party’s legislators disregard the role of the ideology and 
platforms of the party when they are involved in making public policies. Similarly, the 
most prominent characteristic of the legislators of the PKB is their political pragmatism in 
the policy-making processes. Meanwhile, the most interesting feature of the PBR in public 
office is the dominant role of the party elite, more specifically Dede Saiful Anwar in 
deciding political stances of the party in making public policies. Moreover, the PPP, PKS 
and PBB in public office share a similar feature, i.e., their legislators play around with the 
issue on the implementation of sharia in particular and the establishment an Islamic state in 
general. To a different degree, these parties lack significant effort to transform their 
ideology and platforms into public policies in the ideal manners. A summary of the 
organizational features of these parties in the legislature in the district is presented in the 
following table.  
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Table 7.1 
Organization Features of the Islamic Parties in Public Office 
 
Party/ 
Indicators 
Model of 
representation 
Motivation Supporting infrastructure 
 
Ambition to establish  
an opposition force to the 
executive branch of 
government 
Relationship with other 
legislators 
PAN Trustee Personal interests The party organization Minimal Tolerant and 
collaborative  
PKB Trustee Personal interests External organization  
(the NU) and, to a limited 
extent, the party 
organization 
Absent Tolerant and 
collaborative  
PBR Trustee Personal interests Personal infrastructure Minimal Tolerant and 
collaborative  
 
PPP 
Entrepreneur Personal interest and, to a 
limited extent, the 
government interests 
A combination of the 
party organization, 
external organization (the 
NU) and the government 
Absent Tolerant and 
collaborative  
PKS Delegate Personal interests and to a 
limited extent, the 
ideology and platforms of 
the party 
The party organization Minimal Tolerant and 
collaborative  
PBB Trustee Personal interests External organization 
(paramilitary force of the 
Front of Hizbullah) 
Minimal Tolerant and 
collaborative  
 Source: Assessment by the Author.
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As shown in the Table 7.1, the legislators of the PAN, PKB, PBR and PBB tend to 
act as the trustees for their electorates in the policy-making processes. In this sense, they 
receive greater discretion from their party as well as from their electorates when they are 
involved in making public policies. On the contrary, the legislators of the PKS act as the 
delegates for members of the party. In this sense, to a very limited extent, the interests of 
the legislators of the PKS are relatively in accordance with the interests of members of the 
party in making public policies. Meanwhile, the legislators of the PPP tend to act as 
political entrepreneurs in the relationship between their electorates and government in the 
policy-making processes. 
To a different degree, the legislators of the Islamic parties tend to defend their own 
personal interests when they are involved in making public policies. In the case of the PAN, 
PKB, PBR and PBB, such a tendency is very strong. This situation occurs due to the fact 
that most of the legislators of these parties serve as the party leaders as well as officials of 
the party in the central office. Consequently, the party leaders are not able to conduct the 
supervision to the performance of these in the legislature. On the other hand, their 
electorates also take for granted their ideal role in making public policies. A similar 
tendency also takes place in the case of the PPP. By and large, however, the legislators of 
the PPP defend the interests of the executive branch of government as the district head 
comes from the PPP. To a lesser degree, a similar tendency also takes place in the case of 
the PKS. Since they must establish political compromises with legislators of other parties, 
the legislator of the PKS are not able to transform the ideology and platforms of the party 
into public policies in the ideal forms.  
To support their role in policy-making, the legislators of the Islamic parties employ 
different instruments. More specifically, the legislators of the PAN and PKS rely on the 
role of the party organizations due to the fact that these parties do not have a strong 
relationship with other Islamic organizations in the district. To a lesser degree, the 
legislators of the PPP and PKB also involve the role of the party organization. In the case 
of the PKB, however, the legislators of this party rely strongly on the role of the NU in the 
district. Meanwhile, in the case of the PPP, the legislators of this party also employ the NU 
and bureaucracy in the district. In contrast, the legislators of the PBR and PBB employ the 
role of external organizations to support their role in making policies. The legislator of the 
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PBR prefers to establish his personal organization, while the legislator of the PBB employs 
the paramilitary force, namely Front of Hizbullah. 
It is also important to mention that most of the legislators of the Islamic parties have 
minimal ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government in 
the district due to two main factors. Firstly, the national provisions do not support the 
implementation of the overseeing function of the executive branch of government. 
Secondly, most of the legislators of the Islamic parties have limited competence to 
implement their functions, especially in the budgeting process. Moreover, the legislators of 
the PPP and PKB lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of 
government in the district as the district head and the district vice head come from these 
parties. In this sense, despite the fact that the decentralized system has been implemented 
since 2001, the legislature serves just as rubber-stamp for policies made by the executive 
branch of government in the district.  
Moreover, the legislators of all of the Islamic parties also lack ambition for 
hegemony in the policy-making processes. From the discussions above, we can see that the 
legislators of all of the Islamic parties do not have a different political stance in making 
public policies, including with legislators of the secular-nationalist parties either. As a 
result, it is difficult to identify the pattern of conflict and collaboration between the 
legislators of the Muslim-nationalist parties and the legislators of the Islamist parties on one 
side, and between the legislators of these Islamic parties and legislators of the secular-
nationalist parties on the other hand. In this sense, all of the legislators of these parties are 
tolerant of and collaborative with other legislators when they are involved in making public 
policies. 
From the elaboration above, we also can see that the general feature of these parties 
in the Tasikmalaya District Legislature is complex. If we compare these findings to the 
theoretical framework as elaborated in Chapter 2, we can see that each of these parties 
contains some elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the electoralist party 
and even the cartel party. In this sense, all of the Islamic parties have hybrid features so that 
it is not easy to categorize each of them into a single party model. By exploring the 
dominant elements, however, each of them can be categorized into a certain party model. 
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Table 7.2 
Hybrid Features of the Islamic Parties in Public Office  
 
Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
 
 
PAN 
- Legislators act as trustees 
- Legislators defend their personal interests when 
they are involved in the policy-making 
processes 
- Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative 
with other political actors when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes 
- Legislators employ the 
party organization to 
support their role in 
making policies 
- Legislators have ambition 
to establish an opposition 
force to the executive 
branch of government 
  
 
 
 
 
 
PKB 
- Legislators act as trustees 
- Legislators defend their personal interests when 
they are involved in the policy-making 
processes 
- Legislators lack ambition to establish an 
opposition force to the executive branch of 
government 
- Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative 
with other political actors when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes 
 - Legislators employ 
external organizations to 
support their role in 
making policies 
 
 
 
 
 
PBR 
- Legislators act as trustees 
- Legislators defend their personal interests when 
they are involved in the policy-making 
processes 
- Legislators employ their own personal 
infrastructure to support their role in making 
policies 
- Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative 
with other political actors when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes 
- Legislators have ambition 
to establish an opposition 
force to the executive 
branch of government 
  
 
 
 
 
  - Legislators employ the 
party organization to 
support their role in 
making policies 
- Legislators act as 
entrepreneurs 
- Legislators defend their 
personal interests when 
- Legislators defend the 
state interests when they 
are involved in the policy-
making processes 
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Islamic 
Parties 
The elite-based party 
 
The mass-based party 
 
The electoralist party 
 
The cartel party 
 
 
 
PPP 
they are involved in the 
policy-making processes 
- Legislators employ 
external organizations to 
support their role in 
making policies 
- Legislators are tolerant of 
and collaborative with 
other political actors when 
they are involved in the 
policy-making processes 
- Legislators employ the 
state institutions to support 
their role in making 
policies 
- Legislators lack ambition 
to establish an opposition 
force to the executive 
branch of government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKS 
- Legislators defend their personal interests when 
they are involved in the policy-making 
processes 
- Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative 
with other political actors when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes 
- Legislators act as delegates 
- Legislators defend 
ideology and platforms of 
the party when they are 
involved in the policy-
making processes 
- Legislators employ the 
party organization to 
support their role in 
making policies 
- Legislators have ambition 
to establish an opposition 
force to the executive 
branch of government 
  
 
 
PBB 
- Legislators act as trustees  
- Legislators defend their personal interests when 
they are involved in the policy-making 
processes 
- Legislators are tolerant of and collaborative 
with other political actors when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes 
- Legislators have ambition 
to establish an opposition 
force to the executive 
branch of government 
 
- Legislators employ 
external organizations to 
support their role in 
making policies 
 
Source: Assessment by the Author. 
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The PAN and PBR in public office contain hybrid features of the elite-based and 
mass-based party models. Overall, the elements of the elite-based party model are more 
dominant in these parties. More specifically, the legislators of these parties tend to act as 
the trustees for their electorate. They also tend to defend their own personal interests 
when they are involved in making public policies. Moreover, they lack ambition for 
hegemony in policy-making so that they are very tolerant of and collaborative with 
legislators of other parties. In addition, in the case of the PBR, the legislator of the party 
also employs his personal infrastructures to support his role in making public policies. 
Meanwhile, the PKB in public office has hybrid features of the elite-based and 
electoralist party models. However, the elements of the elite-based party models are 
dominant in this party. As a result, the party’s legislators tend to act as the trustees for 
their electorate. Moreover, they tend to defend their own personal interests when they 
are involved in policy-making. As the district vice head comes from the party, they also 
lack ambition to establish an opposition force to the executive branch of government. 
Similarly, they have minimal ambition for hegemony so that they are very tolerant of 
and collaborative with legislators of other parties in the legislature. 
On the other hand, the PPP in public office contains hybrid features of the mass-
based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. In general, however, the elements 
of the electoralist party model are very dominant in this party. Acting as brokers in the 
relationship between their electorates and government, the party’s legislators tend to act 
as the political entrepreneurs. In this sense, they tend defend their own personal interests 
when they are involved in making public policies. In supporting their role in making 
public policies, they also rely on the role of external organizations. Despite the fact that 
they have a significant number of seats, the party’s legislators lack ambition for 
hegemony so that they are very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other 
parties in policy-making. 
In contrast, the PKS in public office resembles hybrid features of the elite-based 
and mass-based party models. In general, the elements of the mass-based model are 
more dominant in this party. As discussed in this chapter, the party’s legislators act as 
the delegates for members of the party. To a very limited extent, they also try to defend 
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the ideology and platforms of the party when they are involved in policy-making. 
Moreover, they employ the role of the party organizations to support their role in making 
public policies. The party’s legislators also have minimal ambition to establish an 
opposition force to the executive branch of government. 
Finally, the PBB in public office has hybrid features of the elite-based party and 
mass-based party models. Taken as a whole, the elements of the elite-based model are 
more dominant in this party as the legislator of the party acts as the trustee for their 
electorates. He also tends to defend his own personal interests when he is involved in 
policy-making. Despite the fact that the party becomes the most Islamist parties which 
proposes the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia, the 
legislator of the party is very tolerant of and collaborative with legislators of other 
parties in making public policies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
The downfall of Suharto in 1998 marked a new era for Indonesia, as the world‟s largest 
Muslim-majority country, to establish a democratic system after more than three decades 
under the New Order‟s authoritarianism. The implementation of democratization since 
1998 as well as the implementation of the decentralized system regarding the central and 
regional government relationship since 2001 has in turn led to the transformation of 
Indonesian political landscape. Among various interesting dimensions of the new political 
system in democratizing Indonesia are the emergence of local politics and the resurgence of 
political Islam, more specifically Islamic political parties.  
Since the implementation of the decentralized system in 2001, local politics has 
emerged as a new arena for political contestation. Different to the role of the regional 
legislatures during the centralization system in the New Order government period, the 
regional legislatures have recently played a more significant role in the policy-making 
processes. Following the implementation of the direct presidential election in 2004, the 
regional governments have also implemented the direct governor, major and district head 
elections (known as pemilihan kepala daerah langsung or pilkadasung) since 2005. On the 
other hand, political liberalization has also led to a growing political participation among 
people at the regional level.  
Moreover, the democratization has facilitated the rise of Islamic parties after they 
were depoliticized in political process not only at the national, but also at the regional level 
during the New Order period. Recently, there are six major Islamic parties that succeeded 
in gaining significant votes and seats in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. These parties 
are the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), National Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi 
or PBR), United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), Justice and 
Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) and Star and Crescent Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang or PBB). In these three elections, despite the fact that these parties 
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experienced a significant decrease at the national level,
1
 most of them succeeded in 
maintaining or increasing their level of political support at the regional level. 
The Tasikmalaya district becomes one of the regional bases for these parties to 
maintain or increase their level of political support in these elections. In addition, the 
district is historically known as one of areas in Indonesia in which Islamic radical actors 
conducted the Islamic State Movement (Darul Islam Indonesia or DII) in the 1950s. It is 
also important to mention that most of Muslims in the district implement Islamic 
Puritanism. Such a religious characteristic is coupled with a low quality of life. As a result, 
Muslims in the district have a strong Islamic sentiment. In addition, supported by the 
Islamic parties, the executive branch of government in the district has actively proposed 
various sharia-based regulations.  
Considering the political achievements of these parties in the district, this study 
aims to explore the way Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties in the district. 
In doing so, this study applies four party models proposed by Krouwel, namely the elite-
based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models.
2
 This study also 
applies the analytical framework of party organization introduced by Katz and Mair in 
which party organizations are divided in three organizational faces, i.e., the party 
organization on the ground (the political linkage between parties and their members or 
supporters), the party organization in central office (party leadership at the district level) 
and the party organization in public office (the role of parties in public in the regional 
legislature).
3
 Based on the experience of parties in established and new democracies, this 
study develops some criteria to define the ideal-type of the party models in these 
organizational dimensions. It is also important to note that the analytical process in this 
                                                          
1
 Furthermore, see Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” in Tun-Jen Cheng and 
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3
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study follow the rational choice institutionalism‟s way of thinking.4 Therefore, this study 
assumes that by taking into account incentives and constraints provided by the existing 
socio-political structures surrounding them, Islamic political actors apply a certain strategy 
when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their chances of winning 
elections. 
By applying these analytical and theoretical frameworks in the case of the Islamic 
parties in the Tasikmalaya district, this study proposes two major findings. Firstly, based on 
the case of the Islamic parties in the district, the Islamic parties at the regional level in 
Indonesia contain the elements of the elite-based party, the mass-based party, the 
electoralist party and the cartel party models in terms of party organizations in the three 
different structures. In other words, the organizations of the Islamic parties at the regional 
level in Indonesia contain hybrid features. Secondly, the way the Islamic political actors 
organize the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia suggests that, by and large, 
these religious actors rely on rational calculations rather than ideological considerations 
when they manage their parties. 
 
1. The Hybrid Features 
The case of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district shows that the Islamic political 
actors at the regional level in Indonesia select different strategies when they organize their 
party organizations on the ground, in central office, in public office. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, the organizational features of these parties in the three different 
organizational aspects contain the elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party, 
electoralist party and, to a lesser extent, cartel party models. As some elements are more 
prominent than the other elements, however, the organizational features of these parties in 
each of these organizational dimensions can be categorized into a certain party model.  
More specifically, the political actors of the PAN select different strategies when 
they manage the party organizations in the three different organizational faces. In creating 
                                                          
4
 Furthermore on the key assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, see B. Guy Peters, Institutional 
Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’ (London: Pinter, 1999), pp. 47-69; Vivien Lowndes, 
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Macmillan Press, 2002), pp. 90-108; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in R.A.W. 
Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 23-38. 
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and managing the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the 
political actors of the PAN attempt to modify their strategy from relying on the role of the 
party organizations to relying on the role of their legislative candidates. Meanwhile, they 
attempt to develop what Panebianco called “a representative bureaucracy” when they 
manage the party leadership.
5
 Moreover, they apply a pragmatic approach when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes. By implementing such strategies, the 
organizational features of the PAN in each organizational face contain some elements of 
the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party models. Overall, however, the 
organizational features of the PAN on the ground have experienced a transformation 
processes from the mass-based party to electoralist party models. Meanwhile, the 
organizational features of the PAN in central office resemble the ideal-type of the mass-
based party model and the organizational features of the PAN in public office are close to 
the ideal-type of the elite-based party model.  
The political actors of the PKB apply a different strategy when they manage their 
party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions. In creating and 
maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the 
political actors of the PKB utilize the role of an external organization, namely the 
Renaissance of Islamic Scholars Party (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU). Meanwhile, they rely on 
the role of the party leaders at the national level and the role of NU‟s leaders in the district 
when they manage the party leadership. Moreover, they apply a pragmatic approach when 
they are involved in policy-making process. By adopting such strategies, the organizational 
features of the PKB in these organizational faces contain some elements of the elite-based 
party and electoralist party models. Taken as a whole, however, the organizational features 
of the PKB resemble the ideal-type of the elite-based party model. 
 The political actors of the PBR apply the similar strategy when they manage their 
party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions. More specifically, they 
prefer to rely on the patronage politics to create and maintain the political linkage between 
the party and its members or supporters. Similarly, they also depend on the role of the party 
leaders when they manage the party organization in central office and in public office. By 
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 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), pp. 262-65. 
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selecting such a strategy, the organizational features of the PBR in the three different 
organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party 
and electoralist party models. Overall, however, the elements of the elite-based party model 
are very dominant in the organizational features of the PBR. 
Meanwhile, the political actors of the PPP select different strategies when they 
manage their party in the three different organizational faces. In creating and maintaining 
the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the political actors of 
the PPP try to maximize their resources, i.e., the party organizations, the relationship 
between the party and the NU as well as the relationship between the party and the 
executive branch of government in the district. Meanwhile, they tend to rely on the role of a 
few persons when they manage the party leadership. Moreover, the political actors of the 
PPP take advantage of Islamic issues, such as the implementation of sharia, when they are 
involved in making policies. By implementing these strategies, the organizational features 
of the PPP in these three organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-
based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. Overall, the 
organizational features of the PPP on the ground resemble the ideal-type of the mass-based 
party model. Meanwhile, the organizational features of the PPP in the central office have 
experienced a transformation process from the mass-based party model to the elite-based 
party model. In this context, this party has experienced Michaels‟s iron law of oligarchy.6 
Moreover, the organizational features of the PPP in the public office resemble the ideal-
type of the electoralist party model. 
The political actors of the PKS select a similar strategy when they manage their 
party organizations in the three different organizational faces. They rely on the role of the 
party organizations when they create and maintain the political linkage between the party 
and its members or supporters. Meanwhile, they combine Islamic tenets and modern 
management mechanisms when they manage the party leadership. They also attempt to 
realize minimal targets as they experience many constraints in transforming the ideology 
and platforms of the party into public policies. By selecting such strategies, the 
organizational features of the PKS in these three different organizational dimensions 
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 Furthermore, see Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-56. 
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contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-based party and electoralist party 
models. In general, the organizational features of the PKS tend to adopt the ideal-type of 
the mass-based party model. 
A different strategy is selected by the political actors of the PBB when they manage 
their party organizations in the three different organizational faces. In creating and 
maintaining the political linkage between the party and its members or supporters, the 
political actors of the PBB rely on the role of the party leaders as well as on the ideology of 
the party. Similarly, they depend on the role of the party leaders when they manage the 
party leadership. In the policy-making processes, they tend to disregard the ideology of the 
party. By adopting such strategies, the organizational features of the PBB in these three 
different organizational dimensions contain some elements of the elite-based party, mass-
based party and electoralist party models. Overall, the organizational features of the PBB 
on the ground have experienced a transformation process from the mass-based party model 
to the elite-based party model. Meanwhile, the organizational features of the PBB in central 
office and in public office are close to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model. 
Table 8.1  
Organizational Features of the Islamic Parties 
In the Tasikmalaya District 
 
Islamic Parties The party on the ground The party in central office The party in public office 
PAN The electoralist party/ 
The mass-based party 
The mass-based party The elite-based party 
PKB The elite-based party The elite-based party The elite-based party 
PBR The elite-based party The elite-based party The elite-based party 
PPP The mass-based party The elite-based party/ 
The mass-based party 
The electoralist party 
PKS The mass-based party The mass-based party The mass-based party 
PBB The elite-based party/ 
The mass-based party 
The elite-based party The elite-based party 
Source: Assessment by the Author. 
Further, the different strategies selected by the Islamic political actors when they 
manage the party organizations in the three different organizational dimensions in the 
district also have an implication for the comprehensive features of these parties. As shown 
in Table 8.1, it is likely that the PKS adopts the mass-based party model as the elements of 
the mass-based party model are dominant in this party. Meanwhile, the PAN and PPP adopt 
the mass-based party model as the elements of this model are dominant in these parties, 
especially in the party organization on the ground and the party organization in central 
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office. The PKB and PBR adopt the elite-based party model as the elements of this model 
are dominant in these parties. Similarly, the PBB also adopts the elite-based party model as 
the elements of this model are dominant in this party, especially in the party organization in 
central office and the party organization in public office and, to a lesser degree, in the party 
organization on the ground. 
Based on their dominant elements, the Islamic parties in the district can be 
categorized into two models, namely the elite-based party and mass-based party models. 
More specifically, the PKS and, to a lesser degree, PPP and PAN can be categorized as the 
mass-based party as these parties rely heavily on the role of their members or supporters so 
that they relatively rely on a bottom-up process.
7
 These parties, therefore, can be 
categorized as the policy-seeking party.
8
 However, it is important to note that in the case of 
the PAN and PPP, some elements of the mass-based party appear in the organizational 
dimension of these parties on the ground and in central office. Regarding the organizational 
dimensions of these parties in public office, the PAN adopts the elite-based party model, 
while the PPP adopts the electoralist party model.  
Therefore, the political actors of the PAN and PPP are experiencing the so called 
“logic of two-level games”.9 On one hand, the political actors of these parties rely on the 
role of members and supporters of the parties when they manage the party on the ground 
and the party in central office. On the other hand, they tend to disregard the ideology and 
platforms of their parties when they are involved in the policy-making processes. In other 
words, these parties rely on their ideologies and platforms when they create and maintain 
the political linkage with their members or supporters and when they manage the party 
leadership, while they employ pragmatic calculations when they are involved in policy-
making. Such a situation is rather different from the PKS in public office as this party, to a 
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limited extent, still attempts to transform the ideology and platforms of the party into public 
policies. 
On the other hand, the PKB, PBR and, to a lesser degree, PBB can be categorized as 
the elite-based party as the role of the party elites is dominant so that these parties rely on a 
top-down process. Therefore, these parties can be categorized as the office-seeking party. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, instead of relying on the role of the party 
organizations, the political actors of these parties rely on patronage politics and 
interpersonal networks of the party leaders when they create and maintain the political 
linkage with members or supporters of the parties. Similarly, the organizational dimension 
of these parties in central office has also experienced a personalization of politics as the 
role of the party leaders is very dominant in managing the party organizations. The 
elements of the elite-based party model also appear in the organizational dimensions of 
these parties in public office as legislators from these parties tend to defend their own 
personal interests when they are involved in making policies. 
Overall, the organization of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district indicates 
that the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia experience so called 
“indigenization”. In addition, when analyzing parties in South Asian countries, Mitra and 
Enskat have come to the conclusion that parties in these countries operate under two 
different conditions, namely international and locally embedded values.
10
 A similar 
situation also takes place in the Islamic parties at the regional level in Indonesia. As 
revealed by this study, the Islamic political actors at the regional level in Indonesia manage 
the organization of the Islamic parties in the three different organizational faces by 
applying democratic and modern principles and, at the same time, traditional mechanisms. 
Consequently, the organizational features of these parties contain some elements of the 
elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party and cartel party models. 
 
2. The Rational Dimensions 
The way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya district 
also shows that, to a large extent, the religious political at the regional level in Indonesia 
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apply rational calculations rather than ideological considerations. As elaborated in the 
previous chapters, these actors have a set of alternative strategies in managing their parties 
in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. More specifically, they can 
manage their parties by developing the ideal-type of the elite party, mass party, electoralist 
party, or cartel party models. By taking into account incentives as well as constraints 
provided by the different socio-political structures surrounding them, they decide to opt 
into a definite party model in order to minimize constraints and, at the same time, to 
maximize incentives within the existing socio-political structures. 
There are at least six major socio-political factors considered by these actors when 
they manage their parties in the three different organizational faces. In addition, each of 
these socio-political factors can be either a constraint or incentive for each of them. The 
first factor is the informal mechanism in the local population, including the patron-client 
relationship and personal or family networks. The second factor is public trust in political 
parties among the local population which has decreased after the implementation of the 
1999 election. The third factor is party identification among the local population, including 
the relationship between the Islamic political parties and Islamic social organizations. The 
fourth factor is the degree of religiousness among the local population. The fifth factor is 
internal conditions of the Islamic parties, such as organizational skills, capabilities to carry 
out the ideal functions of the legislators and supporting organizational infrastructures. The 
sixth factor is the modification of the electoral system from the closed-list proportional 
representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list proportional representation 
system in the 2004 and 2009 elections.  
 By taking into account these factors, the Islamic political actors develop a certain 
party model in order to attract as many votes as possible. To be more specific, the political 
actors the PAN combine the electoralist party and mass-based party models when they 
manage the organizational face of their party on the ground. Meanwhile, they adopt the 
mass-based party model when they manage the party organization in central office and they 
choose the elite-based party model when they manage the organizational face of the party 
in public office. A different strategy is selected by the political actors of the PKB, PBR and, 
to a lesser degree, PBB who prefer to adopt the elite-based party model when they manage 
their parties. Moreover, the political actors of the PPP prefer to develop the mass-based 
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party model when they manage the organizational dimension of the party on the ground. In 
managing the organizational dimension of the party in central office, however, they prefer 
to combine the elite-based party and the mass-based party models. Meanwhile, they adopt 
the electoralist party model when they manage the party organization in public office. 
Different to the other Islamic parties, the Islamic political actors of the PKS tend to select 
the mass-based party model when they manage their party organizations in the three 
different organizational faces. 
 The political actors of the PAN decide to combine the electoralist party and the 
mass-based party models when they manage the party organization on the ground for two 
reasons. The political actors of the PAN realize that the modification of the electoral system 
from the close-list proportional representation system in the 1999 election to the open-list 
proportional representation system in the 2004 and 2009 elections has led to the 
transformation of voting behavior. The modification of the electoral system has led to the 
transformation of voting behavior among the local population in which voters relied on 
candidates of the legislator rather than on political parties as a political organization.
11
 As 
revealed by Liddle and Mujani, along with the implementation of the open-list proportional 
representation system, the Indonesian voters have recently begun to rely more on 
candidates rather than on parties.
12
 The political actors of the PAN, therefore, realize that 
the role of the legislative candidates is more important than the role of the party 
organizations to gain votes in elections. In this sense, they tend to adopt some elements of 
the electoralits party. In addition, such a situation in fact is the typical condition for new 
parties when they must compete with the established parties in a new democracy. As 
argued by van Biezen: 
Faced with the challenge of enticing citizen involvement in a context where mass 
participation is already established, parties (in new democracies) are encouraged 
to pursue expansive electoral strategies to capture the still unaligned voters and to 
create a transient electoral relationship with society rather than durable partisan 
linkages.
13
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 On the other hand, the political actors of the PAN also realize that they do not have 
a strong relationship with major Islamic organization in the districts. They understand that 
the majority of Muslims in the district have been affiliated, either structurally or culturally, 
with the NU. They are also aware that the Muhammadiyah in the district is relatively able 
to maintain its neutrality in political realm. Moreover, they understand that leaders, 
members and masses of the PERSIS tend to support the PBB and PKS. As a consequence, 
they realize that they cannot rely on these Islamic organizations.
14
 In this sense, they 
believe that they must develop their party organizations in order to maximize their chance 
of winning elections. Therefore, although they start to adopt the ideal-type of the 
electoralist party model, the political actors of the PAN still conduct some efforts to 
maintain some elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their 
party on the ground.   
 However, the political actors of the PAN decide to develop the mass-based party 
model when they manage the face of their party in central office as they realize that they 
have organizational resources, more specifically intellectual capacity and organizational 
skills. In this sense, they prefer to rely on modern management principles rather than on the 
dominant role of the party leaders. To a limited extent, they also employ technocratic 
principles. Based on such calculations, therefore, they have decided to develop the 
bureaucratic dimension of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their 
party in central office.  
 Regarding the face of their party in public office, the political actors of the PAN 
prefer to develop the elite-based party model as they realize that instead of a political party 
as a political institution, the local population prefers to make direct contact with the 
legislators when they attempt to access distribution of state resources, such as public 
infrastructure projects. In this sense, the political actors of the PAN rely on clientelistic 
linkage rather than on programmatic linkage strategies when they play their role in the 
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policy-making processes.
15
 In this sense, they provide material incentives (such as money 
and jobs) rather than purposive incentives (such as platforms of the party) to mobilize their 
supporters.
16
 Such a mechanism is paramount for these parties in order to create and 
maintain the political linkage with members or supporters of the party.  
 Meanwhile, considering that they emerged from civil society movements as well as 
the fact that they have a strong relationship with the biggest Islamic organization in 
Indonesia, i.e., the NU, one might expect that the political actors of the PKB and PBR will 
select the ideal-type of the mass-based party model when they manage these parties. 
Meanwhile, in the case of the PBB, considering that the party actively proposed the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of sharia in Indonesia, one might 
also expect that the political actors of the PBB will adopt the ideal type of the mass-based 
party model. On the other hand, because of the modification of the electoral system and a 
growing political pragmatism among the local population, one might expect that the 
political actors of these parties will adopt the ideal-type of the electoralist party model. 
While these assumptions are not completely incorrect as the organizational features of these 
parties contain some elements of the mass-based party and electoralist party models, 
overall, the political actors of these parties prefer to develop the elite-based party model 
when they manage their parties in the three different organizational aspects. 
 The political actors of these parties prefer to select the elite-based party model for 
five reasons. Firstly, they realize that they have a strong relationship with some Islamic 
organizations in the district. In the case of the PKB and, to a lesser degree the PBR, the 
political actors of these parties realize that they have a strong relationship with the NU. In 
the case of the PBB, the political actors of this party understand that they are close to the 
PERSIS and former supporters of the Masyumi Party. Therefore, the political actors of 
these parties realize that it is more effective to utilize their personal networks than to 
develop the party organizations to create and maintain the political linkage between these 
parties and their members or supporters. 
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 Secondly, the political actors of these parties also realize that the patron-client 
relationship serves as the most prominent mechanism in the local population, especially in 
the relationship between Islamic leaders or teachers and the local population. Since many 
leaders and officials of these parties, at the same time, serve as Islamic leaders and teachers 
in the district, they also realize that they have their personal resources, including their 
family connection and religious networks. On the other hand, they are aware that they have 
limited organizational skill, supporting organizational infrastructures and financial 
capability to manage their parties. In this sense, the political actors of these parties tend to 
select the ideal-type of the elite-based party model as they realize that developing the ideal 
type of the mass-based party model requires needs many efforts. They also recognize that 
developing a mass-based party would take time. Moreover, they realize that they must 
compete with other parties which some of whom have been established since the New 
Order period. For the political actors of these parties, therefore, developing the ideal-type of 
the mass-based party model is completely ineffective and inefficient in gaining votes.  
 Thirdly, the political actors of these parties realize that they have a limited number 
of seats in the legislature. They also understand that their legislators have limited 
competence to carry out their functions, especially in the budgeting process. Moreover, 
they understand that the local population relies on the role of the legislators rather than on 
the role of the party as a political institution when they articulate their interests. In this 
sense, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors of these parties prefer to 
establish clientelistic linkage rather than programmatic linkage strategies when they 
manage the face of their parties in public office.  
 Fourthly, in the case of the PKB, the political actors of this party realize that they 
exist around the local population with a strong Islamic sentiment. In this context, similar to 
the political actors of the PAN, it does not make sense for the political actors of the PKB to 
decline sharia-based regulations, despite the fact that the party adopts Pancasila as its 
ideological base. As a consequence, the political actors of the PKB supported the 
implementation of various sharia-based regulations in the district. In this context, the 
political actors of the PKB supported the implementation of sharia-based regulations 
because of a strategic interest in order to attract supporters coming from the proponents of 
the implementation of sharia. 
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 In addition, the political actors of the PKB and PAN are experiencing so called 
“dual obligations”. As Jonasson argues, religious parties in fact exist under such a situation 
in which, “on the one hand, there is the obligation to act in line with the general tenets of 
the religion. On the other hand, there is the obligation to be electorally successful”.17 The 
political actors of these parties realize that in managing their parties, they should act in 
accordance with their ideological foundation. However, they are also aware that they 
cannot disregard Islamic issues which are very sensitive to the local population, such as the 
implementation of sharia-based regulations. In order to attract supporters, therefore, the 
political actors of these Muslim-nationalist parties decide to support the implementation of 
sharia-based regulations, despite the fact that they do not adopt Islam as their ideological 
foundation. 
 Fifthly, in the case of the PBB, the political actors of this party realize that their 
party must proposes a definite agenda which distinguish it from the other Islamic parties. In 
this context they propose the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of 
sharia continuously. Moreover, they also realize that they must maintain the political 
linkage with some leaders and members of the PERSIS as well as with the former 
proponents of the Masyumi Party as the party has a similar ideological stance with the 
PERSIS and the Masyumi Party. In this context, although they tend to move to the ideal-
type of the elite-based party model, the political actors of the PBB still maintain some 
elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the face of their party on the 
ground. 
 A different strategy is adopted by the political actors of the PPP in which they 
develop the mass-based party model when they manage the party organization on the 
ground. They select such a party model for two reasons. The political actors of the PPP 
realize that, different to the other Islamic parties, they have established a party in the 
district since 1973. They also understand that, compared to the other Islamic parties, they 
have a long experience in managing the party organizations on the ground. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, the political actors of this party succeeded in establishing the party 
organization at the village level in the New Order period, despite the fact that they 
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experienced many obstacles from the government and military. Moreover, since activities 
of the party have been embedded in the daily life of the local population, they also realize 
that they have relatively succeeded in developing durable partisan linkages with their 
members and supporters. Such situations suggest that it is likely impossible for the political 
actors of the PPP to establish the party models except the mass-based party model when 
they manage the face of their party on the ground.  
 On the other hand, they select a combination of the elite party and the mass party 
models when they manage the organizational dimension of the party in central office. They 
decide to take this strategy for two reasons. On one hand, they realize that the party 
leadership must take a determinant role in the decision making process inside the party in 
order to manage the party leadership effectively as members and supporters of the party 
have increased from time to time. On the other hand, they realize that they have a strong 
relationship with some Islamic organizations in the district, more specifically the NU. 
Moreover, they realize that the party has a strong political engagement with bureaucracy in 
the district as the district head comes from the party. Therefore, the political actors of the 
PPP realize that they have rich political resources to develop the mass-based party model. 
Consequently, apart from relying on the role of the party elites, the political actors of the 
PPP still maintain some elements of the mass-based party model when they manage the 
face of their party in central office.  
 Regarding the face of their party in public office, the political actors of the PPP tend 
to develop the electoralist model as they consider that similar to Indonesian Muslims in 
general, Muslims in the district are moderate. Further, they understand that Muslims in the 
district agree with the implementation of sharia in general, but they disagree if the meaning 
of sharia includes the harsh Islamic criminal law.
18
 Therefore, it does not make sense for 
them to impose on the implementation of sharia-based regulations that cover the 
implementation of the harsh Islamic criminal law. In addition, the legislators of the PPP 
come from the NU which is known as one of the moderate Islamic organization in 
Indonesia. As Hefner argued, together with the Muhammadiyah, the NU spreads “a culture 
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of tolerance, equality and civility” in Indonesia.19 In this sense, their response to the 
implementation of sharia-based regulations in the district is vague. They also lack ambition 
for hegemony in policy-making despite the fact that the party gained a significant number 
of seats in the legislature. 
 Further, as the patron-client relationship serves as the most prominent political 
mechanism in the local population, one might expect that the political actors of the PKS 
will adopt the ideal type of the elite-based party model. On the other hand, along with the 
modification of the electoral system and a growing political pragmatism among the local 
population, one might expect that they will develop the electoralist party model. While 
these assumptions are not completely wrong since this party contains some elements of the 
elite-based party and electoralist party models, the comprehensive features of the PKS 
indicate that the political actors of this party prefer to develop the mass-based party model 
when they manage the party organizations in the three different faces. 
 The political actors of the PKS decide to develop the mass-based party model at 
least for three reasons. Firstly, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors 
of the PKS realize that they do not have a strong political relationship with the Islamic 
organizations in the district. As explained in the previous chapters, the PKS experiences 
many difficulties in establishing the political relationships with the major Islamic 
organizations in the district. The NU‟s leaders in the district mostly believe that the party 
adopts Wahhabism that is totally different from the ideology of the NU. Meanwhile, the 
Muhammadiyah has been relatively successful in maintaining its neutrality in political 
field. In this context, developing the party machine is a must for the political actors of the 
PKS in gaining as many supporters as possible. 
 Secondly, emerging from an Islamic intellectual movement, the political actors of 
the PKS realize that they have organizational skills to manage the face of their party in 
central office. Accordingly, similar to the political actors of the PAN, the political actors of 
the PKS prefer to apply modern management principles. They also disregard the patron-
client mechanism as not many of them serve as leading Islamic leaders and teachers in the 
district on one hand and as they realize that they do not have a strong relationship with 
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Islamic leaders and teachers in the district on the other hand. Under such constraints and 
incentives, they decide to adopt the mass-based party model when they manage the face of 
their party in central office. 
 Thirdly, similar to their counterparts at the national level,
20
 the political actors of the 
PKS in the district realize that they must develop a positive political image so that the party 
can be distinguished from the legislators from the other Islamic parties. Based on this 
consideration, they supported the implementation of various sharia-based regulations in the 
district. Such an effort is very important in attracting supporters coming from the 
proponents of the implementation of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state. In 
addition, as they put an emphasis on developing a positive political image among the local 
population, they have often been accused of being a hypocrite by the legislators from the 
other Islamic parties. These illustrations suggest that developing the mass-based party in 
the party organization in public office is the best alternative option for the Islamic political 
actors of the PKS in order to attract as many votes as possible.  
 In general, the findings of this study show that the ideological spectrum of Islamic 
parties in Indonesia, as discussed in Chapter 4, has nothing to do with the way the Islamic 
political actors organize their parties. In other words, the ideological foundation of the 
Islamic parties has no correlation with the party models. In this context, one might expect 
that the Muslim-Nationalist parties will adopt the ideal-type of the electoralist party model, 
while the Islamist parties will adopt the ideal type of the mass-based party model. As 
revealed by this study, instead of adopting the ideal-type of the electoralist party model, the 
Muslim-Nationalist parties, more specifically the PAN and PKB tend to adopt the ideal-
type of the mass-based party and the elite-based party models, respectively. Meanwhile, in 
the case of the PKS and PPP, it is true that these Islamist parties tend to adopt the ideal-type 
of the mass-based party model. On the other hand, the case of the PBR and PBB indicates 
that these parties tend to adopt the ideal-type of the elite-based party model. 
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Table 8.2 
Performance of the Islamic Parties  
In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections in the Tasikmalaya District 
 
Islamic 
Parties 
Votes 
1999  
 (%) 
Seats 1999  
(from a total of 45 
seats)
21
 
Votes 
2004  
(%) 
Seats 2004  
(from a total of 45 
seats) 
Votes 
2009  
(%) 
Seats 2009 
(from a total of 50 
seats)  
PAN 5.53 3 4.47 2 7.53 3 
PKB 11.48 5 7.79 5 8.83 5 
PBR - - 3.87 1 0.64 - 
PPP 25.67 11 27.06 12 27.13 14 
PK/PKS 1.36 1 6.4 4 6.89 5 
PBB 4.70 2 3.15 1 1.08 - 
Total 48.74 22 52.74 25 52.1 27 
Source: Modified from Secretariat of the Tasikmalaya District Legislature (1999-2009). 
 The findings of this study also suggest that there is a relatively strong relationship 
between the way the Islamic parties organize and their performance in the 1999, 2004 and 
2009 elections. In other words, the way the Islamic political actors manage their party 
organizations has a consequence for their achievement in these elections. If we explore 
further the relationship between the way the Islamic parties organize and their achievement 
in the district in these elections, as shown in Table 8.2 above, we can see that the Islamic 
parties which tend to adopt the ideal-type of the mass-based party model were able to 
maintain their level of political support in these elections. In contrast, the Islamic parties 
which tend to adopt the ideal-type of the elite-based party model were not able to increase 
or maintain their political attainments in these elections.  
 More specifically, the PKS succeeded in increasing its level of political support 
slightly from 6.4 percent of the votes in the 2004 election to 6.89 percent of the votes in the 
2009 election. Similarly, the PPP succeeded in increasing their level of political support 
slightly from 25.67 percent of the votes in the 1999 election to 27.06 percent of the votes in 
the 2004 election and 27.13 percent of the votes in the 2009 election. After suffering from 
experiencing a significant decline in the 2004 election, the PKS succeeded in increasing its 
level of political support to 7.53 percent of the votes in the 2009 election. Meanwhile, by 
developing the elite-based party, the PKB experienced a significant decline from 11.48 
percent of the votes in the 1999 election to 7.79 percent of the votes in the 2004 election. 
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However, the party was able to increase its levels of support in the 2009 election by gaining 
8.83 percent of the votes. Adopting a similar strategy, the PBR and PBB were not able to 
maintain their level of political support. These parties experienced a continuous decline 
from the 1999 election to the 2009 election. In the 2009 election, these parties even failed 
to pass the required 2.5 percent electoral threshold. In addition, from their performance in 
these elections, we can also see that the level of political support gained by the Muslim-
Nationalist parties is stable. On the other hand, the level of political support obtained by the 
Islamist parties is diverse. In the case of the PPP and PKS, the level of political support has 
increased from one election to another, while in the case of the PBR and PBB, the level of 
political support has constantly decreased.  
It is also important to mention that the case of the Islamic parties in the Tasikmalaya 
district suggests that only the Islamist parties which made a significant effort to create and 
maintain the political linkage with their members and supporters, such as in the case of the 
PPP, PKS and PAN, were able to increase their level of political support. Relying only on 
the dominant role of the party elites as well as on the ideology and platforms of the party, 
such as in the case of the PBR, PBB and PKB, therefore, is not enough to attract voters and, 
in turn, to win elections. Moreover, compared to the other Islamic parties, the way the PKS 
and PPP manage the organizational dimension of these parties on the ground indicates that 
these parties play a significant role in the Islamisation of the local population. In doing so, 
they utilize religious events in the local population. They also generate social activities in 
which some of them have been embedded in daily activities of the local population. These 
illustrations also indicate that there is a significant relationship between the degree of the 
Islamisation of the society and the level of electoral success. 
From the discussion in the previous chapters, therefore, we can see that the Islamic 
political actors in the Tasikmalaya district follow rational calculation rather than 
ideological considerations when they manage their parties. As revealed in this study, the 
Islamic political actors have a set of alternative strategies when they organize their parties 
in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. In this context, they can develop 
the ideal-type of the elite-based party, mass-based party, electoralist party, or cartel party 
models. By taking into account the informal mechanism, public trust in party politics, party 
identification, religiousness of the local population, internal factors and the modification of 
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the electoral system, these actors select a definite party model. More specifically, the 
political actors of the PAN, PPP and PKS tend to develop the mass-based party model, 
while their counterparts in the PKB, PBR and PBB tend to select the elite-based party 
model.  
It is also important to note that despite the fact that these parties select different 
strategies, these strategies in fact are similar in nature, i.e., they are not only efficient in 
terms of political cost, but they are also effective in gaining as many votes as possible. As 
Tan points out: 
As rational actors, Indonesia‟s political operators have perpetually used the least 
costly means available to reach their political goals… Party leaders today, in an 
environment of high uncertainty and high stakes, have sought to take the least costly 
path to power.
22
 
 
The applications of such calculations by these Islamic political actors indicate they rely 
more on rational dimensions as well as pragmatic aspects than on irrational or ideological 
considerations when they organize their Islamic parties in order to maximize their chance 
of winning elections.
23
 
   
3. Theoretical and Practical Reflections 
From a theoretical point of view, the findings of this study suggest that the organizational 
features of the Islamic parties in Indonesia are not completely exceptional and unique 
compared to the organizational features of party politics in other developing countries. The 
relationship between these parties and their members is weak or absent.
24
 As elaborated in 
the previous chapters, most of the Islamic parties disregard a formal membership as well as 
membership fees. Fourthly, similar to party organization in Southeast Asian,
25
 Latin 
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America,
26
 and African countries,
27
 these Islamic parties are associated with certain Islamic 
groups so that they are ethnically-based organizations.
28
  
Secondly, they tend to be dominated by a single leader so that they are often viewed 
simply as ephemeral vehicles for personal ambition of their charismatic leaders. As 
revealed in this study, in managing the party organization in central office, most of the 
Islamic parties rely on the role of their charismatic leaders, including for their primary 
financial sources.
29
 In creating and maintaining the political linkage with their members 
and supporters, most of them also rely on informal mechanisms, such as patron-client 
mechanism, interpersonal relationship and family networks because of the absence of a 
redistributive welfare state.
30
 
Regarding the organizational features of the Islamic parties in public office, the 
legislators from the Islamic parties are rarely in a position to offer ideologies and platforms 
when they are involved in making policies. As a result, the pattern of conflicts or 
collaborations among the legislators from these parties and between the legislators from 
these parties and legislators from the secular-nationalist parties remains ambiguous. In 
addition, the PPP as the winning party has a strong engagement with the state.
31
 Moreover, 
the ideologies and platforms of these Islamic parties are eclectic and vague so that they also 
lack coherent policy. Compared to the Philippine and Thailand, however, party 
organization as well as party system in Indonesia are better institutionalized.
32
 
Based on the experience of parties in Southern and East-Central Europe, van Biezen 
argues that there are three scenarios regarding the organizational development of parties in 
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new democracies.
33
 Firstly, parties in these countries follow the trajectory of parties in 
Western European countries (the life-cycle effect), ranging from the stage of the elite-based 
party, the stage of the mass-based party, the stage of the electoralist party to the stage of the 
cartel party. Secondly, they resemble the organizational development of parties in 
contemporary Western European countries, namely the electoralist party or the cartel party, 
rather than those in early democratized Europe (the period-effect). In this sense, by taking a 
„shortcut‟34 or a „bypass‟ 35 or an „evolutionary leap‟36 towards a more contemporary 
organization, they miss out on the earlier stages of party development, namely the elite-
based party and the mass-based party. Thirdly, they establish entirely new types of party 
organization without having a relationship with the organizational development of parties 
in Western European countries (the generation-effect).  
 It should be acknowledged that except the PPP which was established in 1973 
during the New Order period, these Islamic parties were established in 1998. In the case of 
the PBR, this party was founded in 2002. Considering their initial establishment in which 
the role of charismatic party leaders was very important, we can see that these parties in 
fact were close to the ideal-type of the elite-based party model. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that members and supporters of these parties do not play a significant role 
in developing these parties. Because of a political euphoria after more than three decades of 
living under the New Order authoritarian regime, members and supporters of the Islamic 
parties were very enthusiastic to participate actively in these parties. Such a situation 
occurred until the implementation of the 1999 election.  During the implementation of 
the 1999 election, therefore, the organizational features of these parties contained some 
elements of the elite-based party model and, to a lesser degree, some elements of the mass-
based party model.  
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 After the implementation of the 1999 election, however, the organizational 
development of these parties takes different trajectories. In the case of the PAN and PPP, it 
is likely that these parties are in a transitional stage from the mass-based party model to the 
electoralist party model. In the case of the PAN and PPP, therefore, the organizational 
development of these parties tends to take the second stage. Meanwhile, the organizational 
development of the PKS suggests that this party is experiencing a maturation process of the 
mass-based party model. Moreover, the organizational development of the PKB, PBR and 
PBB shows that these parties are experiencing a stagnation process in the stage of the elite-
based party. 
 Moreover, the findings of this study also suggest that, to a limited extent, the 
Islamist parties are experiencing a moderation process. In party literature, the moderation 
theory argues that the integration of Islamist parties within the political system has led 
these parties to trade off their ideology and platforms for electoral viability and political 
legality. In this sense, according to Tezcür, Islamist political actors have become moderates 
as they have a strategic interest to win elections.
37
 Sinno and Khanani also point out that 
Islamist parties become moderate when a democratic regime implements democratic 
election in a country. On the other hand, they become more radical when a (semi) 
authoritarian regime is in power in a country. Moreover, they also argue that for Islamist 
parties in a democratic country, supporting a democratic regime is more beneficial in the 
long term.
38
 
As revealed in this study, the Islamist parties in the district still rely on Islamic 
ideology, symbols, principles and values when they create and maintain the political 
linkage with their members and supporters and when they manage their organizations in 
central office. Even for the secular-nationalist parties, the role of Islam is very important in 
creating and maintaining the political linkage with members or supporters of these parties 
as the local population has a strong Islamic sentiment. In organizing the organizational 
dimension of the party on the ground and in central office, therefore, the Islamist parties 
rely heavily on the role of Islamic tenets, norms and symbols. In this context, they way 
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these parties manage the party organization on the ground and the party organization in 
central office has led to the long term Islamisation of society. 
However, the political actors of these parties lack significant effort to transform the 
ideology and platforms of their parties into public policies. Considering many constraints, 
the political actors of these parties disregard Islamic ideology and agendas when they are 
involved in the policy-making processes. In this context, the way these parties organize the 
party organization in public office does not have an implication on the Islamisation of the 
state.
39
 As mentioned by a legislator from the PBB, Muhammad Noer: 
Different to the Darul Islam movement or the Islamic State of Indonesia in the 
1950s, our party will establish sharia in the district in particular and in Indonesia in 
general constitutionally. Our party is also concerned with the preparation of the 
implementation of sharia. Therefore, our party attempts to develop a strong 
foundation for the people before the implementation of sharia comprehensively. In 
this context, our party proposes sharia step by step or in gradual manners.
40  
 
Similarly, a legislator from the PKS, Asep Hidayat points out:  
Islam covers every aspect of mankind. Accordingly, our party understands Islam, 
including sharia in the general sense. To transform the ideology and platforms of the 
party, we attempts to propose public policies in order to produce the common good. 
Therefore, we are concerned with democratic issues, such as proposing anti-
corruption policies and introducing pro-poor budgets rather than on the issue of the 
establishment of Islamic legal punishment, such as implementing hand amputation 
for thieves and executing the stoning of adulterers.
41
 
 
Moreover, a cultural observer in the district, Acep Zamzam Noer, emphasizes: 
There is no empirical evidence for the statement that the Islamist parties propose 
sharia-based regulations concerning on the improvement of social welfare. Since the 
implementation of the 1999 election, these parties have been concerning with 
symbols of Islam rather than with the substance of Islam, such as welfare and 
justice. They have also been relying on personal interests of party leaders rather than 
interests of the local population. As a consequence, it is very difficult to distinguish 
the Islamist parties with the secular-nationalist parties.
42
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In addition, many studies have come to the conclusion that the PKS changed their 
political stance to become more moderate prior to the implementation of the 2004 election. 
As a result, this party succeeded in increasing its level of political support in the 2004 and 
2009 elections.
43
 To a lesser degree, as the most Islamist parties in Indonesia, the PBB also 
diminished their radical political stance. However, this party was not able to maintain its 
level of political support in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The case of these two Islamist 
parties indicates that there is a significant correlation between the degree of moderation on 
one hand, and the level of electoral success on the other hand. 
These illustrations suggest that the moderation process of the Islamist parties takes 
place only in the organizational dimension of these parties in public office. On the other 
hand, because Islam serves as the primary instrument for these parties in creating and 
maintaining the political linkage with their members or supporters, the moderation process 
does not occur in the organizational dimension of these parties on the ground and in central 
office.
44
 The way the Islamist parties organize, therefore, provides a significant contribution 
to the Islamisation of society, but not necessarily the Islamisation of the state. In addition, 
this argument is in accordance with Hilmy‟s argument when he analyses the PKS: 
Although they have successfully reconciled democracy and Islam in an electoral 
sense by participating in general elections, the extent to which they subscribe to 
democracy in a more substantive sense remains questionable. It is doubtful that PKS 
activists would advocate democratic values such as civic liberties – freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech, equality, and the like. Rather, it seems as if tolerance 
and pluralism are the only two democratic values that PKS activists uphold, but even 
those values are mainly adhered to externally and not internally. Internally, in fact, 
PKS activists must adhere to a rather stringent internal code of behavior that would 
appear to contradict some basic principles of democracy.
45 
 
However, it is important to underline that, as revealed in the Chapter 7, the moderation 
process of the Islamist parties in public office takes place because of strategic calculations 
rather than substantial changes of their political attitude. In this sense, the Islamist parties 
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still become a major political force in Indonesia in realizing the Islamisation of the state in 
the future.  
In addition, the moderation process of the Islamist parties has its own dilemma. On 
one hand, the process indicates that these parties provide a significant contribution to 
democratization in Indonesia as they accept democracy as the main rule of the political 
process. On the other hand, the process also means that these parties become more 
pragmatic in proposing public policies. Therefore, similar to the legislators from the 
Muslim-Nationalist parties and legislators from the secular-nationalist parties,
46
 the 
legislators from the Islamist parties also tend to hijack democracy at the regional level by 
utilizing Islam to propose personal interests of party leaders. Such a situation is exacerbated 
by the implementation of the new electoral system that has facilitated the emergence of the 
patron-client relationship and a new feudalism in local politics.
47
 
Further, the role of party politics in the process of transition to democracy is very 
important. As Randal and Svåsand argue, in terms of the party organization on the ground, 
parties have two important functions, namely representation (expressing people‟s demands 
and simplifying as well as structuring electoral choice) and integration (integrating voters 
into political system and conducting political education). Regarding the party organization 
in central office, parties have two ideal functions, i.e., aggregating interests and recruiting 
as well as training political leaders. Meanwhile, with regard to the party organization in 
public office, parties play a significant role in making government accountable and 
organizing opposition and dissent.
48
  
As revealed in this study, the way the Islamic political actors organize the Islamic 
parties at the local level indicates that these parties have failed to implement such ideal 
functions. Not surprisingly, according to the AsianBarometer surveys, compared to other 
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political institutions, party politics has the lowest trust level among the Indonesian people.
49
 
In this sense, the way Islamic parties organize may jeopardize the consolidation of 
democracy as well as the implementation of the decentralized system regarding the central 
and regional government relationship in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
More specifically, the way the Islamic political actors organize the organizational 
face of the Islamic parties on the ground shows that they have failed to conduct political 
education to their members and supporters. Compared to the other Islamic parties, the PKS 
is the only party politics which is able to create and maintain the political linkage with its 
members or supporter regularly, including in implementing caderization program. 
Moreover, similar to Islamic parties in other Muslim countries,
50
 all of these parties still 
rely on Islamic symbols, principles and norms when they attempt to create and manage the 
political linkage with their members or supporters. Experiencing various constraints, these 
parties utilize these symbols, principles and norms as the easiest way to create and maintain 
the political linkage with their members and supporters. For these parties, therefore, instead 
of being as a political agenda to improve the social welfare among the local population, 
Islam serves only as a political instrument to attract voters and, in turn, to win elections. 
Meanwhile, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of 
the Islamic parties in central office illustrates that, except the PKS and to a lesser degree the 
PPP, they have failed to implement their functions in recruiting political leadership and in 
training political elites. In this sense, these parties have experienced the personalization of 
party leadership in particular and the personalization of party organization in general. With 
limited organizational skill and supporting infrastructures, they have also failed to articulate 
and aggregate interests of their members and supporters. Such a situation is exacerbated by 
the fact that the local population prefers to articulate their interests directly to the legislators 
from the Islamic parties rather than to these parties as a political institution. In addition, the 
PKS and PPP have relatively succeeded in implementing party institutionalization. Without 
a substantial effort to moderate their ideology and platforms, however, the 
                                                          
49
 Matthew Carlson and Turner, “Popular Perceptions of Political Regimes in East and Southeast Asia,” 
Democratization, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 377-398. 
50
 See, for example, Ann-Kristin Jonasson, At the Command of God? On the Political Linkage of Islamist 
Parties; M.A. Mohamed Salih (ed.). Interpreting Islamic Political Parties. 
271 
 
institutionalization process inside these parties also means the institutionalization of the 
radical political Islam as well. 
Further, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of the 
Islamic parties in public office indicates that these parties have failed to transform their 
ideologies and platforms into public policies. On one hand, the Muslim-Nationalist parties 
support the implementation of several sharia-based regulations in the district. On the other 
hand, the Islamist parties do not push further their platforms into the implementation of 
sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state. In gaining as many votes as possible, 
therefore, these parties experience what Downs called as the spatial model of party 
competition
51
 in which they attempt to gain more votes by moving toward the center of 
party competition as the Indonesian Muslims are moderate in their behavior and attitude. 
Moreover, the way the Islamic political actors manage the organizational face of the 
Islamic parties in public office also suggests that these parties do not make effort to make 
government accountable. As a result, similar to the role of the regional legislature during 
the New Order period, the role of the regional is limited only as a rubber-stamp for public 
policies made by executive branch of government in particular and by the central 
government in general. 
As the role of political parties is very important in a democratic system, the 
consolidation of democracy in Indonesia will be determined by how the Islamic parties at 
the regional level organize. Similarly, the success of the decentralized system will also be 
influenced by how the Islamic parties at the regional level implement their functions 
ideally. In order to provide a significant contribution to the democratization and 
decentralization, these parties must develop their organization properly so that they will be 
able to implement their functions appropriately. In this context, an Islamic party that adopts 
the ideal-type of the mass-based party model and, at the same time, proposes moderate 
ideology and platforms, is likely needed for the democratic consolidation as well as for the 
success of the decentralization process. To be sure, many things are urgently needed to 
develop such an Islamic party not only in local politics, but also in the national political 
stage in democratizing Indonesia. 
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Appendix 1. List of Respondents 
 
Bureaucracy  
1. Tatang Farhanul Hakim (Head of the Tasikmalaya District, Former head of executive 
council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and Secretary of DPW in West Java Province) 
2. Asep Achmad Djaelani (Secretary of the Tasikmalaya District) 
 
Institutions of Election 
1. Dadan Bardan (Staff of the General Election Commission of the Tasikmalaya District) 
2. Bambang (Head of Election Supervisory Board) 
 
Islamic Parties 
PAN: 
1. Ade Komaruddin (Executive council of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District)  
2. Yono Haryono (Secretary of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District) 
3. Demi Hamzah Rahadian (Legislator) 
4. Deden Marno (Former official of Area in Manonjaya Village and official of DPD in the 
Tasikmalaya District) 
5. Dede Komaruddin (Former official of DPRt in Sukaresik Village) 
6. Yane Sriwigantini (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election and official of 
DPC in Sukaraja Sub-District) 
7. Ratna Dewi (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election) 
8. Viva Yoga Mauladi (Deputy Secretary General of DPP in Jakarta) 
 
PKB: 
1. Endang Hidayat (Head of Majelis Syuro of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District) 
2. Acep Adang Ruchyat (Head of Dewan Tanfidz of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and 
Manager of the Cipasung Islamic boarding school) 
3. Abdul Haziz Affandy (Vice head of Majelis Syuro of DPW in West Java Province and 
Vice Manager of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school) 
4. Ujang (Administrator of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District) 
5. Syamsudin (Legislator)  
6. Haris Sanjaya (Legislator) 
7. Husen Zaenal Ali (Official of DPRt in Cibubur Village) 
8. Cecep Abdul Qoyum (Official of PAC in Singaparna Sub-District, Chairman of Garda 
Bangsa in the Tasikmalaya District and Treasury of Anshor in the Tasikmalaya District) 
9. Emen (Former official of DPRt in Cintaraja Village) 
10. Sahid (Former official of DPRt in Cintaraja and Cipakat Villages) 
11. Euis Hasanah (Chairman of Muslimat in the Tasikmalaya District and candidate of the 
local legislature in the 2009 election) 
12. Muhaimin Iskandar (Head of Dewan Tanfidz of DPP in Jakarta) 
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PBR: 
1. Dede Saeful Anwar (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District, legislator and 
legislative candidate in the 2009 election) 
2. Syarif Hidayat (Deputy Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District) 
3. Azis Abdul Karim (Official of PIRANTI in Singkir Village) 
4. Jaja Jamaluddin (Former official of PAC in Cikalong Sub-District) 
5. Iron Saroni (Candidates of the local legislature in the 2009 election) 
6. Nandang Harun (Official of DPW in West Java Province) 
7. Yusuf Lakaseng (Deputy Secretary General of DPP in Jakarta) 
 
PPP: 
1. Ruhimat (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District)  
2. Iqbal (Official of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of the provincial 
legislature in the 2009 election) 
3. Apip Ifan Permadi (Legislator) 
4. Empep Suryadi (Official of PAC in Rajapolah Sub-District and legislative candidate in the 
2009 election) 
5. Gopur (Former official of Branch in Tanjungjaya Village and candidate of the local 
legislature in the 2009 election) 
6. Eko Hadi Praja (Official of Branch in Manggungsari Village) 
7. Neng Madinah Ruchyat (Candidates of legislator in the provincial legislature in the 2009 
election, legislator and official of DPC) 
8. Asep A. Maoshul Affandy (Candidates of legislator in the national legislature in the 2009 
election) 
9. Choizin Chumaidi (Deputy Chairman of DPP in Jakarta)  
 
PKS: 
1. Yuda Cahyadi (Executive Council of DPD in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of 
the local legislature in the 2009 election) 
2. Asep Hidayat (Legislator) 
3. Dadi Supriadi (Legislator) 
4. Iwan (Official of DPRa in Singasari Village) 
5. Ade Suherman (Official of DPP in Jakarta) 
 
PBB: 
1. Momon Abdurrahman (Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District) 
2. Siddiq Anggaperbata (Vice Executive Council of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District) 
3. Saeful Azis (Secretary of DPC in the Tasikmalaya District and candidates of the local 
legislature in the 2009 election) 
4. Muhammad Noer (Legislator) 
5. Syamsudin (Official of DPRt in Sukamenah Village) 
6. Iyuk Luqman (Official of DPRt in Sukaratu Village) 
7. Ulih Muslihudin (Candidate of the local legislature in the 2009 election) 
8. Sahar L. Hasan (General Secretary of DPP in Jakarta) 
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Secular-Nationalist Parties 
1. Eman Sulaeman (Chairman of Golkar Party in the Tasikmalaya District) 
2. Ade Sugianto (Chairman of PDI-P in the Tasikmalaya District) 
 
Islamic organizations 
1. Muttaqien (Vice-chairman of NU in the Tasikmalaya District) 
2. Dadang Sholihat (Chairman of PERSIS in the Tasikmalaya District) 
3. Iip Syamsul Arief (Chairman of Muhammadiyah in the Tasikmalaya District and 
Legislator) 
 
Others: 
1. Ii Abdul Rasyid Wahab (Manager of Sukahideung Islamic boarding school) 
2. Acep Zamzam Noer (Cultural Observer) 
3. Subhan (Academic) 
4. Dudy (Journalist) 
5. Dadi Abdul Hadi (Tasikmalaya Corruption Watch) 
6. Roni Romansya (Student) 
7. Anonymous (Thug) 
8. Anonymous (Police) 
9. Anonymous (Ordinary people) 
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Appendix 2. Interview Guides 
 
1. Interview with officials of the party on the ground 
Interviewee‟s name and position: 
Date: 
 Can I use a tape-recorder? 
 In general, I am interested in the relationship between the Islamic parties and their 
electorates. 
 The profile of the officials of the party on the ground: 
- How is the recruitment process of the officials of the party on the ground? 
- How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of the officials of the 
party on the ground? 
- What kinds of duties and obligations do the officials of the party have on the ground? 
- Why are the officials of the party on the ground interested in organizing the party on 
the ground? 
- How do officials of the party on the ground manage the party on the ground?  
- Why do officials of the party on the ground manage the party on the ground the way 
they do? 
- What is the ideal type of official of the party on the ground? 
 Effort and instruments to create and maintain political linkage:  
- What is the main consideration of the officials of the party on the ground when they 
organize the party on the ground? 
- What is the main instrument to create and maintain political linkage? Clientelism? 
Ideology? Religion? Programs of the government? 
- What kinds of activities do the Islamic parties on the ground undertake to create and 
maintain political linkage during and beyond election periods? 
- How often do the Islamic parties conduct political and social activities? 
- Who is the main electorate of the Islamic parties?  
- Why do the Islamic parties on the ground focus on everybody or on specific groups? 
- How is the relationship between the Islamic parties and other Islamic organizations? 
- What ideal role should the party on the ground play in creating and maintaining 
political linkage? 
 Strategy and technique in election campaigns: 
- What kinds of strategies are used by the Islamic parties in campaigns? 
- Why do the Islamic parties choose certain strategies?  
- What kinds of techniques are used by the Islamic parties in campaigns? 
- Why do the Islamic parties choose certain techniques? 
 Formal membership and background of members: 
- How important are members for the Islamic parties? 
- Is there any formal membership inside the Islamic parties? 
- Why do (not) the Islamic parties have a formal membership?  
- How are the religious, educational and economic profiles of the Islamic parties‟ 
members?  
- How is the recruitment process of members? 
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- What kinds of duties and obligations do members have? 
- Do the members provide a membership fee? Why do (not) the members provide a 
membership fee? 
- Is there any opportunity for the members to communicate with officials of the party on 
the ground? 
 The relationship with the organization of the party in central office and in public office: 
- How is the relationship between officials of the party on the ground and officials of the 
party in central office?  
- How is the relationship between officials of the party on the ground and legislators? 
- Is there any regular forum through which officials of the party on the ground meet with 
officials of the party in central office and legislators? 
- What kinds of intra-channel communication do the officials of the party on the ground 
have? 
- How often do officials of the party on the ground communicate with officials of the 
party in central office and legislators? 
- How is point of view among officials of the party in the central office and members of 
legislators on existence and roles of the party on the ground? 
 Thank you! 
 
2. Interview with officials of the party in central office 
Interviewee‟s name and position: 
Date: 
 Can I use a tape-recorder? 
 In general, I am interested in how the Islamic parties organize. 
 The profile of officials of the party in the central office; 
- How is the recruitment process of officials of the party in the central office? 
- How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of officials of the 
party in the central office? 
- What kinds of duties and obligations do officials of the party in the central office have? 
- Why are officials of the party in the central office interested in organizing the party on 
the ground? 
- What is the ideal type of official of the party in the central office? 
 The party in central office: 
- What is the main consideration of officials of the party in the central office when they 
manage the central office? Votes? Ideology? A position in public office? 
- How do officials of the party in the central office manage the central office?  
- Why do officials of the party in the central office manage the central office the way 
they do? 
- How is the decision-making process in the party in the central office made? 
- Who is involved in the decision-making process in the party in the central office? 
- How far can the members participate in the decision-making process in the party in the 
central office? 
- What kind of activities do official of the party in the central office conduct during and 
beyond election periods? 
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- What ideal role should the party in the central office play? 
 Party finances: 
- What kinds of financial resources do the Islamic parties have? 
- What kinds of expenses do the Islamic parties have? 
- How do the officials of the party in the central office manage the party finances? 
- Who is in charge of the management of party finances? 
 The relationship with the organization of the party on the ground and in public office: 
- How is the relationship between officials of the party in central office and the party on 
the ground?  
- How is the relationship between officials of the party in the central office and 
legislators? 
- Is there any regular forum to meet officials of the party in the central office, officials of 
the party on the ground and legislators? 
- What kinds of intra-channel communication do the officials of the party in the central 
office have? 
- How often do officials of the party in the central office communicate with officials of 
the party on the ground and legislators? 
- How is the point of view among officials of the party on the ground and legislators on 
existence and roles of the party in the central office? 
 Thank you! 
 
3. Interview with officials of the party in central office 
Interviewee‟s name and position: 
Date: 
 Can I use a tape-recorder? 
 In general, I am interested in the role of the Islamic parties in policy making. 
 The profile of the legislators from the Islamic parties: 
- How is the recruitment process of legislators? 
- How is the candidacy process of legislators? 
- How are the religious, educational and economical backgrounds of legislators? 
- What kinds of duties and obligations do legislators have? 
- Why are legislators interested in representing the Islamic parties? 
- Who is represented by legislators? 
- What is the ideal type of legislator? 
 The role of the legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy making: 
- How is the sharia-based policy-making processes made? 
- How is the local budget policy-making processes made? 
- What kinds of considerations do legislators have in making policies?  
- How far can the electorates be involved in the policy making? 
- How do legislators defend the ideology and programs of the Islamic parties in public 
policy making? 
- Why do (not) legislators defend the ideology and programs of the Islamic parties in 
public policy making? 
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- Is there any support from the party on the ground and the party in the central office for 
legislators in public policy making? 
- What kinds of support do the party on the ground and the party in the central office 
provide for legislators in public policy making? 
- Is there any support from the government for legislators in public policy making? 
- What kinds of support does the government provide for legislators in public policy 
making? 
 The relationship with the organization of the party on the ground and in central office: 
- How is the relationship between legislators and officials of the party on the ground and 
the party in the central office?  
- Is there any regular forum by which legislators and officials of the party on the ground 
and the party in the central office meet? 
- What kinds of intra-channel communication do legislators have? 
- How often do legislators communicate with officials of the party on the ground and the 
party in the central office? 
- How is the point of view among officials of the party on the ground and party in the 
central office on the existence and roles of legislators? 
 The relationship between the legislators from the Islamic parties with legislators from 
other parties: 
- How is the relationship among legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy 
making (conflict or collaboration)?  
- How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the secular-
nationalist parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)? 
- How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the 
government in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)?  
 Thank you! 
 
4. Interview with Outside Observers 
Interviewee‟s name and position: 
Date: 
 Can I use a tape-recorder? 
 In general, I am interested in the organization of the Islamic parties. 
 The organization of the Islamic parties on the ground 
- How do the Islamic parties create and maintain political linkage with electorates during 
election periods? In similar ways? In different ways? 
- How do the Islamic parties create and maintain political linkage with electorates 
beyond election periods? In similar ways? In different ways? 
- What kinds of channels do the Islamic parties employ to establish political linkage 
with their electorates? In similar ways? In different ways? 
- What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in organizing their party on the ground? 
Votes? Seats? Policy? 
 The organization of the Islamic parties in central office 
- How do the Islamic parties organize the central office? 
- What kinds of principles do the Islamic parties use in managing the central office? 
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- How is the main feature of the decision-making process in the central office? 
- How far are the electorates involved in the decision-making process in the central 
office? 
- How do the Islamic parties manage party finances? 
- What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in organizing the central office? Votes? 
Seats? Policy? 
 The organization of the Islamic parties in public office 
- What is the type of representation among legislators from the Islamic parties (trustee, 
delegate, entrepreneur, agent of the government)?  
- How is the relationship among legislators from the Islamic parties in public policy 
making (conflict or collaboration)?  
- How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the secular-
nationalist parties in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)? 
- How is the relationship between legislators from the Islamic parties and the 
government in public policy making (conflict or collaboration)? 
- How far can the electorates of the Islamic parties be involved in public policy making? 
- What is the ultimate goal of the Islamic parties in public policy making (votes, seats, 
policy)? 
 Thank you! 
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